


# Book reviews



**Liu Xiaobo,**  
**La philosophie du porc et autres**  
**essais (The Philosophy of the Pig**  
**and Other Essays),**

translated from the Chinese, texts  
 selected and presented by  
 Jean-Philippe Béja, preface by Vaclav  
 Havel, Paris, Gallimard, 2011, 518 pp.

## LUCIEN BIANCO

It was an inspired choice by the Nobel Committee: Liu Xiaobo is China's Solzhenitsyn. Three leitmotifs expressed or implied in his *The Philosophy of the Pig* are similar to Solzhenitsyn's: falsehood, memory, and morality. Solzhenitsyn: "It is difficult to imagine the extent to which deceit has distanced us from being a normal society." Liu: "In post-totalitarian China (meaning one no longer under Mao-era terror), the system has no resource other than deceit to ensure its survival" (p. 139). The conclusion is inescapable: "If everyone rejects falsehood [...], the regime built on falsehood will fall apart" (p. 33 of Béja's brilliant introduction). It is certainly so for someone of Liu's stature. Some intellectuals tackling such moral questions prefer a less restrictive casuistry, such as that set out by Professor Qian Liqun: 1) speak the truth; 2) if that is impossible, keep mum; 3) if silence is likewise impossible, rely on falsehoods that do not hurt others (p. 179). Liu rejects this third line of defence with admirable patience: he is as forceful as but less mocking than Pascal in *Lettres Provinciales*.

Liu does not willingly stay silent, either. He backs the Tiananmen Mothers led by Ding Zilin but does not stop at those killed on 4 June 1989: without memory, which has been banned by a Party that has imposed amnesia, "we would be ignorant of the many catastrophes [...] it created" (p. 128). "More than half a century of these catastrophes [...] have been erased from our national memory and replaced with the false history of the Party's glory" (p. 131). In Liu's view, "Lack of memory is for a nation a form of spiritual suicide": "without memory, [...] there is no future" (pp. 133 and 127). It is impossible not to evoke Solzhenitsyn, who played the part of historian in the first part of *Gulag Archipelago*. Liu takes care to remind the reader of this: "So far, we have not had a [Chinese] *Gulag Archipelago* that could show our real face to the whole world as well as to ourselves" (p. 131).

After falsehood and memory, the third theme is morality. While it is not Liu's style to preach or to invoke morality, it is present throughout this book, as in Solzhenitsyn's, who inveighs with indignation, disrobes the calculations of careerists, and derides their well-meaning talk (*Cancer Ward*). For Liu, the horror lies in the "pigsty existence, with food but no freedom" (p. 299): "The promise of 'relative comfort' has well and truly bought souls"; "the mediocre primacy of interests has penetrated us to the bones and the line between

right and wrong has been blurred by communal greed" (p. 147). The most avaricious flatter and support the authorities so as "to get some pieces of the cake privatised by the oligarchs" (p. 120). Liu, however, is less severe towards this "dominant social class" of the affluent dependent on the powers that be (there will always be arrivistes and profiteers) than he is towards its intellectual counterpart. He fulminates against their spinelessness and against the contradiction between their private and public utterances as well as between speech and action – or lack thereof. Since terror ended with Mao, Liu can conceive of no motive other than greed for "willing submission" on the part of "famous people claiming to be elites" (p. 140). It is a safe bet that it wasn't only friends he made on the way to being persecuted by the authorities! While leading thinkers are his preferred targets, he does not spare the post-June 4<sup>th</sup> generation either, deeming them "pragmatists and opportunists" (p. 308), nor students for their cynical patriotism: They "most naturally insult the United States and equally naturally leave to study there" (p. 312). He also targets the "slavish mentality" of the all too holy masses with their "ignorance, cowardice, and blindness" (pp. 423 and 420).

After all this, the reader might well conclude that Liu is given to tirades against the whole world! Quite the contrary: he is even less indulgent towards himself than towards others, occasionally accusing himself of cowardice for having been silent for too long in his view, or for not having done enough. He is careful not to demand that everyone "become a sage, saint, or martyr" (p. 198). He would be content with a "liberal morality *a minima*" (*ibid.*), a discreet and modest morality founded "on a relatively balanced assessment of interests in tune with human nature" (p. 202). A morality radically different from Mao's intolerance and grandiloquence. If everyone abided by the elementary decency required by this "liberal morality," which in his view is opposed to totalitarian infallibility, it would be possible to see the back of a regime based on falsehood.

