CEFC

03 November 2016

Keywords: 6th Plenum of 18th CCP’s Congress, Xi Jinping, core leader, car-hailing service in China, pro-independence lawmakers in Hong Kong, Basic Law interpretation, meeting between chairpersons of KMT and CCP.

CHINA – POLITICS

The 6th Plenum of the CCP’s Central Committee held between 24 October and 27 October

The 6th Plenum discussed how to strengthen the party discipline. Two documents were in particular discussed and endorsed, namely “Guideline regarding the political life in the Party under the new circumstances” (《關於新形勢下黨內政治生活的若干凖則》) and “Regulation on internal supervision in the CCP”(《中國共產黨黨內監督條例》). Observers are also concerned about whether it will reveal the new personnel arrangement for the political core of the Party. Since the onset of the 18th CCP’s Congress, a number of high-ranked officials have been removed from their positions in the Party, which may re-shuffle the power of the factions within the Party. It is also announced that the 19th CCP’s National Congress will be held in the second half of 2017. For the full communique of the 6th Plenum released on 27 October, please find it here by Xinhua (in Chinese).

The editorial of the People’s Daily to pinpoint the important parts of the 6th Plenum:

  • //党的十八大以来,我们党先后召开十八届三中、四中、五中全会,对全面深化改革、全面依法治国、全面建成小康社会作了部署,这次全会专题研究全面从严治党,这是党中央着眼于“四个全面”战略布局作出的整体设计,是党中央治国理政方略的渐次展开、深度推进。加强和规范党内政治生活、加强党内监督,是新形势下加强党的建设的重要课题,也是推进全面从严治党的重要抓手。严肃党内政治生活是我们党的优良传统和政治优势,也是全面从严治党的基础,党要管党,首先要从党内政治生活管起;从严治党,首先要从党内政治生活严起。党内监督是党的建设的重要内容,也是全面从严治党的重要保证,党的执政地位,决定了党内监督在党和国家各种监督形式中是最基本的、第一位的。 […] 一个国家、一个政党,领导核心至关重要。我们这样的大国、大党,要凝聚全党、团结人民、战胜挑战、破浪前进,保证我们党始终成为坚强有力的马克思主义执政党、始终成为中国特色社会主义的坚强领导力量,党中央、全党必须有一个核心。党的十八大以来,习近平总书记带领全党全军全国各族人民开创了中国特色社会主义伟大事业和党的建设新的伟大工程新局面,在改革发展稳定、内政外交国防、治党治国治军等方面取得了一系列具有重大现实意义和深远历史意义的成就,实现了党和国家事业的继往开来。习近平总书记在新的伟大斗争实践中已经成为党中央的核心、全党的核心。这次全会,正式提出“以习近平同志为核心的党中央”,反映了全党全军全国各族人民的共同心愿,是党和国家根本利益所在,是坚持和加强党的领导的根本保证,是进行具有许多新的历史特点的伟大斗争、坚持和发展中国特色社会主义伟大事业的迫切需要。// Source: Xinhua, 27 October 2016.

Highlights of the communique of the 6th Plenum by Xinhua:

  • //A key meeting of the Communist Party of China (CPC) has called on all its members to « closely unite around the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core. » […] Party members were told to resolutely safeguard the authority of the CPC Central Committee and its central, unified leadership while pushing forward the comprehensive and strict governance of the Party.// Source: Xinhua, 27 October 2016.
  • //Unrestricted power or any unsupervised Party members are not allowed to exist within the Communist Party of China (CPC) […] Supervision is the fundamental guarantee for exercising power properly, as well as a crucial measure for strengthening and regulating political life within the Party […] Party organizations and leading officials must not hide violations of Party discipline and laws, or problems reported by Party members, and must deal with such issues in a timely manner, said the communique.// Source: Xinhua, 27 October 2016.
  • //New circumstances call for new criteria in the political life of the Party. By the end of 2015, CPC membership exceeded 88 million, and over 70 percent members had joined after the reform and opening up. Drastic and profound social transition subjected CPC members to negative influences such as money worshipping, hedonism and extreme individualism. The sixth plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Committee seeks to stipulate norms for intra-Party political life under new circumstances, revise documents on intra-Party supervision and solidify the political foundations of strict Party governance. Designing the overall strategy, the meeting will consolidate the CPC’s leadership, upgrade the CPC’s governance capacity, and lay the institutional foundations to complete the overall tasks, blueprints and objectives set at the 18th National Congress of the CPC.// Source: Xinhua, 25 October 2016.

