Rethinking comparative cultural sociology

*Repertoires of evaluation in France and the United States*

*Edited by*

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This book provides a powerful new theoretical framework for understanding cross-national cultural differences. Focusing on France and America, it analyzes how the people of these two different cultures mobilize national and cross-national 'repertoires of evaluation' to make judgments about politics, economics, morals and aesthetics. The analysis draws on eight case studies by eleven French and American researchers who have worked together over a number of years to develop systematic comparisons between these countries. The topics are wide-ranging, comparing how individuals use the cultural tools at their disposal to answer questions such as: Are races equal? What constitutes sexual harassment? What is the value of contemporary art? Should journalists be neutral? How can the defence of the environment be reconciled with economic imperatives? How does private interest contribute to the public good? Moving beyond simplistic essentialist models of national character, this comparative approach offers important insights that will interest not only sociologists but also political scientists and anthropologists.


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Forms of valuing nature: arguments and modes of justification in French and American environmental disputes

Laurent Thévenot, Michael Moody and Claudette Laffey

This chapter and the next compare political practice and culture in the United States and France through detailed analyses of specific environmental conflicts in each country. We study comparative politics as enacted in a range of public arenas and sites of conflict, but rooted in local participation and particular controversies, rather than focusing on specialized political institutions or actors. In carrying out such a broad comparison of political culture and practices through specific case studies, we need to avoid the risk of merely reinforcing macro stereotypes of the two “cultures” and of looking for comparative evidence on only one level such as “discourse.” We do so by relying on precise analytical categories, which have been developed to account for the complex requirements of all actors in public disputes, and by analyzing both the arguments and the actions of a range of disputants in these particular cases. In this way, our approach to studying comparative politics can provide a precise analysis of the cultural models and practices found in political disputes in each country.

We compare primarily the claims and arguments made by the conflicting entities during the course of the two environmental disputes. And we take seriously the pragmatic requirements of making such claims in the public arena, including the necessity of providing a legitimate “justification” for an argument or evaluation (i.e. a reference to some kind of general interest or common good), the potential for similarly legitimate critiques and denunciations of these justifications, and the requirement of offering proof for the claims made. But the analysis of both cases investigates not only the dynamics of argumentation, but also the institutional, technical, legal, and material arrangements which support or complement the argumentation. Through this multi-level approach, we get a detailed picture of what the disputants in each country consider valuable or worthy (e.g. “untouched wilderness” versus “productive use of resources”), and of the cultural models governing how they go about expressing and implementing these criteria of worth and shared modes of evaluation.
We chose to focus on public disputes involving the environment because – of the range of causes and types of modern political disputes – conflicts such as those over proposed “developments” of nature (roads, dams, tunnels) in “pristine” or relatively remote “natural” areas are among the most complex and revealing. These conflicts yield insights into political culture and practices on many levels – from local communities to national traditions – and involve a great variety of modes and themes of argumentation, a wide range of innovative tactical interventions, and complicated arrangements of people and organizations.

This chapter and the next together explore the comparative findings from field research on two such cases of conflict over proposed infrastructure projects in remote “natural” areas, one involving the Somport Tunnel project in the Aspe Valley in France and the other a proposal to build a hydroelectric dam on the Clavey River in the United States. The first of this chapter presents background information and summary descriptions of each case and an overview of the data and their collection in each country that serves as a general introduction to both chapters. The rest of this chapter then compares the types of arguments which are made by the various protagonists in each case, and the dynamics of making a range of generalized “justifications.” Chapter 10 attempts to place the findings of this chapter in a larger context by comparing the “strategy” of argumentation displayed by the disputants, and by moving to the level of comparing broader cultural models of interests and the common good underlying the evaluative dynamics in each country. Our analysis is particularly concerned with explaining key comparative findings, rather than with analyzing each case individually.

Summary of cases

The French case – the Somport road and tunnel project

The French dispute under study here is a heavily contested road and tunnel project being built through the Aspe Valley and the Somport Pass. The Aspe Valley is located south of the city of Pau in the Pyrenees mountains, near the Pyrenees National Park, between the Basque country and Aragon. It lies at the heart of the Béarn region of France, historically a highly independent, rural, and isolated cultural enclave. The valley, through which the Aspe River runs, is narrow and cliff-lined. It is a primary access route connecting France with Spain through the Somport Pass, which was in fact an important route used in the Middle Ages by pilgrims heading to the shrine of Santiago de Compostela in Spain. The
Aspe Valley is considered to be one of the last relatively wild valleys of the Pyrenees, yet despite its isolation, there are several small villages.

The valley is home to some of the last Pyrenean brown bears, which are protected (hunting them is forbidden) but are nevertheless nearly extinct, with only five or six surviving in the wild. The Ministry of the Environment has recently planned a gradual introduction of similar brown bears from Central Europe. A favorite of the media, the bear is a famous symbol of the Aspe Valley, but environmentalists also point to other rare species in the area, such as the wild chamois goat and a native vulture whose name in Spanish means “bone-breaker.” The Aspe River is also protected by various governmental orders, as it is the habitat of trout and migratory salmon.

From the economic point of view, the Aspe Valley has long been mostly a sheep-herding and farming valley known for producing goat cheese. Dominant in the past, the pastoral economy has in recent times become more marginal: the shepherds are less numerous and they spend less time than before in the mountains. On the other hand, the creation of the national park has boosted tourism, which is now the main activity of the valley. The valley attracts skiers in winter and hikers, climbers, canoeists, rafters, and trout anglers during summer time.

The plans to build the road from Pau (France) to Saragossa (Spain), and to construct a road tunnel under the Somport Pass, began in 1987/88. In 1990, the European Council in Brussels adopted a regulation declaring the “E07 truck road” a priority. This aroused strong opposition to the project, which grew steadily in subsequent years. The first “public utility decision” on the project, adopted in 1991 by the French government after the statutory process of public hearings, was followed by an intense mobilization of opposition, which was both local and supported by nationally known artistic and environmental personalities. The opposition was led by Eric Pétetin, who became a prominent figure in the media after being jailed several times for obstructing the construction site. In addition, some inhabitants of the valley formed a committee and appealed against the official decision. This decision was then overturned by the national administrative tribunal, on the grounds that the environmental impact study had been too limited. This tribunal also called for more study before considering a new decision.

The opponents also organized a collective (collectif), grouping together all organizations opposed to the project on many levels: local (e.g. the “Committee of the Inhabitants for Life in the Aspe Valley,” “Aspe-Nature,” “My Land”), national (“France-Nature”) and international (World Wildlife Fund and Greenpeace). Big demonstrations were organized every year, during the Whitsun weekend. This opposition campaign
proposed the reopening of an old railway and tunnel, closed in 1970, as an alternative to the new project. The opponents feared that the road would become a major highway or "truck corridor" that would harm the valley's human and animal inhabitants.

However, many local officials and some residents are supporters of the project, arguing that it is important for local development. A new public inquiry took place in the spring of 1993; it gave a favorable recommendation and a new official decision (DUP). Construction started again immediately afterward. At the end of 1993, Somport opposition committees were created all around France; they made a variety of legal appeals and continued other types of opposition. Meanwhile the construction of the tunnel through the Pass progressed and was recently completed, but the widening of the road and its connections to other highways are still under dispute. The opposition campaign's arguments are now focused on preventing the tunnel from becoming a main truck route, and on promoting the use of train tunnels there and elsewhere in the Pyrenees.

The American case – the Clavey River dam project

The Clavey River is a remote stream running through a steep canyon on the western slope of the Sierra Nevada mountains, just west of the famous Yosemite National Park in eastern California. It flows south through the Stanislaus National Forest for 47 miles before emptying into the Tuolumne River and creating a challenging set of rapids known as Clavey Falls, revered by some to be among the best white-water "rides." Unlike most rivers in the Sierra range, the Clavey has no major dams along its course and is heralded by environmentalists as "one of the last completely free-flowing, wild rivers" in the region, indeed in the entire American West.

The local area around the Clavey – Tuolumne County, including the main town of Sonora, the classic western town of Jamestown, and the tourist outpost of Groveland on Highway 120 – is part of California's Gold Country, the areas around Sutter's Creek where the 1849 Gold Rush began. Many of the local residents are direct descendants of gold prospectors and many still work in the so-called "resource extraction" industries, mostly timber instead of mining these days. But tourism is fast becoming the dominant industry of the area, serving the flood of visitors to Yosemite as well as a growing number of people braving the white-water rapids of the Tuolumne River with one of several local rafting companies. The Clavey is not itself a major tourist draw, but it is very important to the people who do venture to its banks, including trout fishermen, hunters, hikers, and native plant aficionados who see the Clavey
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as an “untouched wilderness” containing old-growth forests and some endangered species, and a nearby Native American tribe, the Me-Wuk, who trace their cultural heritage to seasonal migrations along the Clavey.

But the remote Clavey could not remain in “untouched” obscurity forever. A proposal in 1990 to build a large dam and hydroelectric plant on the Clavey began a rancorous dispute which played out on the local, regional, state, and national levels over the next five years. The dam was proposed by the Turlock Irrigation District (TID), the water and utility company for the town of Turlock in the San Joaquin Valley about 70 miles (and two counties) away from the Clavey. TID had previously tried to build a dam on the Tuolumne but failed when that river was declared “wild and scenic” in 1984 (see Pertschuck 1986, for a summary).

Turning its attention to the Tuolumne’s main tributary, the Clavey, TID submitted a proposal to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) – which regulates all hydroelectric dam projects – detailing a $700 million project that would affect water flow on 19 miles of the river and be used primarily during peak summer months when the increasingly suburban residents of Turlock (historically an agricultural region) turned on their air conditioners. The Tuolumne County local government (where the Clavey Dam would have been located) signed on as a minor partner in the venture, after TID agreed to pay the locals a share of the revenues from the project, even though all the electricity would be sent down to Turlock.

Building on the coalitions that had been so successful in “saving the Tuolumne,” an opposition force quickly mobilized to “Save the Clavey” by stopping TID’s dam project. The opposition included a heterogeneous mix of groups and individuals on many levels. In Tuolumne County a grassroots opposition coalition was formed that included the rafting companies and other tourism interests, local environmentalists, and other local people who wanted to Clavey left wild. In Turlock a former river rafter started an opposition campaign among TID’s raters, and TID’s main industrial customers also opposed the higher electric rates they would pay to fund the project. And on a state and national level, environmental groups concerned with river protection lobbied in Washington DC and assisted the local opposition. But the project also had its proponents, TID and its “silent partner” Tuolumne County were able to mobilize other supporters for the project, including the Tuolumne Chamber of Commerce and a local pro-development, “wise use” group supported by the local timber company.

During the period when FERC was considering TID’s proposal, the two sides in the dispute rarely debated openly (let alone negotiated) in public, but often submitted dueling comments to regulatory agencies like the Forest Service, lobbied national legislators, sought endorsements...
from the same local groups (including the Me-Wuk tribe), and sought ink in the same state and local media. In July 1994, the FERC recommended against licensing the project as outlined by TID, claiming that the economic benefits did not outweigh the large environmental costs of the project, but suggested a couple of more expensive alternative designs. The TID Board of Directors then decided in January 1995 to “shelve” the project, citing a number of factors that had reduced the demand for power, as well as the impending de-regulation of the electricity industry which made other supply sources cheaper. Since this decision, TID has not pursued its plans on the Clavey further, while the environmental opposition has continued to push for federal protection for the river.