Such beatific optimism risks being mocked: as if a regime could be brought down by refusing to lie! Has there been such a simpleton since Prince Myshkin? <sup>(1)</sup> It is necessary to clarify the impression given earlier: this man with the obsessive dream, nay design, to rid his compatriots and the world at large of a regime he deems nefarious has none of the attributes of a classic revolutionary. He stands for non-violent struggle; "A limited violent resistance can always be repressed and a violent revolution could well lead to a new tyranny" (pp. 140-141). He acknowledges that limits to the number of terms at the helm (of Jiang Zemin, and now Hu Jintao) lend some flexibility to the despotic regime (p. 341) and that it remains entrenched because the people at large are for now content with the deal, "slaves, get rich." In the end, post-totalitarianism inevitably follows totalitarianism, the regime is "much weaker than in the Mao era" (p. 326), no one has faith in its ideology, the robber baron capitalism it presides over has enraged a society that is less myopic now (pp. 428 and 439), more inclined to protest, and more able to express itself, if only via the Internet, "God's greatest gift to Chinese people so that they could defend their rights" (p. 474). Further,

1. Hero of Dostoyevsky's *The Idiot*.

he says, "The cost of defending the *ancien régime* [what Liu calls those now in power, taking on revolutionary vocabulary while rejecting such methods] is rising ever higher" (p. 301). In the final analysis, Liu prefers modest and gradual victories that chip away at the regime bit by bit, revealing its true nature: he suggests nothing more than "developing societal forces favourable to freedom and democracy" so as to "compel the authorities to evolve through gradual social change" (pp. 301-302). This is the plan of the criminal condemned to 11 years in jail, not counting previous punishments. Of course, Charter 2008 demands more, but surely no more than the application of rights enshrined in the constitution of the so-called People's Republic.

If Liu's political tools resemble Solzhenitsyn's, the two part company on the issue of nationalism. Here again is a trait that inspires admiration for Liu: quite clearly he does not spare his own country. He praises Lu Xun for having revealed like no one else has "the defects in China's national character" (p. 63). He speaks of a "cynicism with Chinese characteristics" (p. 117) as if it is self-evident, and regrets that "Chinese society's nationalist zeal surpasses that of the authorities" (p. 310). Plainly unmoved by China's revered sages, Liu accuses them of "fostering two-faced cynics" (p. 200) and detects a link between the untenable (and therefore hypocritical) morality they advocate and that of Mao, "the greatest representative of this line of two-faced personalities" (p. 201). His famous criticism of post-Maoist literature, which from the outset scandalised the literary establishment, was largely inspired by the extra-literary aspirations of a mind devoid of any "patriotic" prejudices. Listing the "pitiable, lamentable, detestable, and abominable national failings" as exposed by Lu Xun in the Chinese conscience (p. 72), Liu makes sure not to omit reverential attachment to tradition, which blocks and even inhibits all capacity for change. In 1986, Liu conveyed to a chorus of critics (most given to singing praises of the "new literature" born of the post-Maoist thaw) his conviction that "new literature merely repeats all that is wrong in old literature" (p. 65) (pre-May Fourth Movement), and that under the "searching for roots" banner, it pursues "a dangerous and reactionary harking back to traditionalism" (introduction, p. 16).<sup>(2)</sup> In 2003, when everyone sounded ecstatic over the speedy modernisation of China's economy and society, Liu persisted in deploring that "after a century of efforts, China had really failed to modernise" (p. 245). An as yet unknown Liu complained in 1986: "I believe new literature has produced nothing to be proud of" (p. 86). No wonder that this whippersnapper who was so innocently outspoken was initially regarded as a "black horse"!

There is nothing original in the ideas and values Liu upholds, nothing but the commonplace. He is least bothered about making an original contribution to political science or philosophy. And he is not fussy or niggling like scholars who might be inclined to juxtapose the "ethics of absolute ends" (ethics of conviction) that underlies his actions and the "ethics of responsibility" (Max Weber) represented by, among others, the main author of the June 4<sup>th</sup> massacre.<sup>(3)</sup> Liu is not a research scholar but is concerned about what really matters. He launches frontal attacks on problems that haunt him, tracing grand perspectives and eschewing flourishes, hurrying to combat other injustices and denounce other base acts.<sup>(4)</sup> A brave and sincere person who returned from the United States in May 1989 to take part in the pro-democracy movement, the defects of which he was quick to attack given his incorrigible honesty, he pleaded with students to vacate Tiananmen Square before the army advanced, and finally negotiated a peaceful evacuation with the army. A good, reasonable man who counsels responding "to


hate with love, to prejudice with tolerance, to arrogance with modesty, to humiliation with dignity, to fanatical violence with reasonableness" (p. 433). Better still, what he preaches he practices consistently and with candour, mounting a brave and dignified defence during his trial and in his final declaration ("I have no enemies, no hate," p. 510), which ends the book.