Further elaboration of the two documents by CCP cadres in a press conference:

  • //中组部副部长齐玉介绍了《准则》的有关情况。他说,此次制定新的准则,一是完善“四个全面”战略布局的需要。十八届三中、四中、五中全会相继就全面深化改革、全面依法治国、全面建成小康社会进行专题研究,这次六中全会再以制 定党内政治生活准则和修订党内监督条例为重点专题研究全面从严治党,这样“四个全面”战略布局就都分别通过一次中央全会进行了研究部署。这是我们党的一个整体设计。二是深化全面从严治党的需要。全会在深入总结十八大以来全面从严治党生动实践的基础上,认真分析新形势下党的建设面临的新情况新问题,对加强和规范党内政治生活作出新的制度安排,这对于深化全面从严治党必将起到有力的推动作用。三是解决党内存在突出矛盾和问题的需要。要巩固全面从严治党的好势头,有效防范已经解决的矛盾和问题反弹复发,防止新的矛盾和问题滋生蔓延,必须完善规范,健全制度。[…] 中央纪委副书记吴玉良介绍了《条例》和全面从严治党,加强纪律建设、强化党内监督有关情况。吴玉良说,此次修订《条例》以党章为根本遵循,全面贯彻习近平总书记系列重要讲话精神,围绕理论、思想、制度构建体系,围绕权力、责任、担当设计制度。 是坚持党的领导、强化责任担当;二是坚持问题导向,不贪大求全,有什么问题解决什么问题,增强现实针对性;三是坚持信任不能代替监督,强调党内监督没有禁区、没有例外,同时抓住关键少数,将党的领导机关和领导干部特别是主要领导干部作为监督重点对象;四是坚持民主集中制,强化自上而下的组织监督,改进自下而上的民主监督,发挥同级相互监督作用,规范党内监督与其他监督方式的关系,实现依法治国与依规治党有机统一;五是坚持务实管用,兼顾必要性和可行 性,总结实践经验,提炼管用实招。// Source: New Beijing News, 28 October 2016.

Highlights of four terms: “leadership core”, “political life within the Party”, “supervision within the Party” and “intra-party democracy”:

  • //领导核心﹣﹣全会提出:坚持党的领导,首先是坚持党中央的集中统一领导。一个国家、一个政党,领导核心至关重要;全党同志紧密团结在以习近平同志为核心的党中央周围,全面深入贯彻本次全会精神,牢固树立政治意识、大局意识、核心意识、看齐意识。专家解读:中央党校教授辛鸣认为,公报中的这一重要表述意义重大而深远,有助于确立中央权威,有利于全党更加团结统一,增强凝聚力和战斗力。中国共产党建党以来,之所以一直受到群众的拥护支持,并且在革命斗争中取得胜利,源于我们党拥有坚强的领导核心,带领全党全国人民不断取得长足发展。// Source: New Beijing News, 28 October 2016.
  • //党内政治生活全会提出:党要管党必须从党内政治生活管起,从严治党必须从党内政治生活严起。专家解读:辛鸣说,严肃党内政治生活是全面从严治党的基础。党在1980年就出台《关于党内政治生活的若干准则》,30多年以来,世情、国情、党情都发生巨大变化。新制定的准则突出密切联系群众、批评与自我批评、民主集中制、党内民主等内容,强化政治意识、大局意识、核心意识、看齐意识,系统解决当前一些地方党内政治生活出现的庸俗化、随意化、搞“小圈子”等问题,为全面从严治党筑牢根基。// Source: New Beijing News, 28 October 2016.
  • //党内监督﹣﹣全会提出:坚持党内监督和人民群众监督相结合,增强党在长期执政条件下自我净化、自我完善、自我革新、自我提高能力。专家解读:在公报中,“监督”出现40余次。中国纪检监察学院原副院长李永忠表示,此次全会通过党内监督条例,给党内监督再添利剑,以上级纪委领导为主,加强对同级党委监督,调动民众反腐积极性,致力形成“科学的权力结构”。国家行政学院教授汪玉凯认为,我国公务员队伍中党员占绝大多数,党内监督至关重要。以重新修订党内监督条例为龙头,加上之前公布的问责条例、廉洁自律准则、纪律处分条例等法规,使党内监督体系进一步完善。// Source: New Beijing News, 28 October 2016.
  • //党内民主﹣﹣全会提出:党内民主是党的生命,是党内政治生活积极健康的重要基础专家解读:辛鸣表示,当前,一些地方和单位党内民主不够,在重大问题决策、重要干部任免、重大项目投资决策、大额资金使用等问题上,个人意志凌驾于组织之上。党要长期执政,必须保障每个党员的民主权利,拓宽党员表达意见渠道,不断激发党内“正能量”。// Source: New Beijing News, 28 October 2016.