Methods and data

Data from extensive field research on the two cases orient the analysis and are offered as evidence throughout both chapters. The data consist of various sorts of “texts” and observations collected from several sources: in-depth interviews with the major participants in the Somport and Clavey conflicts, documents and public statements put out by the opposing organizations or governmental agencies involved (e.g. planning reports, legal petitions, opposition campaign flyers and press releases), media coverage and quotations, any available private papers or other materials, etc.² Our analysis of these texts is targeted on a few themes and topics of specific analytic concern, but our findings within each topic come from reviewing and comparing these texts in the two cases. We focused the comparison particularly on areas in which the data were directly parallel (e.g. comparing interviews with local opponents in the Aspe Valley to similar interviews with local opponents in Tuolumne County), and care was taken to collect similar data when possible. We also consider the relation of the texts to their complex context, but we are careful to recognize that the “setting” for an argument or action is multi-layered and often ambiguous.³

The data for the Somport tunnel case were collected during fieldwork in the Aspe Valley (March and April 1995) by Claudette Lafaye, Marie-Noël Godet, Jean-François Germe and Laurent Thévenot, with additional fieldwork in 1997 completed by Eric Doidy. A total of 17 activists and other local actors were interviewed in sessions ranging from one to two hours, in their homes or offices in the Aspe Valley and Oloron. Other data included observation of a demonstration in the Valley and Oloron (April 8, 1995) which brought together a variety of styles of expression and contestation – from trade union members’ marches to animal spokesperson’s speeches – and of a meeting of the “Collectif Alternatives
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Pyrénées à l’axe E7” where public positions and strategies were discussed. An extensive file of national and local media accounts was assembled by Godet, with the generous help of Jean-Luc Palacio’s own documentation brought together for the purpose of the “Collectif.” This was supplemented with a Nexis database search for English-language newspaper reports. Various other reports and documents were collected and analyzed also, including the government’s impact study report, which was analyzed in detail by Germe.4

The data for the Clavey River case were collected both during a joint research trip by Michael Moody and Laurent Thévenot in June 1995, and during visits and the on-going research efforts of Moody during 1995 and 1996. A total of 21 activists and interest representatives were interviewed in sessions ranging from one to three hours, usually in their homes or offices in Tuolumne County, the Turlock area, or in San Francisco and Sacramento. A large collection of other materials was assembled from several sources. Nexis and other database searches yielded much of the public and media record of the dispute, and the major activists provided additional public and some internal documents in response to phone and mail research queries. Materials were also gathered while in the field (e.g. from government offices or while conducting interviews in organizational offices). Two sources in particular were most beneficial: the vast files of the Tuolumne River Preservation Trust, and the personal files of Wally Anker (who founded the local grassroots opposition group), including his notes, minutes of group meetings, correspondence, reports, and materials from TID and his opponents.5

This chapter and the next were written in a time-consuming but rewarding joint writing process. The two main authors, Michael Moody and Laurent Thévenot, wrote and revised primary drafts of the texts in English during several intensive periods of coordinated work in Paris and in Princeton, discussing each new section of text in depth and making revisions together. This face-to-face writing dialogue between scholars native to the two countries forced each to clarify more extensively to the other highly nuanced interpretations, reduced the risk of unintended stereotyping or misunderstanding, and, we believe, resulted in a more balanced presentation of the two “cultures.” A third co-author, Claudette Lafaye, wrote some original sections of the Somport analysis (in French) and participated in the development of Chapter 10.

**Analytical approach**

Our comparative approach to studying political culture and practice in France and the United States takes seriously the complexity and diversity
of the argumentation dynamics when actors and organizations are engaged in important public disputes. We focus on a specific environmental dispute in each country, but explore these cases with an analytical focus which allows us to consider the array of voices, actors, and issues in a variety of public arenas and discursive settings.

In this chapter, we take a first step by sorting through the complex public debate over the disputed projects. We systematically categorize rich comparative detail the argumentation dynamics and types of "justification" utilized by the disputants. Our analysis explores the ways in which these disputants attempt to defend their positions through various types of "generalized" arguments – that is, arguments which make some claim to general applicability by reference to different sorts of values, principles, or models for judging what is good, worthy, and right (e.g. equality, tradition, the free market, or environmentalism). We compare the frequency of certain types of arguments and "modes of justification," as well as the dynamics of their use in national and cultural contexts, paying particular attention to argumentation that involves combining various modes of justification. We also consider the material or organizational arrangements which support the justifications found in each case.

Disputes that ostensibly pit infrastructure projects "against" nature, or economic goals "versus" environmental goals, are particularly revealing subject matter for comparative cultural analysis. The activists, planners, and others who advocate a particular position on the development projects at the center of our two cases rarely offer only one sort of statement of their claim, or one description of the project or of their opponents. Instead, the public claims and portrayals are quite diverse, and any one participant in the conflict routinely varies the form and content of his or her arguments, making the task of comparing argumentation a complex one, irreducible to the broad characterization of cultural contexts. We employ a rigorous analytical approach to accomplish this complex task.

The comparative approach employed here builds on the analysis of modes of "justification" developed by Boltanski and Thévenot (1991), which examines the type of appeal to a common good characteristic of a set of different "orders of worth" regarded as particularly legitimate. A justification in this theoretical view is an attempt to move beyond stating a particular or personal viewpoint toward proving that the statement is generalizable and relevant for a common good, showing why or how this general claim is legitimate. Disputants involved in debating the resolution of a public problem are charged with this task of justification.

Each order of worth offers a different basis for justification and involves a different mode of evaluating what is good for a common humanity (in terms of market worth, or efficient technique and method, for instance).
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Justifications can involve positive "arguments," claims, or position statements, but might also be critical "denunciations" of opposing views in the dynamics of public disputes. The critique of justifications from one order usually rests on the evaluative basis of another order (such as the denunciation of bureaucratic planning from a market flexibility perspective, for instance).

Justifications involve more than "just words" or "accounts" — they rely on the engagement of objects or other elements of the situation (as relevant backing for an argument), and they must meet the requirement of offering proof for their assertions. The form of proof that is considered legitimate, and the way objects or events are evaluated as relevant to sustain the justification, varies with each kind of worth. In order to be engaged as a probe in justifications, objects (or persons or events) need to be "qualified" according to the particular order of worth. For example, the Somport road is qualified as an "international highway" in one order and as a "local access road" in another order. This qualification of entities is more than a rhetorical characterization, but also involves material features, such as the number of lanes of highway.

Boltanski and Thévenot describe in detail six orders of worth in this regime of justification: "market" performance; "industrial" efficiency based on technical competence and long-term planning; "civic" equality and solidarity; "domestic" and traditional trustworthiness entrenched in local and personal ties; "inspiration" expressed in creativity, emotion, or religious grace; and "renown" based on public opinion and fame. More recent work has pointed to the contemporary emergence of an additional order of worth, "green" worth, which is gaining specificity but is still often used in combination with other types of justification. We are particularly interested in comparing how such "green" arguments are employed or expressed in the two cases. Using a range of justification types as a starting point, we compare how an array of arguments and generalized justifications are expressed in the two countries.

Our analytical approach relates to recent work in cultural sociology (Lamont and Wuthnow 1990) and connected fields like practice theory and the "new institutionalism" approach to organizational analysis.
Laurent Thévenot, Michael Moody and Claudette Lafaye

(Powell and DiMaggio 1991), as well as the "turn" toward cultural analysis of social movement discourse or "framing" and toward narrative and argumentation in policy analysis (Throgmorton 1996; Rowe 1998; Fischer and Forrester 1993). But we also seek to fill some prominent theoretical and methodological gaps in these "cultural" approaches to rhetoric and public debate.

Current approaches to the use of "repertoires" or "cultural resources" in the justification, preparation, or explanation of action attempt to move beyond a static and determinist model which assumes an overarching layer of values and "culture" to an approach which considers values and culture "in use" and examines the way actors creatively employ certain resources in practice (Knorr-Cetina and Schatzki forthcoming) and in varying contexts (Eliasoph 1998; Lichterman 1996; Steinberg 1995; Alexander and Smith 1993; Lamont 1992; Wuthnow 1992; Wilson 1990; Schudson 1989; Swidler 1986). We also focus on the usage of cultural elements or repertoires in practice, but with an eye toward the nature of the constraints on this usage, including the fact that different arenas of debate and justification have variable requirements for generalization. We pay close attention to the pragmatic requirements of demonstrating proof of one's argument (e.g. by pointing to the real world), and to the possibility of critique as a consequence of open debate about public problems (Tricot 1996). In this way, we also seek to bridge analysis of "cultural repertoires" and "repertoires of contention" (Traugott 1995; Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1978) or action.

The recent spate of work on "framing" in social movements focuses primarily - at times exclusively - on the strategic manipulation (the "business of persuading others") of appeals to resonate and mobilize an intended audience (McAdam et al. 1996; Morris and Mueller 1992; Snow et al. 1986; for critiques of the instrumental approach, see Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Jasper 1997; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1996) although some work (e.g. Gamson 1992) does examine how frames are used or interpreted by the audience. While we consider at length in Chapter 10 the nature of the "strategy" involved in constructing arguments, we approach argumentation not simply as a rhetorical assertion but also a provision of evidence involving more than one speaker, one intended audience, or one mode of claiming a common good. In this way, we also go beyond the standard "social construction of social problems" perspective (e.g. Best 1989; Hilgartner and Bosk 1988; Spector and Kitsuse 1977).

We are concerned with examining the pragmatics of public space and discourse through an analysis of a plurality of regimes of action. Habermas' (1984) normative theory of the linguistic pragmatics of communicative action, and Arendt's (1958) theoretical understanding of the
maintenance of a public realm through the "disclosure" of unique individuals also approach the study of politics through a close examination of multiple modes of action. Similarly, we seek to uncover common requirements shared by all orders of worth, and to account for a variety of modes of acting which may qualify for public legitimacy. As we shall see from the comparison, the configuration of public space and the dynamics of discourse depend heavily on the mode of acting privileged in a political culture.

Comparative issues

Utilizing this analytic approach, we provide fresh insight into a number of important areas of substantive comparative research on the dynamics of political dispute. In particular, our findings contribute to the understanding of locality in the two countries. In addition to general discussions of environmental movements, policy, and politics in the United States (e.g. Dowie 1995; Fiorino 1995; Gottlieb 1993; Dunlap and Mertig 1992; Paehlke 1990) and France and western Europe (e.g. Axelrod 1997; Dalton 1994; Prendiville 1994), much existing American research on local political or environmental disputes focuses on the tactics of local or so-called "NIMBY" ("Not In My Back Yard"), groups in fighting corporate power, infrastructure development, or toxic waste disposal (e.g. Walsh et al. 1997; Gould et al. 1996; Williams and Matheny 1995); on the NIMBY phenomenon as a national movement (Mazmanian and Morell 1994; Freudenberg and Steinsapir 1992; Piller 1991); or on the differential determinations of "risk" in various communities or localities (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). We expand on this work by considering the more general question of whether threats to a local areas in our two cases are rejected based on NIMBY-sorts of arguments or not, and by closely comparing how such arguments are specifically expressed and considered as legitimate in the two countries.

In exploring the category of "green" justifications, we contribute fresh insight into the literature on environmental discourse or rhetoric, particularly the understanding of the different conceptions of wilderness and nature in the United States and France, and of the relations of humans (and human communities) and nature (Dupuis and Vandergeest 1996; Spangle and Knapp 1996; Bennett and Chaloupka 1994; Killingsworth and Palmer 1992). And our analysis adds an important comparative dimension missing from most previous work on environmental rhetoric by asking what differences might exist in the content or use of "green" arguments or images in these two countries, which have different environmental histories and movements.
More generally, our analysis also contributes to the literature on comparative political culture, specifically by opening to empirical investigation the basic characterizations of American political culture as individualistic and market-oriented, and of French political culture as collectivistic and civic-oriented. While we address some basic comparative questions along these lines—such as whether market arguments are used more commonly in the United States, and whether “solidarity” arguments are used more in France—we also try to make more nuanced comparisons of how these general political-cultural orientations are played out in practice, such as comparing the dynamics of connecting different types of justifications in each country.