Two Nobel prizes very badly received by the authorities – the Soviets in 1970 and the Chinese in 2010 – incite comparison between Liu and Solzhenitsyn. But Liu is more akin to the recently deceased Vaclav Havel, who likewise embodied courage, honesty, and humility. Liu would unhesitatingly subscribe to this Havelian dictum: "Love and truth will conquer hate and falsehood." It is no surprise that Charter 77, which was so much Havel's handiwork, inspired Charter 2008, which cost Liu 11 years in jail.

■ Translated by N. Jayaram

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2. This formula of Liu's is reported by G eremie Barm e, as B eja has noted (p. 16, note 2). I highly recommend Barm e's stimulating article, initially a contribution ("Confession, Redemption and Death: Liu Xiaobo and the Protest Movement of 1989") in the volume previously edited by George Hicks, *The Broken Mirror: China after Tiananmen*, Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1990 (pp. 51-99). The reference to the "roots" literature is to be found on page 55.
3. The subject of a recent biography unlikely to be bettered soon: Ezra Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011. The ethics of responsibility and the ethics of absolute ends are clearly defined in Richard Swedberg, *The Max Weber Dictionary*, Stanford University Press, 2005, pp. 89-91.
4. Liu's direct challenges to the Chinese authorities (he only acts in the open) being too numerous to list, it should suffice to note his letter to Yahoo's CEO (pp. 373-90). Yahoo had conveyed to the Chinese Public Security Bureau material used in convicting and sentencing the journalist Shi Tao to ten years in jail. This open letter was translated by J er me Bonnin for *Esprit*, January 2006. Apart from Bonnin, others who have translated some texts into French are Frank Muiyard, Jacques Seurre, and Sebastian Veg. All others were translated and annotated by B eja, who has rightly given greater place to Liu's essays of the past decade: There is, it seems, greater maturity in his writings following the three-year (October 1996-October 1999) "re-education" in a labour camp.



**Julia Lovell,**  
**The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams**  
**and the Making of China,**  
Basingstoke/Oxford, Picador,  
2011, 458 pp.

## XAVIER PAUL S

Opium is one of the most bandied about subjects in Chinese history, and the specialist would learn little that is new in this study, which is mainly a (good) synthesis of existing works. The main value added in this book lies in its offering of a larger perspective that more pointed research tomes often lose sight of. We learn that the First Opium War (1839-1842) was actually of secondary importance in the eyes of contemporaries. The Qing dynasty faced threats (revolts and natural calamities) that its administrative elite deemed more serious for its very survival. In London, the frustrations of the far-off military operations came in handy as tools for internal political wrangling in parliamentary debates.

The author rightly points out the extent to which the British Empire's engagement in the war was marked by improvisations, hesitations, and pangs

of conscience, so much so that it was far from having a precise or well thought-out plan of imperialist conquest. This is by no means a superfluous lesson for the historian, often given to attributing *a posteriori* coherence to a series of events.

Lovell has taken pains to present a series of lively and precise portraits of the major protagonists of the First Opium War such as the Emperor Daoguang, imperial commissioner Lin Zexu and his Manchu successor Qishan, and on the British side, foreign secretary Lord Palmerston and Chief Superintendent of the China trade Charles Elliot. It is a judicious choice, considering that distance conferred on the actors on the ground much freedom of action: it should be borne in mind that for the British forces, the operation theatre was many months' voyage from the mother country. Thus, the replacement in May 1841 of Elliot (rather inclined towards conciliation) by the intransigent Henry Pottinger represented a real turning point in the war. From then on, the British expeditionary force turned ruthless in using its crushing military superiority to force a speedy agreement. This was the famous Treaty of Nanking (Nanjing), hammered out under extraordinary conditions. Lovell describes over some wonderful pages the poker game between Pottinger and the Emperor's two emissaries, Qiying and Yilibu, highlighting the role of the obscure Zhang Xi, personal secretary of Yilibu.