Proposal of institutionalization of anti-corruption measures:

  • //中共總書記習近平及中紀委書記王岐山在十八大掀起反腐風暴,在不搞西方「三權分立」相互監督制衡的前提下,中共也希望實現自我監督和自我淨化。據了解,在六中全會審議新修訂的《中國共產黨黨內監督條例》,將對黨內監督進行細化,尤其是明確紀委系統的監督權力。有知情人士向本報指,自十八大反腐以來,檢察院系統的「反貪局」幾乎處於無用武之地的狀態,為了加強中共的內部監督力量,反貪系統料將劃歸紀委。目前該建議料獲得高層通過,北京反貪系統已收到試點劃歸紀委的風聲。中共各級紀律檢查委員會是黨內監督的專門機關,也是自我監督最重要的力量。知情人士指,為了落實習近平要求的「強化黨內監督」,六中全會之後,紀委系統料將擴權,而擴權之一是試點將檢察院系統的反貪力量劃歸紀委。1989年8月18日,經中共廣東省委批准,廣東省檢察院反貪污賄賂工作局宣告成立,這是內地成立的第一個反貪局。1995年11月10日,最高檢察院反貪污賄賂總局正式成立,標誌檢察機關懲治貪污賄賂犯罪工作進入專業化、正規化軌道。不過從近年的反腐實踐來看,檢查系統的反貪力量在黨內監督中並沒發揮太大作用。// Source: Ming Pao Daily, 26 October 2016.

The implication of the “political core” of CCP:

  • //With his new core status, Xi is expected to play a more dominant role in orchestrating next year’s reshuffles – a sharp contrast to Hu’s position 10 years ago. Next year’s congress will see the election of more than 300 full members and alternate Central Committee members. Up to 11 seats on the 25-strong Politburo will also be vacated, including up to five members of the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee who are expected to retire. Unlike the official title “general secretary”, the term “core” and its powers are not defined by party regulations. Beijing-based political commentator Zhang Lifan said the new reference meant Xi was guaranteed to have unchallenged authority in the party. “It means Xi has the final veto power. It’s the official crowning of his real power,” Zhang said. “It also means the end of the last ‘core’, Jiang Zemin. There can’t be two cores in the party.”// Source: SCMP, 28 October 2016.
  • //「習核心」,往遠說,與中共九十五年的歷史相連,與一九八九年以後的政治變化相關。往近看,則主要看過去四年,特別是二○一二那年的風風雨雨。中國歷史上,講的是「君權天授」,中共歷史上,最愛說「核心形成」。九十五歲的中共黨史一直到今天,顯示核心的形成分三種形態,一種是自然形成,如第一代領導核心是毛澤東,說是在革命和戰爭中自然形成的,第二代領導核心是鄧小平,是透過改革開放而形成。第二種是「老人授予」的,在六四後特殊的政治背景下,江澤民被政治老人選擇登台,為了穩固當時的領導權,被授予黨政軍三位一體的權力,享有「黨的領導核心」地位。所以後來就有了「以江澤民同志為核心的黨中央」。但是到了胡錦濤接班,因其是鄧小平隔代指定,又沒有政治老人撐腰,江澤民不肯傳下核心地位,胡錦濤又無力無為,由此開創了中共「沒有核心的十年」。[…] 習近平接班以後,在王岐山助力下,以反貪腐為突破口,很快獲取了大部分領域的權力,但沒能全面肅清反對派。在這種背景下,他的主要精力用在權力重整、黨內整肅之上,認定必須走威權政治之路,而且要快,要趕在中共十九大權力重組前。於是他的主要助手栗戰書出頭,用了大約一年多時間,以主張全黨要有「核心意識」入手,到六中前的最後關頭,做好諸侯勤王人事安排,使中共六中全會上,自授核心地位得以實現。// Source: United Daily News, 27 October 2016.