Comparison of arguments and modes of justification

Justifications based on the market ("market" worth)

Arguments involving market justifications evaluate worth based on the price or economic value of goods and services in a competitive market. Relevant pieces of evidence brought in support of these arguments only “qualify” for market justifications as long as they can be treated as exchangeable goods or services. These justifications consider the worth of things only in terms of price, and support a very short-term construction of time in which the market competition “test” is the basis for evaluation. Market arguments for the projects in dispute in our cases might include, for example, claims that the project will boost revenue for a region’s commercial areas, or that it is the cheapest method of providing a service for which there is demand. In general, the use of market arguments are more common and well developed in the United States case. In the French case, market arguments come “from above” (from Brussels) rather than emerging “from below” as in classic market economics. Market arguments are endorsed by local actors only when they are “compromise” within the idea of “local development,” i.e. articulated with arguments based on traditional trustworthiness entrenched in local and personal ties (another order of justification dealt with in detail in a later section).

In the French case, the road and tunnel were conceived and defended by the European Community (EC) in Brussels as an integral part of the Pan-European transportation network intended to foster the “free circulation” of goods and people, which is the main reference point in the construction of the EC. Supporters of the tunnel claim it will integrate and provide access to previously isolated or “landlocked” areas—the French term “désenclavées” is used to express this process—which are situated at the periphery of the EC. The road is defended as a way to reduce the cost...
### Table 9.1. Schematic summary of orders of worth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of evaluation (worth)</th>
<th>Market</th>
<th>Industrial</th>
<th>Civic</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>Inspired</th>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Green&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Price, cost</td>
<td>Price, cost</td>
<td>Technical efficiency</td>
<td>Collective welfare</td>
<td>Esteem, reputation</td>
<td>Grace singularity</td>
<td>Renown,</td>
<td>Environmental friendly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence, reliability, planning</td>
<td>Market competitiveness</td>
<td>Equality and solidarity</td>
<td>Trustworthiness</td>
<td>Passion, enthusiasm</td>
<td>Popularity, audience, recognition</td>
<td>Sustainability, sustainability,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measurable: criteria, statistics</td>
<td>Form of relevant proof</td>
<td>Emotional involvement &amp; expression</td>
<td>Fertility, locale, heritage</td>
<td>Emotional involvement &amp; expression</td>
<td>Semiotic</td>
<td>Ecological, ecosystemic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freely circulating market good or service</td>
<td>Qualified objects</td>
<td>Emotionally invested body or item: the sublime</td>
<td>Sign, media</td>
<td>Sign, media</td>
<td>Sign, media</td>
<td>Sign, media</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure, project, technical object, method, plan</td>
<td>Qualified human beings</td>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Creative being</td>
<td>Creative being</td>
<td>Creative being</td>
<td>Creative being</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer, professional, expert</td>
<td>Time formation</td>
<td>Perennial</td>
<td>Customary past</td>
<td>Eschatological, revolutionary, visionary moment</td>
<td>Vogue, trend</td>
<td>Future generations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local, proximal anchoring</td>
<td>Space formation</td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Communication network</td>
<td>Planet ecosystem</td>
<td>Planet ecosystem</td>
<td>Planet ecosystem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

<sup>a</sup>This column presents indications of a possible new order of green worth. This category is currently being developed and is far from being as well illustrated or strongly integrated as the others (see text for comments on this; also see Lafaye and Thévenot, 1993).

<sup>1</sup>The specific meaning of “test” and other terms here – e.g. “qualified” – is explained in the text.
of transit traffic. The funding for the project was proposed in Brussels as a way to promote competition and free markets in Europe through better transport of goods. However, the sorts of evidence that are most characteristic of the way market arguments are put to a “test”—e.g. comparative prices and actual competition—are not provided in the course of debate over the merits of the Somport project.21

While the French case begins with market arguments but contains no consequential market evidence, the American case seems to end with market arguments, and market evaluations seem to have considerable consequences for the eventual fate of the project. Throughout the dispute over the proposed Clavey dam, the opponents attempted to characterize the project as “economically unfeasible,” while Turlock Irrigation District (TID) and its allies continually claimed the dam was the “cheapest” way to meet the long-term energy demand of Turlock residents. Market evaluations were particularly salient in the Turlock area of debate, as the local opposition group, Turlock Ratepayers’ Alliance, emphasized the impact of the project on the electricity bills of county residents.22 Several opponents acknowledged this emphasis on economics as a key strategic move on their part, designed both to avoid being labeled as “environmentalists” (in an area where environmentalism has little public support) and to appeal to the sensitivity of politicians to economic arguments. As the organizer of the Ratepayers’ Alliance, Mike Fuller describes their choice of arguments, “... it was anything that we could really grab onto within reason that had to do with economics.” Also, market evaluations seem to have largely determined the decision to halt the project. TID maintained from 1990 through the end of 1994 that the dam was the cheapest way to meet rising electricity demand, while its opponents claimed other sources were clearly cheaper (and less environmentally damaging); both sides judged the project on market criteria. In announcing the decision to shelve the project in January 1995, TID offered as its primary reasons the declining cost of natural gas and the impending deregulation of the electricity market which would make other sources more accessible.

A different example of market justifications found in both cases involves the tourism and recreation industry, which is important to the regions in which both projects were proposed. In France, the market argument of improving tourism is carefully blended with arguments promoting local and traditional activities. According to this “compromise,” the road should not be an axis for improved trade markets (as Brussels would have it) but should give access to local trades and tourist sites.23 The road, say the locals, should not be a “truck corridor” (as a pan-European market argument would propose it), but rather should be
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road going to and ending at points within the valley – the road should be a way to access the valley, not pass through it. One local mayor, Jacques Lassalle, presents this in terms of the desire by locals to control any infrastructure projects built in their area (in explicit challenge to control from above): “It is necessary to build transportation networks that will remain in our locale and that we will therefore dominate.”

So the local businesses propose a sort of mitigation of the project, a “compromised” road – they will accept a road if it is not a superhighway track road. To demonstrate the problems with the current proposal, locals cite an example of a valley in the Maurienne region, where a small road has been connected by tunnel to Italy, and the whole valley has become exactly the “traffic corridor” feared in the Aspe Valley. The road cuts across historic old towns, people have left their homes because of the traffic and the accidents, etc.

In the United States case, the frequent references to tourism are more directly framed as market justifications. Representatives of the tourism industry in the Clavey area, led by an active group of river rafting companies and employees, repeatedly argue the dam would lead to a decrease in tourist dollars for the local economy. A group of tourism business owners, the Highway 120 Association, was strongly opposed to the project, which they considered a threat to their “livelihood.” Tourism supporters claimed fishing, hunting, and camping on the Clavey would be diminished when its status as a “free-flowing, wild river” was lost. However, proponents of the dam, such as the Tuolumne County Chamber of Commerce, argued the opposite, claiming the dam’s reservoir and new roads would provide better access for other sorts of tourism that would benefit the local economy even more.

Justifications based on technical efficiency and planning

Another category of justifications includes arguments where evaluations depend on technical efficiency and professionalism, planning, and long-term investment in infrastructure. This category relates to the “industrial” order of worth in the Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) scheme, but “industrial” here is not limited to the industrial economic sector. While technical competency and planning arguments are sometimes connected as such to economic outcomes, the bases for evaluation in this category are different from market criteria. Market justifications place value based on the competitive price of goods while technical competency justifications place value based on the efficiency of investments, professional planning and expertise, and long-term growth. In addition, the form of
proof involved in market justifications is short-term profitability, while the form of proof for planning justifications is long-term investment and technical or scientific competency.25

In their beginning stages, both cases show a predominance of technical and planning arguments, as evidenced by the treatment of each project as an “infrastructure investment.” In the Clavey case, TID describes the project as part of a long-term planning effort to ensure continued growth in the Turlock area and argues that further hydroelectric power development is necessary “for the future of California” – they characterize the dam as a well-planned and scientifically sound investment.26 Most often these planning arguments are made (by both sides) in combination with other types of justifications, particularly in terms of the now common American debate over whether to use nature as a resource for human benefit or to preserve nature in its pristine state. The “wise use” movement has emerged as an explicit counter to what their supporters view as the excesses of the environmental movement, with wise use advocates claiming nature can be “conserved” while still serving useful purposes for human development (Dowie 1995; Echeverria and Eby 1995).27 The wise use movement found a local expression in the Clavey dispute through a group called TuCARE (Tuolumne County Alliance for Resources and Environment), which characterized the opposition to the dam as an attempt by “preservationists” to “lock up” the resources of the Clavey and deny local residents the benefits of their use. TuCARE’s perspective is a good example of an explicit “compromise” of planning or technical efficiency (and market) justifications and environmental justifications: they envision nature as both an environmental and a scarce economic “resource” with multiple potential uses – energy, recreation, income for the county – which must be used efficiently.

Interestingly, both sides in the Clavey dispute claim to be advocating what is “best for the future,”28 but present competing visions of what is best: the environmentalists say preserve wilderness for the future, while the dam proponents say build infrastructure. Also, both sides utilize a form of proof which is congruent with technical competency justifications – the use of scientific expertise and evidence – to validate opposite arguments, for example on the question of whether the dam will hurt or help the Clavey fish populations.

Another important connection between planning and environmental justifications is the notion of “mitigation”: making up for or minimizing the project’s impact on the environment. The idea of mitigation rests on the acceptance of both technical and environmental criteria of value as legitimate, and provides the basis for a compromise between them through, for instance, features added to the project to make it more “envi-
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ronmentally friendly." At one point in the Clavey case, both sides discussed possible mitigations, including additional releases of water at times when the fish most need it, placing the dam further upstream so it would not be visible to rafters on the Tuolumne, a faux-wooded path across the top of the dam for deer to cross, and even diversion intakes made to look like rocks. However, the environmental opposition continued to oppose the dam categorically, implying that no amount of mitigation was possible to “make up for” the damage caused by a dam in a cherished wilderness. This continued opposition angered the dam proponents, who touted their project as a model compromise. The project director, John Mills, praises the dam proposal in a way that nicely shows the attempt to use both green and infrastructure justifications: “a project that would leave the smallest footprint on the river and get the highest returns to the county and to Turlock.”

In the French case, technical and planning arguments are also found most significantly in the beginning of the conflict. The project is defended because of the necessity of providing roads, tunnels, and other infrastructure in order for there to be economic growth in the future. This sort of industrial planning argument is extremely influential as an argument for the tunnel project in France, and reflects the well-documented embrace of an “engineering mentality” or “technocratic” approach by the French state (Jasper 1990; Lamont 1992). This strong compromise of technical-industrial and “civic” justifications (see the next section also) closely connects technocratic planning by the state with the general interest, and this approach is perpetuated through the training of elites in “engineering schools” [Grandes Ecoles] for high positions in the state.

Providing relevant proof for a technical and planning argument became a very prominent point of contention in the French case, as the market proof did in the US. Specifically, the initial plans contained a very extensive report projecting the level of traffic on the new road, but then an ecologically minded geography professor from Pau, a city near the Aspe Valley, produced a counter-report projecting much higher levels of traffic. What is significant is that while this report refuted the other report, they are both based on the same type of “test” – the long-term efficiency of the project – with the same criteria of proof and instruments of evidence (technical evidence from modeling and statistical analysis).