As the title indicates, the First Opium War takes up two thirds of the book, and the Second (1856-1860) is dealt with in much less detail. The final chapters show how late nineteenth century intellectuals such as Yan Fu literally "invented" the Opium Wars (until then, historiographers did not label them as such, simply referring to border skirmishes). Finally, Lovell presents interesting elements regarding the privileged place accorded to the Opium Wars in the current historic orthodoxy. She stresses that it is only since the late twentieth century that the wars have gained primacy in school curricula and official rhetoric in the People's Republic of China. Following the Tiananmen massacre, the Communist Party had the brilliant idea of exploiting the anniversary of the 150-year-old opium wars to deflect public wrath towards an external enemy – imperialism.

To the reader's delight, Lovell has produced a clear, agreeable, and lively account. Some lengthy passages could have been shortened, especially descriptions of the horrors of different military operations, as well as discussions of the appalling hacks pushing the Yellow Peril thesis (pp. 274-291). It is regrettable that Lovell seems to be unaware (but then again, unfortunately, so is a near totality of opium historians) that the routinely reproduced photographs of opium smokers in the late Qing are just studio jobs meant to fuel a flourishing picture postcard industry presenting a rather spurious exoticism. It is thus futile to theorise as she does over the degree of addiction and even more over the feelings of "smokers" from the time the cliché caught on (p. 17).

She may also be accused of some lack of fair play. While she has read (and generously used) the best of historiography in English on the subject, she rarely mentions a few older academic works in Chinese. It is regrettable that some excellent accounts of the history of opium, such as the one by Wang Hongbin, have been ignored. While it may not necessarily have been the author's intent, the book gives the impression that all Chinese historians today adhere to the totally grotesque official interpretation of the Opium War aimed at the larger public.

■ Translated by N. Jayaram

■ Xavier Paulès is Assistant Professor at EHESS, Paris.



**Jie Chen and  
Bruce J. Dickson,**  
**Allies of the State: China's  
Private Entrepreneurs and  
Democratic Change,**  
Cambridge, Mass.,  
Harvard University Press,  
2010, 220 pp.

## GILLES GUIHEUX

For almost ten years Bruce Dickson has worked as a political scientist on mainland Chinese entrepreneurs. Following from *Red Capitalists in China: The party, private entrepreneurs, and prospects for political change* (Cambridge University Press, 2003) and *Wealth into Power: The Communist Party's embrace of China's private sector* (Cambridge University Press, 2008), he has co-written a new contribution with Jie Chen, also a professor of political science. This volume adds to the already abundant literature on the lives of the Chinese business class (by Margaret Pearson, David Wank, David D.S. Goodman, Kellee S. Tsai, among others). During the last 20 years the private sector has developed at a very rapid pace and today constitutes the leading driver of economic growth and the primary source of employment creation. The authors wonder about the political consequences of this structural transformation of China's economy and society; their questioning, as they remind us, rests within a tradition that started from the first works of political science on the link between economic and political modernisation (Seymour Lipset, 1959). In the case of China, the question regarding the possible role of the business class in democratisation arises in a particular configuration: since the state is the architect of economic and social transformation, the private sector does not emerge in opposition to the state but as a result of its initiatives.

The book's conclusion is pessimistic and conforms to what all authors agree with today: this social group that arose from the policies of reform and opening is favourable to the political status quo and is thus not likely to incite change towards more democracy. Private entrepreneurs depend on the party-state for their prosperity; co-opted by the CCP, often with a state apparatus background – former state or party cadres, former managers or employees of state enterprises – they are also its allies. As a methodological consequence, the authors did not envisage the entrepreneurs as a group or social class, but rather from the perspective of their relations with the party-state.

The novelty of the book is supported by the weight of the evidence presented. It deals with quantitative data retrieved from more than 2,071 entrepreneurs. In collaboration with the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (Zhonghua quanguo gongshangye lianhehui 中华全国工商业联合会), the survey was conducted in 2006-2007 on a representative sampling of private enterprises (*siying qiye* 私营企业) of the five coastal provinces where the private sector is most developed (Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong). The survey concerns enterprises of different sizes and various sectors, in regions more or less prosperous. Since 70 percent of Chinese private enterprises are located in these provinces, the sample is representative of two-thirds of the private sector. The data as-


sembled enable an evaluation of the support of the business class regarding democratic ideas. The data allow the general testing of a number of hypotheses depicting the relationship between the economic characteristics of enterprises and the personal and institutional links maintained with the state, the relations between these links and the values the entrepreneurs adhere to, and the relations between these links and the type of political activities of businessmen. In other words, the survey identifies the causes of the entrepreneurs' political behaviour and the relationship between entrepreneurs and the state.