On the other hand, the official endorsement of Xi Jinping as the “core” of the party is accompanied with a statement in the communique that reaffirms the principle of “collective leadership” which is not to be amended by any organization or person under whatever circumstances.

  • //[A]nother is the principle of collective leadership, which the party has stressed for more than three decades to prevent a repeat of Mao Zedong’s personality cult. Last week’s communique reaffirmed the commitment to collective leadership, saying the practice “must always be followed and should not be violated by any organization or individual under any circumstance or for any reason.”// Source: Bloomberg, 01 November 2016.

A commentator from the Initium Tao Ren (陶仁) suggests that the seemingly contradictory phrases of both “core” and “collective leadership” might indicate two possibilities: one is that the emphasis on “collective leadership” within the CCP does not target at Xi Jinping himself but to prevent any charismatic cadres of lower level such as Bo Xilai from disobeying the CCP’s central authority. Another possibility is that it showed the inability of Xi Jinping to assert absolute authority over the party and his opponents insisted on the principle of “collective leadership” as the bottom line.

  • //值得注意的是,公報在增添「核心」的同時,也增加了對領導人「禁止吹捧」、「堅持集體領導,任何組織和個人在任何情況下都不允許以任何理由違反」的條文。在習近平外部形象和內部權勢都迅速擴展的氣氛下,以如此絕對化的語氣,將「禁止吹捧領導人」與「集體領導」寫入公報,十分耐人尋味。這背後,極有可能存在著政治博弈。由於外界無法得知開會的討論過程,我也只能依據過往的中共政治規則提供兩種解釋:可能性之一,是這兩條規矩並非針對習本人,而是用以規訓中共高級幹部和地方黨委書記,淡化其他幹部的明星效應,防止如薄熙來式的魅力型地方領袖再度出現,防止挑戰中央權威的情況發生。另一種可能性是,這可能是習近平的對手陣營,對「習核心」的反擊。中共的派系之爭從未停止過,就連毛澤東本人也承認「黨外有黨、黨內有派,歷來如此」。作為十七大時異軍突起的接班人,習近平在北京的根基並不牢固,上任後四年的反腐,也勢必會大量樹敵,中央委員會和政治局中並非沒有對立陣營。此外,對手能夠用「在任何情況下都不允許以任何理由違反」這樣毫無迴旋餘地的措辭,試圖維護住「集體領導」的底線,則說明習對於中央委員會的控制還不夠,對手選擇在「核心」這一名義稱謂上讓步,來保住現有制度的實體。// Source: The Initium, 29 November 2016.