The effectiveness of the infrastructure planning arguments in France might also explain a primary difference with the United States: in France, these evaluations are not as frequently mixed with environmental evaluations as in the United States in terms of “wise use” or mitigation or “renewable” energy sources. On the one hand, the process of trying to make up for environmental damage is certainly found in the Somport
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For example, planners of the proposed Somport road included a great many innovations in their impact study to make the road more "environmentally friendly" (to use the American term), such as using "local species of trees" and "techniques of ecological engineering" in "landscaping the roadside" and rest areas, building "bear bridges" and "bear-ducts" over or under the road, and modifying the work schedule to avoid interfering with "sensitive nesting sites" during the "reproductive periods" of birds. On the other hand, there is no comparative term for "mitigation" in French, nor a legal requirement for it, as in United States environmental regulations. In France it is much more common to stay within the realm of infrastructure planning and efficiency evaluations rather than trying to compromise this with environmentalism. For example, hydropower projects in France were not normally defended by reference to their relatively green, renewable quality (as the Clavey project was), but rather were judged based on their efficiency as long-term investments.

**Justifications based on civic equality and solidarity ["civic" worth]**

Justifications based on civic equality or solidarity refer to the collective welfare as the standard of evaluation, and propose or oppose projects based on such goals as equal access and protection of civil rights. Various forms of these "civic" justifications are found in both cases, and equality or solidarity is often the guiding logic underlying the modes of engagement or organization, especially in the Somport case. There are comparative differences also, relating generally to the fact that in the United States the emphasis is more on equal rights, while in France the emphasis is on solidarity against inequality (but not as much on civil rights: cf. the contributions of Michèle Lamont and Abigail Saguy in this volume, who find the same differences in the implementation of civic justifications). There are also many examples in both cases where equality and solidarity justifications are combined or integrated with other types of justifications, although in different ways in the two different cases (e.g. combinations of civic and technical - industrial worth - arguments in France, combinations of civic equality with opinion, market, and environmental justifications in the United States).

In the Somport case, both proponents and opponents make a range of equality or solidarity arguments: the project, like other infrastructure developments, is very often defended by the state and by other proponents as a way to meet the common needs of citizens, and as a way to maintain equality of access and communication between regions. The opposition campaign makes different sorts of civic arguments, but they also engage in modes of protest and organization which embody these
civic goals. For example, there has been an attempt to make connections between the Somport struggle and other similar disputes in Europe, in the Alpine region including Switzerland, which involve the choice of building a railway tunnel for the transportation of cars and trucks ("routage") versus a road or traffic tunnel (the opposition prefers a railway). This attempt to generalize the cause is couched in civic language of "solidarity between struggles" during meetings where spokespersons provide testimonies of comparable experiences. The opposition to the Somport project also organized many demonstrations and used the high level of participation in their demonstrations and their unitary slogans as proof for their arguments against the project. 32

In the Clavey case, civic justifications are utilized by the various players on both sides of the dispute (as in the Somport case), but are more commonly employed by the opponents of the dam project. The local "grassroots" opposition coalition in Tuolumne County often emphasizes their representation of a diverse array of local people (not just the rafting interests or the environmentalists), and the silent solidarity of many more uninvolved but concerned local citizens. The proponents of the dam, however, also lay claim to this silent support of the locals. Both sides at different times collected thousands of names on petitions and submitted them to either the local Board of Supervisors or the national FERC officials. This dispute over who has "public opinion" on his side reveals the connections in the United States between two modes of arguing: a "civic" mode of arguing based on a figure of "majority" commitment to one's side and on the need to "raise consciousness" for gaining more active supporters; a mode of arguing (to be reviewed in detail later) based on "renown" attempting to gain media attention or to "put the issue on the national agenda," as environmentalists explicitly tried to do with the Clavey dispute. In the US case (as in other domains investigated in this volume: cf. chapters by Cyril Lemieux and John Schmalzbauer, and by Nathalie Heinich) frequent references to the "majority" offer a bridge between civic and renown justifications. This connection has historically been a highly legitimate argument in American political culture. Whereas in France, the civic reference to the "general interest" or "solidarity" is not indexed on the number of supporters or some measure of public opinion (see the next chapter for further exploration of this also). The debate over the Clavey in the Turlock area, the valley agricultural region where the power from the dam would be used, provides additional insight into how solidarity is conceived in terms of opinion in the United States. Both sides in this arena – Turlock Irrigation District proposing the dam versus the opposition from corporate "ratepayers" and the "Ratepayer's Alliance," a group claiming to represent the residential customers – claim
to be doing “what’s best for TID’s ratepayers” and to offer evidence that “public opinion” is in their favor. For example, the opposition groups compiled lists of groups opposed to TID and tried to make the list as diverse and as public as possible.

It is also notable that the environmentalist-sponsored opposition group called itself the “Ratepayers’ Alliance.” This name shows the connection often made in the United States between civic equality concerns and market concerns, which were seen as more effective and generally resonant than strictly environmental arguments (or environmental-sounding group names). The term “ratepayer,” which is commonly used throughout the United States, is in one sense a market identity—a “customer” of the power “company”—but it also signifies a civic, non-market identity—a citizen (or citizens as a group) being served by a “public utility” which they usually cannot abandon for another competitor utility for the market reason of lower price. The Alliance leaders often utilized this dual connotation because it allowed them to emphasize market arguments at some times and civic equality arguments at others.

The same sort of combination of equality and market arguments is usually rejected in France (see also Camus-Vigué in this volume). In contrast, it is more common in France for equality and solidarity justifications to be connected with justifications concerning infrastructure planning and technical efficiency (“industrial” rather than market worth). Projects like the Somport tunnel are often defended by their developers as meeting the needs of citizens (collectively and equally) through the most competent technical planning. In fact, the civil servants of the Ministry of Public Works (Ministère de l’Equipement), charged with planning and building infrastructure projects, denounced local opponents of the Somport project as trying to protect their own piece of land and remaining stuck in the past, while resisting “progress” and denying the benefits of the project to all others.

A durable “compromise” between equality arguments and environmental arguments has been developed in the United States earlier and to a greater extent than in France. The great concern with protecting everyone’s equal right to access to nature (at least on “public lands” such as national parks or forests) is both promoted and regulated with the goal of keeping individuals from appropriating nature for their own exclusive use. United States programs and devices to promote equal access to nature include interpretive nature trails, nature education centers, and, in the Clavey case, United States Forest Service regulation of rafting capacity on the Tuolumne River designed to protect the river from overuse and to preserve the pristine wilderness experience for others to enjoy. The debate over the recreational uses of the Clavey reflects the importance of
"making nature available to all people," but also shows a further connection to market arguments in the US (similar to the one observed in the publishing industry, where popular access means both general availability and market distribution). In fact, both sides in the Clavey debate claim to be concerned with marketing recreational services so that many people will be able to enjoy nature. The opposition groups maintain damming the Clavey will take the Clavey away from the people who want to enjoy it recreationally through rafting or fishing or hiking. TID and other dam proponents, on the other hand, retort that the Clavey is currently so remote that only "wealthy yuppies" who can pay the high price for a rafting trip or for wilderness gear can now enjoy it, while their project will provide new roads into the Clavey canyon and many more opportunities for "flatwater recreation" on the reservoir and camping on its shores.4

The attempt to reconcile civic equality arguments with environmental arguments is also at the core of the much-disputed "wise use" movement and the wise use group involved in the Clavey conflict, TuCARE (described earlier). TuCARE argues that their populist approach to environmental protection ("wise use" of resources, not abuse nor complete preservation of them) is a better reflection of local public sentiment (in an area where many residents work in "resource extraction" industries), and a better representation of what is good for all local citizens, than that of the environmentalists (who, they claim, care little about the good of most local citizens). Both of these examples of connections between equality and environmental arguments are not nearly as well developed in France - where there is no institutional equivalent of the "wise use movement" - but the land-use planning of protected areas has been recently growing in France.

Justifications based on tradition and locality ["domestic" worth]

Another distinct category of arguments relies on justifications where traditions are valued and are constantly being revisited in making judgments about the present, and where locality and ties to a place are revered. Evaluations of this type support hierarchies of reputation and trustworthiness. These justifications relate to what Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) term the "domestic" order of worth in which the claim of a general value is warranted by personal tie or local attachment, so that personal character or proximity are considered the source or building blocks of universal goods. In the French case, arguments of this sort are found in the call by project opponents to protect the region's treasured culture and heritage (patrimoine in French), of which the valley's landscape is a significant part.5 In the American case there are many similar arguments.
pointing to the preservation of a place close to one’s home and hearth, and references to the region’s heritage. But these arguments are oriented less around the idea of heritage and patrimony in the United States and more in terms of the protection of one’s “backyard,” either as a protection of private property (a compromise with market arguments) or a rejection of non-local authority.

Justifications based on tradition and locality are utilized extensively by opponents of the Somport project in France, and there are a variety of rich testimonials from the inhabitants of the Aspe Valley on the need to preserve a patrimony and way of life cherished by many and upheld in various ways by existing traditions of the region. This local view is summarized in a report on the project, “This project will confiscate the best cultivated land. The movement of animals [transhumance] by shepherds will be impeded by the new transportation axis. The tourism industry, which is presently harmoniously integrated in the area, will suffer from the proximity of a heavily used road. The local trades and craftsmanship which give life to the villages will be forced to disappear.” This shows the consideration of the French “landscape” of villages – with their distinct cultures, traditions, and crafts that are highly differentiated across regions (régionalisme) – as a tourist attraction threatened by the project.

When local officials and some residents support the project with these sorts of justifications, they compromise local patrimony with market or infrastructure arguments. They claim the project is important for local development: it will improve tourist access to the area, open markets for local trades, etc. As the mayor of the small valley town of Borce explains, “It [the project] is the only possibility we have at present to develop handicrafts, trade, industry, and tourism in our isolated region, which is becoming more and more depopulated.” The “compromise” is made in proposed restrictions to the width of the road: “We only need a two-lane road with three-lane sections for passing. This will create the necessary and indispensable exchange among nearby locals,” says another local mayor who supports the project.

Many of the arguments in the Somport case, in both camps, refer to the harmonious existence of “living on the land”: “what was really significant for me was this land; I did not want to betray this land … We have a fabulous land” (a pro-project local mayor); “My valley is so beautiful, I pity those who left” (an anti-project shepherd). Close connections between people and their land, from villagers who reside in the small valley communities to the shepherds who make their living traveling to remote and rugged mountain pastures, through fishermen and hunters. In France, the idea of “domesticating nature” includes nature and animals as parts of the broader human community or “habitat.” Also, the idea of a “land-
scape” in France is not simply used to refer to a wild area or a vista; rather, a landscape specifically includes the human community, the towns, the networks of trails and roads around the villages, scattered but integrated groups of houses, etc. Even the old railway running through the Aspe Valley is now seen as a part of the “domestic” landscape and is favored as part of the heritage of the area — a past infrastructure project has been transformed into a patrimonial value.

In the Clavey dispute there are also many examples of arguments, almost exclusively among the local opposition activists, calling for the preservation of a treasured local place which is a valued piece of the local history and heritage as well as a location of special meaning for the personal history and lives of many inhabitants. For example, Wally Anker is a retired banker who now raises horses on land near the Clavey that has been in his family since they were early settlers in the nineteenth-century Gold Rush. He spearheaded the founding of the Clavey River Preservation Coalition and he would begin his speeches with a story about how he first visited the Clavey in 1944 as a teenager, at a time when the Clavey was legendary among the local “old-timers” as the most remote and wild stream for trout fishing. Upon returning to the area in the 1980s, Mr. Anker resolved to help keep it that way for his grandchildren. Talking about the Clavey, another activist muses, “You know, there’s a certain thing to be said about a sense of place, and that’s hard to put into words. Pride, sort of.” He goes on to say the river has since taken on this familiar meaning, this “sense of place,” for his son and daughter whom he took to the Clavey’s banks throughout their childhood. These personal stories are made public and assumed to have a public (not simply private) value because of the general legitimacy made possible by this order of worth based on locality and tradition.