With a multivariate analysis, the authors obtained results that are both fine and detailed. In Chapter Four, for example, the relationship between the entrepreneurs and the state is broken down into four dimensions: financial support from public banks, institutional links, shared values, and the evaluation of public policies. Statistics led the authors to an expected outcome: all things being equal, the entrepreneurs who received bank loans from state banks are less inclined to support democratic values or institutions (multiparty, freedom of organisation or candidate suffrage, or elective procedures with executive responsibility). Other results are more surprising and contradict previous studies: the entrepreneurs who manage the largest enterprises are, all things being equal, more likely to support democratic values and institutions. The authors explain this positive correlation between the size of the enterprises and the support for democracy by a possible dissatisfaction with the current regulation that limits the growth of private companies. Even more surprising, the authors show that the institutional links woven between entrepreneurs and the state – as members of the Party or of national or local assemblies and professional associations – do not determine their political opinions. The corporatist strategy followed by the regime since 2001 – including entrepreneurs in the system – has not had the anticipated results.

Support of entrepreneurs for the regime, the authors find, is principally determined by two elements: their positive evaluation of the policies, and their personal views. This constitutes a predictable factor: if the entrepreneurs are not satisfied with economic policy or change their opinion of democracy, then their political attitude may become less favourable towards the current regime.

The book possesses the defaults of its qualities. Although the explanation is driven by method and rigour, readers are unable to hear enough of the voices of the entrepreneurs. Uniquely based on quantitative data, the book lacks the human element. It lacks portraits of well-known figures – certainly there are some notable public figures – and a typology that draws the plurality of personal itineraries and positions in the diverse space in which they experiment: the press, their blogs, and the hagiographies published by the most famous among them.

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**Zha Jianying,**  
**Tide Players,**

New York, The New Press, 2011, 228 pp.

## JEAN-FRANÇOIS HUCHET

With detailed portraits of seven Chinese – a woman and six men – Zha Jianying presents a rich and nuanced canvas of urban China's evolution since the early 1970s. It must be noted at the outset that this is not an academic tome; nevertheless, the book is far from superficial. Among the plethora of academic works being published on China today, many fail to deliver the kind of account of change in Chinese society that this book does. It is not Zha's first such effort either. Her *Bashi niandai* 八十年代 (*The 1980s*), published in 2006, presented a picture of artists, intellectuals, and researchers during that decade and met with major success, to the extent of being named in China one of the most important books of the decade in 2010.

"Focus on the Chinese to explain China," says the author in her introduction (p. 10). Indeed, but which individuals are to be relied on to best embody China's history of the past 40 years? It was no simple choice, and as the author notes, China is too big for just one author. It was therefore preferable to focus on people one knew best. And so she chose those from the pre-1978 generation who had had a taste of Mao-era China. The four entrepreneurs and three intellectuals Zha looks at in her book are all public personalities who at one time or other "made headline news." From household appliance magnate Zhang Dazhong to property tycoon Pan Shiyi as well as Peking University vice-president Zhang Weiying, the book sheds highly contrasting light on many facets of change in China over four decades.

The author deserves particular praise for not having avoided writing about those close to her: her brother Zha Jianguo,<sup>(1)</sup> a dissident; Sun Lizhe, a "bare-foot" capitalist and university classmate; and the late 1980s culture minister Wang Meng, whom she met in the early 1990s. Far from painting just flattering portraits, the author used her intimate knowledge of the personalities to describe their personal motivations and contradictions, as well as their courage, most tactfully linking them to the functioning of the political system and society. She presents, for instance, a nuanced portrait of Wang Meng as a man of letters and "servant of the state." Zha was taking on a difficult exercise, as Wang had been the target of barbs from all sides – from intellectuals for his continued service to the state through the 1989 political crisis as well as from Party apparatchiks for having refused to pay homage to "fallen soldiers during the fight to restore order" in June that year. Zha tackles the subject with her own assessments and expressions of irritation with the "state servant," only to gradually mollify her judgment along with her increasing friendship with him. Without shedding her critical stance, she

1. Also published in *The New Yorker*, 23 April 2007, pp. 46–57.

ends her account of Wang by recognising in this controversial public figure a certain coherence of action and personality towards a political regime that had claimed his entire career. It was her more intimate knowledge of the man that helped her perceive this coherence and understand some of the choices he made. Such nuance and absence of definitive judgments on personalities are to be found in all the portraits, be they of entrepreneurs who amassed much wealth or of her brother who chose the path of dissidence. Through these portraits, she seems to indirectly pose a question to Western readers: How exactly would you have behaved in these situations and under such a harsh political system? Her portraits amount to as many responses to this question. Some chose to rebel against the political system and risked being crushed by it; others sought to influence it from the inside, laying themselves open to being condemned as collaborators; and yet others abandoned politics altogether at the end of the Cultural Revolution or of the 1989 student movement, plunging headlong into business.