Chris Buckley from the New York Times proposed there are some areas we can observe with Xi being the “core leaders”:

  • //Look for signs that Mr. Xi is extending his power or being held in check. First, how will the campaign to acclaim him as core leader play out? How enthusiastically will provincial leaders join the campaign? Two officials recently promoted by Mr. Xi were among the most avid public supporters of making him a core leader. Other officials hoping to rise will feel pressure to join the adulation. Also, pay attention to who is promoted leading up to the party congress next year. Which officials will be assigned to cities and provinces that give them a good shot at joining the elite Politburo and its Standing Committee? The pattern of who rises will tell us something about the balance of forces inside the elite. Finally, will Mr. Xi’s power provoke opposition in the elite? Some officials and businesspeople complain about Mr. Xi’s hard-line ideology and policies against corruption, which make life harder even for clean officials. But so far, there are no signs of that frustration’s coalescing into high-level opposition. Mr. Xi has the upper hand. There are no challengers in the elite in sight.// Source: New York Times, 30 October 2016.

Kerry Brown from the University of Sydney pointed out another aspect of Xi being named as the core:

  • //The formal comeback of the term in 2016 can be seen either as a sign that Xi is amassing powers unlike any of his previous predecessors or that he is shoring up his insecurities with yet another verbal trinket with no real political worth. The reality probably lies in between. The incessant hunt for new names and titles for Xi is starting to look desperate and insecure. Surely just being party secretary is enough — that is where the power is. All the other positions are subservient to this one. But in the bigger narrative of party building developed since 2013, Xi being named the core of the leadership falls into place and makes sense — at least, as part of this story. It’s a recognition that the party vision, its view of its role in the building of a victoriously modern China, is intimately linked with a specific style of leadership — that practiced by Xi. Focusing on Xi in himself is to miss something crucially important. It’s the style of leadership he practices and that the party is collectively supporting that is important, not him and his personal ambition and networks. This style of leadership is strong on demanding loyalty, strong on centralization, and strong on placing the party at the heart of Chinese social and political development. And it’s strong on demanding that everyone around it recognize that it’s strong.// Source: Foreign Policy, 31 October 2016.

Despite the heated discussion on the personnel reshuffle before the 6th Plenum, the communique does not reveal much in this regard. However, Deng Maosheng, a director with the party’s Central Policy Research Office, specifically told the media in a news briefing that retirement rules must be flexible to cope with the circumstances if needed, indicating a potential break from the unwritten “Seven-up-eight-down” rule.

  • //Deng Maosheng, a director with the party’s Central Policy Research Office, told reporters at a government-organized news briefing in Beijing on Monday that retirement rules for senior officials needed to be flexible and revised if circumstances required. He was responding to a question about “seven up, eight down,” shorthand for the party’s convention of retiring officials age 68 or older from the Politburo’s supreme Standing Committee.“The strict boundaries of ‘seven up, eight down’ don’t exist,” said Deng, who has participated in the drafting of all four plenum communiques issued under Xi. “This is something from folklore, and cannot be trusted.” […] It’s rare for party officials to acknowledge discussion of the “seven-up, eight-down” guideline. Wang Yukai, a professor at the Beijing-based Chinese Academy of Governance, a state-run think tank, said the “unwritten rule” dates to around 2002, when then-President Jiang Zemin asserted it while the next Standing Committee was being shaped. The Standing Committee is the inner sanctum of Chinese political power and its membership usually includes the president, premier, the national legislature chief and other top leaders. The convention of excluding any member 68 or older has been maintained for 15 years, and was consistent through the decade-long tenure of Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao. […] “What I’ll be looking for at the 19th Party Congress is nothing original with me,” Andrew Nathan, a political science professor at Columbia University who studies Chinese politics, said by e-mail. “I’ll want to see whether Wang Qishan stays, breaking the seven up, eight down rule, and whether an heir-apparent emerges or not, with the lack of an heir-apparent increasing the signaling that Xi will serve a third term.”// Source: Bloomberg, 01 November 2016.

Tao Ren argued that CCP has developed a specific internal election mechanism for the central authority over the past decades. It allows predictability of who will succeed the top positions and with what general criteria. However, the anti-corruption campaign by the Central Commission for Discipline and Inspection pulled down many of the high-ranked party cadres, which not only disturbs the former routinized way of selecting leadership team and increases the instability of power distribution, but also making predictions by external observers less meaningful. He further contended that Xi Jinping has the practical need to promote cadres loyal to him for the next 5 years of rule, which renders the “Seven-up-eight-down” rule less rigid in his eyes with the quest for the men he needed.