Another comparative difference in the ways local attachments are valued and made general are the references to the good of protecting one’s personal home or “backyard,” which reveals divergent ideas about ownership, property, and individuality between the United States and France. In the United States the defense of one’s property is strongly stated and tied to an individual identity, and it rests on private ownership and property rights (which also sustain market worth) (Perin, 1988). The acronym NIMBY (“Not In My Backyard”) is first a rejection of any intrusion on personal property but also has a broader usage as a rejection by a community of an unwanted development or an environmental health risk. Clearly, though, NIMBY is a powerful conceptual tool and motivating force for United States activists. For example, Marty McDonnell describes his intense involvement with the opposition coalition in these NIMBY terms: “We had a personal interest in it, this is our backyard...
This is my home. You know people will pick up guns and defend their home . . . I will go to the wall [for] my backyard.” He determines what he will fight for, then, based partly on locality, partly on a notion of individual possession or even property – “my backyard” – that is not found in similar justifications in France. In France the attachment of a human to property is, in law, dealt with in this liberal way (the individual is the owner of property and locus of privacy), but there is also a different sense of a shared attachment to the land within a local community, particularly in agricultural areas, where local heritage and integration of people with the land are the issues, not private individual ownership. In the United States, where individualism is strongly defended even at a community level (Bellah et al. 1985; Varenne 1977), often in opposition to federal (or other non-local) intervention, it appears more legitimate for someone to argue on the basis of private ownership or NIMBY. Whereas in France, there appears to be a greater tendency to appeal to values more general than NIMBY such as tradition, la patrie (Wiley 1974), or nationalism (see Brubaker 1992, on the evolution of a national conception of “citizenship” in France); for example, saying “my backyard” is part of “our” local or national heritage.39

Justifications based on inspiration and emotion [“inspiration” worth]

A less obvious but often quite significant category of justifications involve judgments based on inspiration, passion, and emotion, and often point to the singularity or creativity of a person, object, or action which is the source of inspiration. The “proof” for inspiration justifications is the display of an emotion, or otherwise showing that one is moved or overwhelmed or awed. Although these sorts of arguments often lead to the critique that they are unable to be discussed or challenged as general (more than personal) claims, and that they are irrational or unreasonable, we find that emotionally inspired (or inspiring) gestures and claims can be publicly displayed, commonly evaluated, and criticized within a specific order of worth.40 They can be the proof of some valuable attachment beyond mere personal feelings, of people making the step from personal passion to a kind of generalized argument where inspiration is valued as a common good.

In both the Somport and Clavey cases participants make crucial moves from inspiration arguments to environmental arguments in terms of an emotional or even spiritual attachment to nature. In the French case, the expression of inspiration arguments are best illustrated through the actions and rhetoric of the main opposition figure, Eric Péetin. Péetin is
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often portrayed in quasi-religious terms, e.g. as “an English preacher ser-
monizing alone in the desert” who presumably preaches his opposition
message from a spiritual inspiration. Pétetin gives impassioned
speeches with artistic flair and gestures; he lives in an abandoned railroad
station in the Valley and, in a similarly avant-garde way, has transformed the
derelict railroad station into a café to welcome hip, non-touristy travelers.
The radical singer-songwriter Renaud also protests against the project
from an emotional or aesthetic standpoint: “The Aspe Valley is really one
of the most grand landscapes, one of the most overwhelming that I have
had the privilege of seeing.” There is also a local shepherd, Labarère, who
has been an active opponent of the project and who writes poems in the
native dialect of Béarnais extolling the beauty of his land. One of his
poems reads: “The Bédis peaks, what a grandiose place / Hidden in the
heights of the Aspe Valley / Two giants watch over it, the Audâ and the
Soperet / Two stone giants clothed in red / Who, since eternity, look at one
another like a couple in love.” Another quote from Pétetin reveals the
inspirational value placed on the “harmony” of man and nature: “The
Aspe Valley is a stone cathedral, unique in the world. Because it is narrow
and winding, it is impossible to build anything without destroying its
balance and its beauty and harmony.”

In the Clavey case, inspiration arguments almost always relate to the
sacred value of nature and many in the United States talk about the highly
emotional, even spiritual experience they have in the wilderness of the
Clavey area. People refer to the Clavey canyon as a special place evoking
personal tranquillity, and they talk about the transformative “feeling” of
being a mere human in the rugged wilderness of the area. This is particu-
larly true of the professional river rafters who became involved in the
opposition campaign (they spend more time physically near the Clavey
dless than anyone else), and of the members of the Me-Wuk tribe who attach
not simply an emotional but a religious importance to the Clavey canyon.
Finally, like Pétetin, Clavey activists refer to the natural “harmony” of
man and nature, an equilibrium that is beautiful and inspiring, that is
found in the remote canyon. Clearly the examples in this section from
both cases involve not merely inspiration justifications about the awe or
passion to be derived from nature, but also environmental or green justifi-
cations which imbue “nature” and “wilderness” with some measure of
inherent value beyond its effect on humans.

Justifications based on renown and public opinion (“renown” worth)
While all orders of justifications involve arguments designed to garner
public support, the standard for judgment and evaluation of arguments in
the other orders is not the extent of public knowledge or renown itself. There are arguments and evaluations, however, which do point to the importance of public knowledge for determining the worth of a cause. In the cases under review here, the mechanisms specifically designed for generating this valuable renown and fame are much more developed in the United States than in France, and arguments about the extent of public concern are more common in the United States. There is even a sort of division of labor among the project opponents in the Clavey case, so that one organization, the Tuolumne River Preservation Trust (TRPT), is primarily responsible for promoting and managing public knowledge about the dispute (on a state and national level). However, both cases involve attempts at gaining media attention or influencing the impressions of an audience who might not know the issues in-depth. More significantly, both cases involve denunciations of these sorts of “publicity” moves.

In the Clavey dispute, advocates for both sides had at their disposal a well-developed set of tools (used in political disputes of all sorts in the United States) for generating public and media attention, such as a fax network for press releases, slick bumper stickers (the opposition’s read simply: “Save the Clavey”), guest editorials sent out to newspapers for consideration, slide shows, newsletters and mass mailings, endorsement campaigns and announcements, and a distinctly American form of pamphlet, the “alert.” Interviews with key environmental leaders in the Clavey dispute reveal they were explicitly concerned with making the Clavey a well-known issue, particularly among environmentally minded citizens in San Francisco and nationwide, and among key elected officials such as national Democratic congressional representatives who might endorse the opposition campaign. TRPT worked with national environmental groups including American Rivers, which publishes an annual list of “The Ten Most Endangered Rivers” in the United States and generates a great deal of national media coverage. The head of TRPT, Johann Thomas, said the national groups acted “kind of like a public relations firm for the river, because they had the ability to put out materials and reach a huge audience, much like advertisers do.” This advertisement for the river then paid crucial dividends in the form of pressure on the dam proponents to recognize that not just the politicians were against the dam but also masses of people from throughout the state and nation, many of whom wrote letters to government calling for a halt to the project. Sh contends, “I think it was very threatening when [TID] saw that the Clavey was getting this kind of attention.”

The denunciation of these publicity efforts by the dam proponents also suggests the relevance and power of opinion claims. Mills attempts to play
down the national renown of the Clavey by pointing out that most of the people who wrote opposition letters were “outsiders” who would never see the river and had no “stake” in the dispute. He characterized them as professional adversaries of any dams, who for that reason should have no weight in local decision-making. Mills goes further to argue against judging the project in terms of opinion at all; he believes opinion evaluations are dangerous because opinion is so fickle and so easily manipulated by “public affairs gurus” and “spin doctors” who know how to “push buttons” on “whatever’s popular right now.” Another project supporter, Shirley Campbell, also acknowledged the importance of opinion on a local level. She helped start the wise use group TuCARE partly because she wanted to counter the loud publicity from the environmentalists. Thus, the Clavey dispute in the local area took on the appearance of a “public opinion war” because both sides effectively utilized the many tools available to them.

While public opinion is also at stake in the Somport case, the goal of generating media attention and public notoriety is less explicitly pursued by the participants, and the mechanisms for renown are much less developed. The famous singer of protest songs, Renaud, made headlines when he came out against the tunnel, and he has continued to make dramatic public statements denouncing the tunnel. Also, there has been quite a lot of national and international press coverage of the large protests against the project. But there has been some reaction against the press treatment of the project, partly because the press were considered “Parisian” and not local. Finally, the Minister of the Environment, Brice Lalonde, has been denounced by opponents as being overly concerned with managing his image through his prominent role in the dispute. The influential valley mayor, Jacques Lassalle, says in an interview: “Mr. Lalonde feels compelled to shine [il a besoin de briller] in Paris.” Overall, opinion judgments have not played the same central role in the Somport dispute as they did in the Clavey.

Attracting the attention and influencing the opinion of politicians is another area of comparative difference. This is an essential goal of both sides of the Clavey conflict, and both sides were active in lobbying both directly and indirectly. The opposition coalitions actively sought the endorsement of key legislators, and even took many legislators on rafting trips with the goal of letting them personally “experience” the Clavey. Much attention was given by the media to a visit by Senator Barbara Boxer to the region, when she came out against the dam. Again, the denunciations of these renown tactics also reveal the significance of public attention in contributing to the fate of the project. Shirley Campbell and other local dam supporters saw Senator Boxer’s public
endorsement as a “purely political” ploy to win her votes by portraying her as the champion of everyday local folk and environmental awareness.\textsuperscript{43} Activists in the Clavey case even developed ingenious methods for informing the public and prompting “ordinary citizens” to write to their legislators. For example, rafting companies active in fighting the dam had their guides talk to the customers about the dispute and (when they felt they had convinced them) ask them to write letters to their representatives and to FERC. John Mills denounced this tactic also; he even sent in “spies” to take the rafting trip and report back on what the other side was telling the public.

Lobbying is a much less common activity of either side in the Somport case, and this is partly due to the fact that in France there are fewer direct, budgetary or other ties between legislators and specific agencies like the Ministry of Environment\textsuperscript{44}. But also the idea of lobbying – trying to influence legislators outside of public settings or even publicly announcing endorsements of any one side in the dispute – would rarely be considered legitimate in France, while it is often (but not always) considered a legitimate tactic in the United States\textsuperscript{45}. An example of the denunciation of lobbying in France comes from someone (quoted in an English-language news report) who believes lobbying had an influence in the French case: “It is incredible that as a consequence of the pro-road lobby, comprised of lorry drivers, public works construction companies, and local politicians, work has begun on building a tunnel like this without having made a complete study of the project.”