Nevertheless, even in the case of the entrepreneurs Zha has described, politics and memory are never far away. Despite their personal material affluence, which could have helped expel the memory of past difficulties, the Mao-era privations and humiliations keep rising to the surface and influencing current events. Such is the case with Zhang Dazhong, the affluent entrepreneur who dominated China's household appliance sector until his recent sale of his company at a premium. Despite his business acumen, Zhang was long at pains to rehabilitate the reputation of his mother, who was persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. He held Mao in such deep disdain that he sometimes publicly questioned the official Chinese history since the Communist takeover. In her own way, property developer Zhang Xing, who with her husband Pan Shiyi became rich and famous by building the Soho complex in Beijing, frequently refers to her years of penury and of work in a factory during her youth in Hong Kong. In her conversations with Zha, she harks back to the importance of having discovered Western-style politics during her studies in England and then, later, in the 1989 student movement. From all the personalities covered in Zha's book, the impression that emerges is that they lived several lives in one, but that they fell back on their own resources to cope psychologically with their memory and the pace of change they orchestrated in their lives. Some succeeded better than others.

In general, and this is one of the book's strengths, the author has superbly managed to enmesh China's larger history into individual life stories. Although she does not say so clearly in her introduction, Zha Jianying sought to avoid a "top-down" approach to history, that of viewing events merely through the prism of changes in Party politics. Some personalities, such as entrepreneurs, plunged headlong down the paths the Party opened up; others, such as her brother, resisted by forming a political party; but all were vectors of change that caught the Party off guard. While most "surfed" the reform wave created by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, all contributed in their own ways to influencing an autonomous evolution in society, the economy, and perhaps in some respects politics as well.

One of the lacunae that may be pointed out in the book is that it could have done with two or three more portraits to complete the picture of post-Mao urban China. In her introduction, Zha defends her decision not to have attempted descriptions of those she is ill acquainted with, such as migrants, farmers, and workers. Surreptitious observation would not have helped her deliver the finesse and the nuances of personalities distilled into her book. Seeing how the portraits have turned out, it is just as well that she did not attempt it. Nevertheless, it would have been good to have had more women in addition to Zhang Xing. Then again, the current mix may reflect some-

thing deeper about contemporary male-dominated China. The same is true of the absence of younger people: they appear in the background, especially in the portrait of the entrepreneur Zhang Dazhong, who forced his young assistants to read Jung Chang's account of Mao<sup>(2)</sup> in order to open their eyes to the reality of Chinese politics. Again, the book would have been more representative had it included a young person of the post-Cultural Revolution generation.

■ Translated by N. Jayaram

■ Jean-François Huchet is university professor, INALCO-Langues'O, Paris.

2. Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, *Mao: The Unknown Story*, New York, Knopf, 2005, 814 pp.

## Books received

**Vivian P.Y. Lee (ed.), East Asian Cinemas: Regional Flows and Global Transformations**, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 253 pp.

**Steve Chan, China, the United States, and Power Balancing in East Asia**, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2012, 282 pp.

**Katrien Jacobs, People's Pornography: Sex and Surveillance on the Chinese Internet**, Bristol/Chicago, Intellect, 2012, 203 pp.

**Marc Andre Matten (ed.), Places of Memory in Modern China: History, Politics, and Identity**, Leiden/Boston, Brill, 2012, 285 pp.

**James W. Heisig, Timothy W. Richardson, Remembering Simplified Hanzi 2. How Not to Forget the Meaning and Writing of the Chinese Characters**, Honolulu, University of Hawai'i Press, 329 pp.

**David Shambaugh (ed.), Charting China's Future: Domestic and International Challenges**, London/New York, Routledge, 2011, 187 pp.

**Tonio Andrade, Lost Colony. The Untold Story of China's First Great Victory over the West**, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2011, 456 pp.

**Bruce Jacobs, Democratizing Taiwan**, Leiden/Boston Brill, 2012, 305 pp.