  • //中共的制度傳統,是一整套長期形成的內部制約框架,包括一套特殊的中央選舉制度。它成為中共近四十年來政治運作的基本守則。鑑於毛時代中共中央委員會乃至政治局的決策災難,改革開放之後的中共,提高了中央委員會的效能,通過將黨代會定期化、實行差額選舉、取消黨主席等方式,恢復了「集體領導」,增加中央委員會選舉高層領導集體的權重。[…] 此後,中共的派系分歧,多利用中央委員會和全代會職能,為自己爭取更多「隔代政治局成員」的席位。所謂的「接班人」——即能夠在下屆全代會躋身常委,從而在十年後的隔屆全代會上躋身最高權力的人,必須保證在本屆成為中央委員,且足夠年輕,資歷夠深,方有被選舉資格。這一原則,幾乎不會被輕易改變。此外,自十七大開始,中共又增加了所謂「七上八下」原則(即67歲履任政治局常委的年齡上限,若換屆時已達68歲,則需退休),「五零后」、「六零后」幹部成為當時乃至今天媒體爭相聚焦的重點。選舉制度的相對穩定,使外界幾乎可以猜出侯任的「接班人」。[…] 縱觀改革開放以來的中共,政權交接、決策貫徹,都有賴於這套由選舉辦法、年齡限制交織而成的制度傳統,和不斷修正的交接原則 。習所定義的「改革」,似乎正在利用,甚至打破這種「制度化」。因此在外界看來,習總是不斷釋放打破常規,甚至謀求超期連任的信號。實際上,他本人是否連任並不重要,關鍵在於,這一整套存續近30年的制度,是否能夠被他所掌控的新制度代替,這將是他未來維繫控制力的關鍵。[…] 年的「反腐」,罷黜中央委員乃至政治局成員的成本已經大大降低。一個頗具潛力的官員,不管是否確有其事,只要被中紀委調查並冠以腐敗的帽子,不論職位多高,都將斷崖折戟。在「反腐」已然常態化的今日,根據年齡、資歷「猜接班人」將變得不具意義。[…] 對習近平的人事布局來說,重要的不是年輕幹部多,而是自己人多。在他缺少傳統派系子弟的背景下,打破年齡藩籬,幾乎是他最有可能的選項。由此,任職年齡是否還會遵循十七大以來的「七上八下」原則,也並不能確定。而這,就涉及到一些關鍵部門領導的留任問題,其中包括王岐山所在的中紀委。隨着常委會「九龍治水」格局的逐步瓦解,關鍵領域的實權部門,將成為超越固定年齡和級別的新看點,級別的靜態序列有可能被打破,權力中樞的不穩定性將會更大。// Source: The Initium, 29 October 2016.

In a review article, a reporter from The Initium observed that a number of officials disciplined by the Party are related to Zhou Youkang and Bo Xilai in various departments including the Political-legal System, the military system, etc. The fall of the top aide to former President Hu Jinao, Ling Jihua, also suggests the general breakdown of the “League Clique” (Tuanpai). It is also observed that a number of officials who worked with Xi before are promoted under Xi Administration.