\textit{Justifications based on “green-ness” and environmentalism [“green” worth]}

Many examples in previous sections refer to nature or the environment within an evaluation based on non-environmental justifications and principles, e.g. when nature is marketed as a tourist attraction. Other examples move to the next level: when environmental justifications, based on principles of what might be called “green-ness” (as described below), are presented for their own sake or are combined with other sorts of justifications, e.g. when mitigations to infrastructure plans are proposed to make them more environmentally sensitive.\textsuperscript{46} These types of justifications – which might add a new “order of worth” to the Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) scheme (see Latour 1995; Lafaye and Thévenot 1993; Barbier 1992) – have become more refined and widespread since the rise of the global environmental movement in the past few decades, but they also have important historical and cultural precursors (Oelschlaeger 1991; Nash 1982; Moscovici 1977; Collingwood 1945).
Actions or entities are worthy, with regard to this "green" justification, when they support or reflect the principles of environmentalism or "green-ness", e.g. clean/non-polluting, renewable, recyclable, sustainable, and in harmony with nature. Justifications based on environmentalism consider the general good of humanity to be advanced through a sensitivity to environmental issues and consequences, protection of wilderness, stewardship of environmental resources, and cultivation of various attachments to nature, the land, or the wild. Strictly green arguments, beyond the level of integrating the environment into other sorts of non-green justifications, posit a unique type of dependency which assumes more than simply a spatial interaction of humanity with the natural world, but also a temporal extension of humanity by way of an implicit or explicit reference to future generations (Goodwin 1992; Dobson 1990; Larrère 1997; Larrère and Larrère 1997; Naess and Rothenberg 1989; Taylor 1986). The green order of worth is revealed in distinctly "green" qualifications, such as the "health" of trout in the Clavey River valued as something that is good for humanity, which are not considered relevant in any other order. At a further level, some environmental evaluations depart from the political and moral requirements which are shared by all orders of worth – where common humanity is the group of reference for the evaluation – and propose an extension of the "community" of reference to include non-human entities (a move to "ecocentrism" rather than "anthropocentrism"; see, for example, Eckersley 1996; Devall and Sessions 1985; Stone 1974).

The subsections which follow compare the expression and frequency of a number of green or environmental arguments found in the comparative survey, and explore the different modes of the relation of humans and the environment revealed by these arguments.

Unique and endangered Perhaps the greatest similarity between the two cases is the extent and nature of arguments about the uniqueness or singularity of the natural places in dispute, and about the threat to "endangered species" (plant and animal) posed by the projects. In the Clavey case, uniqueness arguments are perhaps the most prevalent environmental justifications offered by dam opponents. There are several senses in which the river is characterized as a unique natural place: in terms of being the "last" undammed river in the ecosystem, in terms of its specific role in local heritage and its historical importance, in terms of being a "rare" ecosystem not found elsewhere and in terms of the number of endangered species which live in the ecosystem. The environmentalists who opposed the dam on the Clavey were constantly referring to a long list they compiled of all the "officially threatened or endangered" plant
and animal species, such as the rare “wild trout,” found within the Clavey canyon and presumably further endangered by the project. The other side for their part constantly tried to refute this justification, either by denying the danger to these species or proposing to mitigate for any potential harm (but never explicitly by denying the importance of protecting endangered species).

Arguments in the Somport controversy focus on the singularity of the Aspe Valley and the scarcity and uniqueness of the animals in the area. Evaluations of the uniqueness of the valley are not so much concerned with it being the last wild place of a certain type, but rather concern the singularity of the entire “landscape” of the valley, including the animal and human inhabitants and the special integration between the people and land found there. The bears became a famous symbol of the project opposition – they were described as the “last of their kind” and “endangered,” and were considered deserving of protection because they had lived in the area for a long time (a somewhat different characterization to the legal sense of “endangered species” in the United States). The attachment to the Pyrenean bear is understandable because it holds a special place of honor in this region – it plays a central role in local customs such as carnivals, and it was a feared threat to humans, particularly farmers and shepherds, but also the prized prey of local bear-hunting heroes. An exhibition on the bears in the valley town of Accous tells the “fabulous story of a mythical animal.” The use of the bear as a symbol attractive to the media has also been denounced by project supporters. In addition to the bears, other animals were put forward as endangered by the project, including a unique sort of amphibious mole.

Untouched wilderness In the Clavey case, there are numerous arguments about keeping the Clavey “free-flowing,” “untouched,” “pristine,” and “the way it was long before humans arrived.” These claims became crucial points of contention and debate, and were given explicit consideration in the decision-making by the government agencies involved – e.g. the Forest Service rated the river partly on its value as an undisturbed habitat. Dam proponent John Mills spent much of his time attempting to disprove the claims that the Clavey is “free-flowing” and “untouched” – for example, he argues there have been non-wild, hatchery trout released into the river, and that there are small dams near the headwaters of the river.

When used by environmentalists, however, these arguments generally mean “untouched by development” rather than untouched by man at all. While they are accused by Mills and others of taking a “preservationist” or deep ecological stance that wilderness should be locked up and unused by
any humans, many dam opponents making these “pristine” arguments are in fact fishermen, hunters, and rafters who enjoy “using” the “untouched” Clavey. So these green arguments in the United States about pristine wilderness imply a view of the relation of humans and nature whereby humans can get great benefit from “participating in,” “experiencing” or “struggling against” wilderness (or preserving untouched wilderness) for others in the present or future to experience. So wilderness is valued (by dam opponents) because of its non-human qualities, but the pristine quality of wilderness is used as a justification (against building the dam) because pristine wilderness has a benefit for humanity.\textsuperscript{51}

In France, the notion of a “sublime” and “wild” nature is commonly found in the Somport dispute, as in the Clavey dispute.\textsuperscript{52} Renaud provides a nice example of this view: “If you touch the Aspe Valley, if you want to make it more accessible, if you give it over to concrete and trucks, it would be a crime against beauty, an acid facelift of the noble visage of a distinguished old lady.” However, the relation of man and the wild is not described in terms of a struggle so much as in the United States, and there is less attention to the “experience” of wilderness. In France the idea of “domesticated nature” is not necessarily set against “untouched wilderness” as in the United States\textsuperscript{53} While the Clavey debate often concerns separating what is to be untouched and what is not, this is not always the case in the Somport debate, and there are instead connections made between the domestic life of the valley and its natural life. For example, one reason offered against the road-tunnel project was, “The survival of the large Pyrenean scavenger birds depends on the perennial continuation of traditional practices such as mountain transhumance.”

The “wilderness industries” in the United States are more highly developed commercial enterprises than in France. These industries explicitly market a struggle of man against the wild and an escape from domestic life, and in the Clavey dispute they are a primary source of the environmental arguments against the dam. In France, the tourist activities oriented toward nature were not, until recently, nearly as heavily equipped and are not geared toward a “struggle” of man against the wild, but rather a contemplation of the landscape by man. We can distinguish in the arguments made by wilderness industries between explicit green arguments—wilderness experiences are good for people—and the compromise of these arguments with market concerns, i.e. selling this experience to tourists.

\textit{Wild places as heritage and habitat} In the earlier section dedicated to justifications based on tradition, we saw how evaluations of the projects based on “patrimoine” or “heritage” sometimes refer to “green”
attachments to a place – "inhabiting" a wild or natural place. The green characterization of "natural" heritage is particularly oriented toward future generations. In the Clavey case, for example, dam opponents made the arguments that wild places like the Clavey must be preserved because they have been entrusted to our stewardship by past generations and we must pass them on to the future generations. Other times, these sorts of heritage arguments are also careful combinations of justifications based on tradition or locality ("domestic") and green justifications. For example, there are similar arguments in both cases about the value of being attached for a long time to a land that has been passed down through several generations of one's family, and these are then combined with arguments about the natural value of the land and the need to preserve it for the future. The Clavey activist Wally Anker combines arguments in this way by saying first that the Clavey is "the only place I know that is the same today as it was during the Ice Age," then saying that his family has lived near the Clavey for generations, and he wants to preserve the Clavey so his grandchildren can have the same attachment to it.

Animals can of course be included in these evaluations of wild places as part of our heritage, but animals have their own attachment to the wild place in terms of their "habitat," an attachment which environmentalism wants to preserve as part of "heritage." This raises the problem of arranging for "cohabitation" of humans and animals in making green arguments. This cohabitation problem is found in both cases, but is perhaps more central in France, where the connection between wild nature and domesticated nature has been built up over time. A voluntary association in the Aspe Valley, FIEP, is in fact entirely dedicated to promoting harmonious "cohabitation," particularly by working to "let shepherds and bears live together in the Pyrenees." FIEP arranged for helicopter transportation of supplies to shepherds in their mountain outposts as a way to avoid building new roads that would threaten bear habitats, while still retaining the shepherds' way of life. They promoted numerous mitigation measures such as wildlife road passages to allow for cohabitation. They emphasized the integration of valley habitats: "The bear is an integrator. We cannot take care of bears without taking care of the forest or the pastures, because the bears are demanding." The problem of cohabitation of humans and animals is also used in an ironic way by the prominent project supporter, Jacques Lassalle, who at one point states his goal as having "both genuinely wild bears and genuine humans." He contrasts wild bears with non-wild bears put in zoos, and compares this to the contrast between genuine humans and non-genuine humans who are forced by environmental restrictions to live in a "reservation of humans like a reservation of Indians" – in this way he uses cohabitation ironically as a
defense of the project and at the same time denounces his opponent, the “Indian” Eric Pénetin, who often identifies himself with the native Indian ideal of living in harmony with the land.

Native “Indian” attachments to sites  Pénetin’s identification with the native American “Indians” makes an ideal of the intimate connections of native Indians to their culturally significant sites. Pénetin often dresses up using some symbols of American Indian costumes like a feather in his hair, and holds up Indian culture as an exemplar of a sustainable and harmonious relationship with the land – this attachment is then used as a green justification for his position against the Somport project (although there is also a significant element of inspiration justification). Pénetin says, “The Indian culture is a culture shared by men and women who lived in harmony with nature all year around, without spoiling it, while using its richness, while loving it, while knowing it.” Pénetin’s reference to the “Indian” orientation to nature points to the important overlap between the native political and moral viewpoint, which emphasizes the integration and dependency of humans with non-human entities, and the viewpoint of modern environmental politics which emphasizes this dependency also.

In the Clavey case, the involvement of the Me-Wuk Indian tribe in the controversy meant there was a more direct consideration of Indian attachments to their land in this case. The tribal member most active in the Clavey controversy is a grandmother named Phyllis Harness, who expressed her attachment to the Clavey in many ways, including the fact that her grandson is named “Clavey.” One of her primary self-descriptions is as a “gatherer” – one who collects plants, particularly mushrooms, from the ancestral lands which surround the Clavey – and she often describes her gathering as a ritual, “sacred” cultural practice (something her elders taught her). The sacredness of her attachment to this place is in some ways “proved” only through being present in the place, and she prizes the experience of being near the Clavey. This sort of presence is an intimate attachment to the natural place that Phyllis compares to the connections of animals to specific locales or habitats: she compares the Me-Wuk historical migrations through the Clavey canyon with the migratory routes of a particular deer herd.

The recognition of the power of this sort of native attachment to the Clavey site as a general good (and so as a possible justification for or against the dam) was revealed in the rigorous competing attempts by both sides in the dispute to gain the endorsement of the Me-Wuk tribe. The spokeswoman for the tribe originally endorsed the project (without an official tribal vote) after project supporters promised that the tribe could operate campgrounds on the dam’s reservoir. When the rest of the tribe
found out about this, however, Harness and others vigorously objected and eventually passed a tribal resolution against the dam. Thereafter the Me-Wuk were often touted by the opposition campaign as key opponents of the project. The courting of the Me-Wuk tribe’s endorsement was clearly important both because of its political appeal (politicians are known to be sensitive to “native” issues), and because their attachment to the land makes them the most legitimate “spokespersons for the land.”

**Deep ecology** A particular variant of “green” standards of evaluation known as “deep ecology” has been developed, primarily in the United States but initially in Europe (Naess and Rothenberg 1989; Devall and Sessions 1985; Lovelock 1979), which makes a very important move away from the common moral requirements found in the other types of justification we have been considering. The justifications – environmental or other types – discussed so far refer to the good of humanity as the primary basis for assigning value: the goal is “good for everyone.” But in the deep ecology philosophy and movement, the community of “everyone” that is the basis for evaluations is extended beyond the human community to include the good of non-human natural entities (e.g. trees, animals); they refer to this as a shift from “anthropocentrism” to “ecocentrism.” Green arguments based on a deep ecology perspective value a healthy environment or the preservation of species not because of the benefits for humanity, but for their own sake, for the benefit of the integrated ecosystem (which includes humans) itself.