  • //習上任以來,圍繞他們展開的行動,成為反腐向軍隊推進的鐵腕宣示,並捲出不少後勤腐敗、買官賣官的弊案,如前空軍政委田修思。在軍隊之外,周永康則是當之無愧的「大聯繫人」。在10名落馬中央委員中,至少有6人據報與周永康有關聯,13名落馬候補中委中,則有4人,這些人的落馬還在這場反腐運動中創下多個「第一」。周永康的權力網絡以「石油幫」、「四川幫」、「秘書幫」、「政法系」為四大支柱,其中「秘書幫」貫穿在其他三大支柱中,從與周相關的落馬中委和候補中委的仕途經歷可見一斑。[…] 政情觀察和分析人士一般認為,令計劃的落馬讓「團派」遭受極大打擊。共青團一向是中共黨政幹部後備軍培養地,「團派」政治勢力隨著中共在上世紀80年代啟動的「幹部年輕化」而起,前中共總書記胡耀邦、胡錦濤都被視為「團派」領袖,現任國家副主席李源潮、國務院副總理汪洋則均位列大將。2012年十八大中共第五代領導集體亮相前後,外界仍關注「團派」中有哪些強人——比如現任廣東省委書記胡春華、最高人民法院院長周強、黑龍江省省長陸昊等——能在此後10年間完成關鍵躍升,並在二十大晉身第六代領導層。但2016年2月,中紀委罕有地批評共青團中央存在「機關化、行政化、貴族化、娛樂化」等問題。目前,共青團正在積極地進行「改革」,並轉身耕耘網絡戰場,成為民族主義輿論旗手。甚至有觀點認為,現在官場中有「共青團經驗」的官員,但已無「團派」。今年9月30日,路透社引述3名消息人士報導,習近平決意阻截「團派」,以另選他人上位。除了「團派」的背景之外,隨著令計劃在政壇羽翼漸豐,以他出身之地山西為總基地的官商權力網絡「西山會」亦崛起,他的落馬也引起了山西官場的塌方式陷落。[…] 誰是可以信任的「新軍」?從34位在十八大後仕途惹眼的官員軌跡來看,曾與習一起共事,似乎是重要的考察窗口。基於公開報導和過往資料爬梳的不完全統計,十八大之後,習近平的舊日相識、主政過的地方的老部下,陸續在中央機構、國家部委和省級地方佔據要津。這些要職,包括了在習近平上台之後積極組建和親自擔任組長的數個「中央領導小組」以及「國家安全委員會」負責日常工作的辦公室主任、副主任。[…] 從2012年開始被逐漸提拔的這34名官員,根據官方公開簡歷,大致統計為福建背景最多,有11人,浙江次之,有10人。其中蔡奇和黃坤明都是先在福建、後在浙江,在統計時均僅計入福建一組一次。其他官員則是與習近平在不同軌跡上有所重疊:上海4人,中央4人,舊識2人,清華2人,河北1人。 // Source: The Initium, 24 October 2016.

The Publicity Department of CCP and CCTV produced a new programme “Always on the Road” (永远在路上) about the success of anti-graft campaign before the 6th Plenum of 18th CCP’s Congress. A number of former officials already denounced by the CCP appeared on the screen criticizing themselves for their corrupt behavior and how they have severely undermined the credibility of the Party. During the 6th Plenum, another programme “The Role Model” was also released to show that a qualified member of CCP should study the Party’s rule and the words of the leader Xi Jinping.

  • //8集大型电视专题片《永远在路上》由中央纪委宣传部、中央电视台联合制作。摄制组先后赴22个省(区、市),拍摄40多个典型案例,采访70余位国内外专家学者、纪检干部,采访苏荣、周本顺、李春城等10余位因严重违纪违法而落马的省部级以上官员,剖析了一些典型案例,讲述了一些鲜活的监督执纪故事。// Source: The Paper, 24 October 2016.
  • //而在六中全會結束前,昨晚8時,中央組織部、中央電視台聯合錄製的「兩優一先」(在基層黨組織和黨員中開展評選表彰出的優秀黨務工作者、優秀共產黨員和先進基層黨組織)「兩學一做」(學習共產黨黨章黨規,學習貫徹習近平總書記系列重要講話精神,做合格黨員)特別節目《榜樣》,在央視綜合頻道播出。該節目稱以「不忘初心、繼續前進」為主題,以「向榜樣看齊、做合格黨員」為主線,生動詮釋中國共產黨人堅定理想信念、為民實幹擔當、勤勉敬業奉獻的精神風采,是開展黨員教育的生動教材。// Source: Ming Pao, 27 October 2016.
  • //The first episode featured dramatic scenes that included footage of $31 million worth of cash hidden in an empty apartment owned by former energy chief Wei Pengyuan. Another official named Zhou Benshun appeared on the program recounting his illegal dealings with businessmen and developers in exchange for bribes, which enabled him to live in an 800-square-meter house complete with chefs and maids. In another scene, the son of disgraced Jiangxi Party Secretary Su Rong was shown condemning his father in a rare act among family members not seen since the Cultural Revolution. Of all the officials in the series, Xi Jinping is the only one depicted in a positive light. The show portrays him as a virtuous leader leading a simple lifestyle worthy of emulation. In addition to these scenes, several high-level officials, including former Sichuan Party Secretary Li Chuncheng, were shown publicly repenting and admitting their guilt during the program. These confessions bear an uncanny resemblance to a series of forced guilty pleas made by lawyers and activists who were detained as part of the “Black Friday” crackdown on China’s legal profession in 2015.// Source: China Digital Times, 26 October 2016.