Deep ecology arguments are explicitly made only rarely in the Clavey case; they are never made seriously in the Somport case, but there are a couple instances when they are used sarcastically. One example from the Clavey case is a statement made by the rafting company owner with a deeply personal connection to the river, Marty McDonnell. In talking about reasons to preserve the river, he discounts the human definition of clean environment and privileges the animal’s concerns in determining what’s really important: “Throwing a beer can out the window doesn’t really harm the health [of the environment]. It may look bad, but I’m sure that the deer that walks by could care less if he sees a beer can on the side of the road or not. It offends my sense of natural order, but that’s just a human thing.”

In the Somport case, there are a couple of instances where deep ecological arguments are used sarcastically, mocking the radical environmental notion that the good of animals on their own should be the criteria of worth or evaluation. One instance of this is a letter to the editor of an important paper in the Pyrenees region which is in fact a parody of efforts to protect the bears. The author mentions all the money to be spent on
Somport mitigation measures such as bear-ducts and bridges, and he proposes to spend as much money to protect a species of glow-worm from devastation by the road and tunnel. He ironically praises the efforts of Americans to save species in peril (stranded whales rescued by an ice-breaker), by suggesting the construction of an underground tunnel for the worms to avoid the road is a similar but more modest effort of a less wealthy country. This parody is partly also a denunciation of the influence of “radical” American environmentalist views in the Somport controversy.

Conclusion

This detailed review and classification of the range of legitimate critiques and justifications in two environmental disputes adds precision to our understanding of the differences between French and American patterns of evaluation and constructions of what is generally good. We found comparative discrepancies in the generality or scope of different types of evaluations in each culture, in the ways that arguments were combined or “compromised” (in the sense of making different forms of evaluations compatible), and in which arguments were in tension with which others in each case.

Rather than finding that market evaluations were only – or more – important in the United States, we found more interesting and specific differences. Market evaluations were common in the United States and were often combined with other sorts of evaluations, often with “civic” arguments (see Chapter 1 in this volume) and also with “green” arguments (which is surprising, given the anti-capitalist tendency of some environmental movements). Market arguments for the project were also used in France, but primarily came from Brussels and were not endorsed at the local level, except in connection with contributions to “local development”, in a combination with “domestic” arguments grounded on the value of locality. Claims based solely on the value of the free market were much more commonly criticized in France.

Arguments based on planning and technical competency evaluations (“industrial worth”) were important in both countries and were employed in similar ways, particularly at the beginning of the disputes. The biggest difference was that in the United States, as with market criteria, there is a more developed and accepted combination of planning arguments with green arguments, particularly as embodied in the “wise use” movement for which there is no real equivalent in France.

Both cases also involved plenty of attention to civic equality and solidarity as standards of judgment, but here the difference in application was significant. In France civic equality arguments were tightly bound with
planning arguments (as the technocratic defense of the state and the role played by engineers would suggest). By contrast, in the United States equality judgments are more commonly tied to market judgments, making what in France would be considered an odd association between one’s status as a free consumer or “user of nature” and one’s status as a citizen with equal rights to access nature and wilderness (in opposition to élitist control of nature).

As would be expected in disputes involving local communities, we found the debate about local development and local heritage or “patrimony” (“domestic worth”) to be of central concern in both countries. But there were interesting differences in the ways that local attachments were shaped and the models of community in which they were placed. In France the arguments were oriented toward a defense of a shared local “patrimony” and local tradition, while in the United States the arguments tended to be oriented toward a defense of a “backyard” (although not always). Even though the American political trope of the “backyard” can be extended to include the collective “backyard” of a community, the model is still based on a private property model, whereas the French notion of patrimony is more general and explicitly not private.

Both cases involved similar wars over “public opinion,” and there were very similar denunciations of opinion-seeking. However, the tools for and attention to generating media renown or publicity are more developed in the United States, particularly as a preferred means of influencing public officials and of making a connection, expressed by the demonstrations of “majority” support, with a civic expression of a collective will – this sort of civic expression is not tied to opinion so much in France.

Finally, we found significant evidence in both cases for recognizing a distinct category of generalized justifications based on “green” or environmental evaluations. For example, the protection of “endangered species,” reverence for the natural beauty and harmony of the land, and especially for the harmonious attachment to the land of “natives,” were important as arguments against the projects in both countries. However, in the United States there were more arguments relating to “wilderness,” and even a whole well-developed “wilderness industry,” based on the notion of humans struggling against a “pristine” wilderness that stands outside man, while in France there is a stronger connection of the domesticated life (and patrimony) of the valley with the wild life of the valley. So the issue of the “cohabitation” of humans and animals is much more central in France (where the bears are seen as long-time inhabitants of the valley alongside the shepherds and valley folk) than in the United States (where the fish are also long-time inhabitants, but are valued for their “wild” habitation and not their cohabitation with humans).
The differences we discovered in our comparative analysis are grounded in (and help us specify) the political culture and traditions of France and the United States. For example, we found some evidence for the standard comparative finding of the “classical liberal” orientation of American political thought versus the “republican” orientation of French political thought, but we showed how these orientations are manifested in complex patterns of justification in each case (e.g. the various compromises of market evaluations with other types in the United States). To specify our understanding further, we need to situate the types and patterns of evaluations that we have identified here within a broader perspective by considering the “strategy” of argumentation displayed by the disputants, and by comparing the conceptual models employed in each culture for connecting the actors’ “interests” with some configuration of the “common good” or some vision of “community.” We address these tasks in the next chapter.

Notes

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1 The Tuolumne was dammed upstream of the Clavey confluence long ago to create Hetch-Hetchy Reservoir and provide a good portion of the drinking water and power supplies for the distant metropolis of San Francisco.

2 Translations of French quotes from the Somport case used in Chapters 10 are the authors'. At times the original French word or phrase is also given for statements that convey a particular meaning in French that is lost or awkward when translated.

3 “Setting” or context might include such factors as real or imagined audience, objects, place, history, past or present or planned relations of people involved, political and national climate, etc. We pay particular attention to instances
when the participants themselves point to a particular feature of the context as relevant.

4 We are also indebted to Olivier Soubeyran (Université de Pau) for giving access to the unpublished results of research he carried out with Véronique Barbier.

5 Johanna Thomas generously opened and copied the Trust’s files when requested, and Mr. Anker provided full, unsupervised access to his box of materials, which yielded an extensive documentary record of the dispute. Anker’s files are now located in the Water Resources Center Archives in Berkeley, California.

6 For a short presentation in English, see Boltanski and Thévenot 1999. While we started from this pre-developed set of general categories, we maintained an open empirical perspective which actively looked for variations in the frequency and type of arguments in the two countries, including the possibility that some category of justifications might be entirely absent in one or the other country. This led us to identify and analyze significant differences and second-order elaborations of the justification types rather than merely confirm the existence of the categories.

7 Each order of worth has been “built” historically to address public problems through an order that ranks people or things while also maintaining equal human dignity, and each derives its legitimacy as a basis for evaluation from this (e.g. a eugenic order that ranked people based on genetic qualities would not meet this requirement of common humanity and would not address the need for justice). See Boltanski and Thévenot 1991 for a precise analysis of the shared specifications and matrix of justification common to all orders. For a comparison of this analytical framework to theories of justice (Rawls and Walzer, in particular), see Thévenot 1992b, 1996a. For a general perspective on justification and evaluation, see Chapter 1 in this volume.

8 While our approach benefits from ethnomethodological or other research on “accounts” (Orbuch 1997; Mills 1940), our analysis seeks a more systematic treatment of modes of evaluation beyond situational context. Instead of analyzing the consistency of the process of making accounts under situational constraints, we consider the cross-situational constraints imposed by the fact that one is attempting to produce a generalized argument and to refer to a certain extra-situational value or justification. Instead of considering all claims as only locally valid, we consider the different ways to make a claim generally valid.

9 Reality may be engaged in the proof of a generalized justification in many ways, e.g. presented as a chart or table of statistics, embodied in a highly recognizable sign, or pointed to in terms of lived experience or displayed emotion. Following Latour’s (1987) and Callon’s (1986b) seminal work on the “enrollment of non-human entities,” Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) deviate from them in highlighting the plurality of ways this association is made, in relation to orders of evaluation, and the critical tension or compromises that result from this plurality. John Law (1994) accounts for a plurality of “modes of ordering” within an actor-network perspective.

10 In an extension of the ordinary usages of the word “qualify,” we use it to designate the characterizations which are intended to make people and things
Forms of valuing nature
general and relevant to public issues. On the “investments in forms” that are needed for such generalizations by means of standards, grades, criteria, customs, etc., see Thévenot 1984. On the relation with the ways facts need to be “qualified” in court to justify the enforcement of law, see Thévenot 1992a; on a comparison between these everyday “qualifications” and the construction of artificial “moral entities” in law, see Thévenot 2000b.

11 This process of qualifying relates to what Bolzanski and Thévenot (1991) call putting the argument to a “test.” A “test” in this sense is a creative and dynamic process of demonstrating what is relevant in a particular situation (and de-emphasizing or ignoring what is not relevant), and attributing “worth” to the relevant entities.

12 The orders of worth taken into account in the regime of justification do not encompass all possible kinds of evaluation, as the eugenics example given in n. 7 above suggests. For a short presentation of the theoretical and empirical agenda of this research orientation, and commentary on its position within on-going debates, see Thévenot 1995c. For a discussion, see Dodier 1993.

13 Our approach to argumentation is different from the tradition of “Rhetoric” practiced and studied since Aristotle and the Sophists, revisited in the “new rhetoric” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1988) and continued in recent work (Hirschman 1991; Billig 1987; Simons et al. 1985). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca updated and refined this classical approach by arguing that rhetoric is more than simply manipulating opinion, but is part of understanding reasoning and reasonableness more generally. However, they are concerned only with discursive evidence and not with the technique of pointing to the real world or to objects. On the relations between rhetoric, justice and justification, see Thévenot 1996a.

14 The notions of “frame resonance” and “alignment process” account for variability in subjective meanings among a target audience and raise the issues of the credibility and ideological relevance to personal identities (Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994; Snow et al. 1988).

15 Referring to Kenneth Burke’s analysis of irreducible “God terms” (Burke 1969 [1945]), Jasper (1992) argues there are types of rhetoric which claim unquestionable grounding and are employed in rhetoric to stifle any critique. By contrast, Bolanski and Thévenot (1991) study orders of justification that involve an inevitable process of questioning within each of them, or in their mutual critical relationship. When the generalized rhetorical claims made within any order fail to be questioned, it leads to a sense of injustice. On the requirements of a third party evaluation for democratic debate, see Meyers 1989.

16 Both Habermas and Arendt carefully distinguish different types of human activities (e.g. Arendt delineates fine distinctions among labor, work, and action) and types of action (e.g. Habermas contrasts communicative action explicitly with instrumental action).

17 On the modes of generalization used to escape NIMBY in the French context, see Lolive 1997a, b. For a discussion of the challenges for democratic theory presented by NIMBY environmental disputes, see Press 1994.

18 For attempts to specify these general characterizations see Bellah et al. 1985 on the United States; Brubaker 1992 on France; and Lamont 1992 on both.
See Table 9.1 for a schematic summary of the different orders of worth and types of justification.

Recent work in economic sociology (e.g. DiMaggio 1994; Zelizer 1994) argues that markets and a market orientation are socially constructed and embedded in social networks and cultural norms. Along these lines, our aim is to consider how the market can be used as a generalized argument in different contexts and is combined or articulated with other sorts of general arguments in the two countries.

There is no competition for the production of the road and tunnel or discussion of it as the “cheapest” alternative, and the service provided by the project is only considered as a means to improving competition (or lowering prices) rather than the object of competition itself.

James Jasper (personal communication) draws a parallel with the way arguments about high costs eventually stopped the construction of nuclear plants in the United States. He also observes that “ratepayers” differ from other “customers” because the rates charged by utilities (as “natural monopolies”) are set by public utility commissions. So the only way of negotiating with their electric utility is by organizing politically, without the possibility of switching brands or boycotting.

To speak of natural areas as “tourist sites,” as is done in both France and the United States, is to transform nature into “goods and services” which qualify for market justifications.

In French the term “voie de communication” – translated here as “transportation networks” – actually implies a broader sense of the connection between the transportation of goods and the possibility for communication between cultures or communities. The same official makes this connection explicitly when he says, “We realized that we had a culture which made us distinctive while allowing for communication with the entire world.”

This distinction is made explicitly by some of the disputants in our cases. John Mills, a principal dam proponent in the Clavey case, argues against focusing on short-term profitability (market) and for evaluating the project as a long-term, reasonably planned investment. Electric utilities were traditionally run by engineers, and it is only recently that they have adopted this sort of more market-oriented thinking. The tension between short-term market evaluations and long-term “industrial” evaluations is a well-developed subject in economics, and the dominance of the short term over long-term evaluations is seen as a recurrent problem in market economies.

In defending the dam in these terms, TID reflects what has been called the “engineering ethos” (Espeland 1998) that guided most dam-building projects throughout American history (see Worster 1985). Paterson’s (1989) history of TID demonstrates that the District was historically one of the greatest champions of this ethos. (A similar ethos is common in French history, but tied more directly to the national level and the state-owned Electricité de France or the national railways company SNCF (Dobbin 1994).)

Environmentalists, in turn, challenge the wise use movement as merely a grassroots façade for large resource extraction industries who seek to exploit and over-use resources, not use them “wisely.”
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28 These claims might be seen as compromises between orders of justification also, since both technical planning and environmental justifications focus attention on the long-term future. However, although these two types of justifications are temporally oriented toward the future, which helps support the combinations of the two, they propose different ways of building that future—in "industrial worth," the future is supported by the regularities of technical investments while in "green worth" the future is supported by ensuing human generations and ecological evolution.

29 Mills is an interesting case study in the art of making strategic connections between types of justifications. He clearly prefers to operate in the realm of "industrial" judgments, and sets up the dam project as the product of rational and scientifically sound planning while characterizing its detractors as unscientific and unconcerned with the long-term needs of the public. However, he also makes much of the fact that hydropower is a "clean, renewable source of energy" in order to make connections with green concerns.

30 Struggling against the lack of precision in the contemporary usage of the term "civil society," Alexander (1997) conceptualizes a "solidary sphere" of "universalizing social solidarity" which "transcends particular commitments, narrow loyalties and sectarian interests" and where protests against injustice become social movements. In such a definition, civil society is deeply grounded in this order of worth that Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) identify as "civic."

31 See also the penultimate section of Chapter 1 above on "The relative salience of some criteria of evaluation and how they are brought together."

32 Certain engagements in protests and demonstrations may also qualify for the worth of "inspiration" which values "emotional" elements (see section on this order below), as passionate or creative expressions of outrage. Fortunately for our comparison, the rafting company owner and anti-Clavey dam activist Marty McDonnell happened to witness a protest against the Somport project while visiting the Pyrenees. He recalled the protest as "incredible" and "one of the most impressive, emotional demonstrations I'd ever seen," while this same protest was viewed, in France, as a nearly standard expression of solidarity to the cause.

33 See Chapter 5 above; see also similar connections for artworks in Chapter 7.

34 This later argument reveals a tension concurrent with the acknowledged benefits of civic access to nature: use can quickly become overuse, and too much human access can "disturb the wilderness." This problem is often illustrated by reference to the heavily visited Yosemite National Park near the Clavey. The Me-Wuk tribal member most active in the Clavey campaign, Phyllis Harness, nicely illustrates this tension when discussing the possible increased use of the Clavey: "I'm kind of bitter for having to give up Yosemite [their ancient habitat: Godfrey 1977 (1941)], and to see it the way it is now. But, I mean, that's progress." Later she acknowledges that moderate human use is the ideal because she wants people to be able to see the "breathtaking" beauty of the area, rather than leave it completely "untouched."

35 For a French-German comparison of the "patrimonialisation" of nature, see Trom 1997.
36 On the concept of *habiter* [inhabit] and its political implications, see Abel 1995; Berque 1986, 1996; Bréviglieri 1998. On the possible politicization of attachment to the earth into conservative and Nazi politics, see Ferry 1992; Alphandery et al. 1991.

37 Similarly, the rancher Ian McMillan became a powerful symbol of opposition to the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant in California (Jasper 1997, chap. 5). For an illustration of the depth of attachment to a local or “family river” that can result from trout fishing, see Norman Maclean’s passionate account in *A River Runs Through It* (1976).


39 Of course, this sort of generalization happens in the United States also—NIMBY groups often try to argue a particular development should not be in anyone’s backyard (see Williams and Matheny 1995, on “NIABY”)—and there is certainly a great deal of reverence for local ties and celebration of local community in the United States (Fischer 1991). But there seems to be more of a standing imperative to generalize to locality or tradition justifications in France. For an example of such an extension, see the autobiographical account, titled *Saint Concrete: A War Diary*, of one person’s singular and ardent fight in France against the “concrete builders” who “ruined our pastures and our forests, who raped our sacred land” (Antigona 1995).

40 For approaches to studying social movements and protest which take emotions seriously, showing how emotions are part of almost every collective action and do not make that action irrational as some critics claim, see Goodwin 1997; Jasper 1997; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1996; Jasper and Nelkin 1992.

41 In his discussion of Pétetin’s activism, Eric Doidy (1997) mentions that, as a student, Pétetin wrote a paper on “Faith and Activism” (“l’engagement”).

42 In his survey of American Christian ethical codes and practices, Stephen Hart (1992) describes the decisive religious experience of a man facing the sublime of an inspired nature: attending a camp meeting as a youth, he experienced an intense storm that blew the tents down. However, inspiration worth does not always coincide with religious engagement. There can be non-religious expressions of inspiration in a creative experience, whether artistic or entrepreneurial. There can also be kinds of religious engagement which relate not to inspiration, but rather to other orders of worth. Hart shows that Christian faith can lead in the United States to other forms of evaluation which depart from inspiration and include a “civic” fight for equal rights and social welfare, or a “domestic” respect for authorities, sustaining paternalism and corporatism.

43 Congress did control the funding of the agencies ruling on the Clavey (e.g. the Forest Service and FERC), so beyond the mere opinion benefits of getting political support there were other strategic concerns for lobbying.

44 By contrast, lobbying is very active at the level of the European Community (Mazey and Richardson 1993).

45 There are quite different traditions and definitions of “lobbying” in the two countries, and different conceptions of what is legitimate contact between...
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Legislators and citizens. For instance, in the United States citizen letter-writing is often considered a legitimate form of lobbying alongside more traditional "interest group" lobbying, whereas in France citizen-letter writing is directly opposed to interest lobbying by corporations or other groups. In both countries, much private influence exerted (or attempted) on politicians take place outside the public realm that we focus on here.

The difference between these two levels of environmental reference can be seen clearly when we compare two sorts of justifications of hydropower projects in the Clavey case. In one instance, hydropower is seen as a way to bring nature in as another "resource" to be "developed" - a justification based solely on planning and technical efficiency criteria - while in another instance, hydropower is seen as a "clean and renewable" energy source: a combination of planning and efficiency justifications with environmental justifications based on criteria like "renewability."

Various forms of valuing nature result from placing value on different types of "attachments" to nature which involve both material and emotional dependency (Thévenot 1996b). On the "social construction of nature" and the cultural, ideological, and rhetorical frameworks used to make sense of the natural environment, see Fine 1997; Eder 1996; Cronon 1995; Hannigan 1995; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982.

Both the state and national governments in the United States make "official" designations of individual species as either "threatened" or "endangered."

For example, a great deal of the debate over protecting rare species focused on whether the dam would hurt the populations of "wild trout" or whether the dam and its mitigation measures would actually be "better for the fish."

The threat of legal action and entanglements regarding endangered species protection in the United States makes these sorts of arguments more threatening than in France.

There is obviously a range of American conceptions of "wilderness" - and the relation of man and nature - which in fact were developed historically in direct comparison with the ideas about nature in Europe (Nash 1982). Wilderness is considered "terrible" and savage but also sublime with its "splendidly sculptured rocks and mountains" (Muir 1970 [1918]). The geological or biological features of wilderness are emphasized, and man's interaction with the wild is valued for its benefits to human health and well-being. The construction of the "wild" is also closely connected to the "frontier" mentality of the settlers of the western United States, who struggled to control the wilderness they found (Walton 1992; Turner 1920).

Mid nineteenth-century French painters developed the idea that a landscape "only has grandeur if it is uninhabited" (du Camp 1861, quoted in House 1993).

In La Nouvelle Héloïse, Rousseau distinguishes between "wild nature" [nature sauvage] - "huge rocks" and "eternal torrents" - and "cultivated nature" [nature cultivée] - a "cheerful, peaceful [ranch] pasture" - but emphasizes the "striking blend" of the two one finds in the world: "houses found close to caverns" (Rousseau 1959, p. 77). He shows the integration of the two rather than the radical separation of them that we find in the "sublime" tradition (Pseudo-Longinus 1965; Burke 1990 [1757]) and German Romanticism, but
also in Chateaubriand ("les tempêtes ne m'ont laissé souvent de table pour écouter que l'écueil de mon naufrage.") Chateaubriand, Mémoires d'outre-tombe 1997 (1850), p. 64), and in the American exaltation of wilderness (e.g. Thoreau 1997 [1854]; Muir 1970 [1918]; see Nash 1982, Oelschlaeger 1991).

54 On the notion of "patrimony" in relation to the environment, see Goddard 1990.

55 The tribal legends of the Yosemite Me-Wuk clearly reveal dependencies to places and animals (who are said to have gathered in a council to create man). See La Pena et al. 1993 [1981].

56 On the use of the notion of "community" in the history of ecology, and its resurgence in sociology (and to Robert Park in particular), see Acot 1988.

57 Deep ecology writer Gary Snyder (1985), for instance, urges people to see a country as a "natural biological region" governed by "parliaments or soviets" which include "the voices of trees, rivers, and animals, as well as human beings," so that "the world of nature penetrates the political meeting-chambers of mankind" (for a similar idea of a "parliament of things" which would represent non-human actors, see Latour 1995). Snyder argues that this is partly achieved with ritual dances (as we can learn from the Ainu people): "She who becomes a bear in the bear-dance for a brief while can speak for the bear." A French participant in a Somport demonstration acted the part of the bear in order to speak for the bear among other demonstrators. Similarly, an American participant in a public hearing on the Clavey wore an owl costume.

58 These differences in the nature and employment of "green" judgments can be partly explained by the different form and extent of environmental movements in the two countries, and their very different environmental histories, particularly the fact that the United States has (relatively recently from a French viewpoint) engaged in the development of a massive "frontier" in the West which left substantial marks on the political and cultural life of the entire nation (Walton 1992).