CHINA – SOCIETY

1. Proposed regulations of online car-hailing service in Beijing and Shanghai received heavy criticisms

In response to the state legal recognition of online car-hailing service for China in July this year, many cities rolled out draft regulations on this matter for public comments, which will be in effect starting 01 November. On 08 October, four big cities including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen published respective drafts of the regulation for public comments, followed by many other smaller cities. It soon arose discussion nationwide. In Beijing and Shanghai, the draft regulations only allowed people with respective household registration (hukou) to drive a car registered locally for the car-hailing service. The draft regulations also restricted the car types used for the service, permitting only those high-end vehicles with luxury brands. For other cities, the draft regulations were not as restrictive as those in Beijing and Shanghai, but included similar clauses. Critics doubted the need for such harsh requirements that may put many present drivers out of jobs and whether overregulation would undermine the basis of sharing economy and stifle economic innovation.

The largest online car-hailing company in China Didi Chuxing issued an open letter calling for a more lenient approach to the regulation of car-hailing service, arguing harsh regulation will reduce the number of drivers and cars, and push up the cost for riders. For the full text in Chinese, please find it here (in Chinese).

  • //Didi said in a statement on Saturday that the measures were quantitative limitations in disguise, forcibly raising the bar to accessing car-hailing business platforms. As a result, there would be a sharp drop in market supply of rideshare vehicles and significant drop in the number of rideshare drivers who could comply with the new rules. “In Shanghai, for instance, less than 20 per cent of existing rideshare vehicles meet the proposed wheelbase requirements,” the company said. “Of more than 410,000 activated driver accounts in Shanghai, fewer than 10,000 are residents with Shanghai residency registration,” it added. Didi warned that operating costs were bound to rise sharply if only high-end vehicles like the Volkswagen Passat or Audi A4L-level luxury sedans were admitted. In some cases, rideshare fares might rise to twice as much as comparable taxi fares, it said. The development of the shared economy would also suffer, Didi said. “Many part-time drivers who joined the new economy in response to Premier Li Keqiang’s support for the sharing economy will also have to withdraw from the sector,” it said.// Source: SCMP, 09 October 2016.
  • //距離111日《網路預約出租汽車經營服務管理暫行辦法》正式實施還有不到半個月時間,自108日京滬廣深四個一線城市發佈網約車管理細則以來,中國網記者梳理髮現,截至1017日,北京、上海、天津、重慶、廣州、杭州、深圳、成都、武漢、合肥、蘭州、濟南、南京、梅州、惠州、江門、肇慶、清遠、韶關、潮州、寧波、東莞、青島等23個城市均發佈了網約車管理細則徵求意見稿。另外記者從河北、黑龍江、吉林、湖南等省交通廳了解到,石家莊、哈爾濱、長春及長沙等城市網約車管理政策將很快出台。其餘城市最晚也不會超過11月1日大限。記者注意到,23個城市中京津滬限司機戶籍,限車輛排量、限當地牌照,要求最高,堪稱「史上最嚴」。有專家稱,北京網約車管理細則不會有太大修改,可能會微調某些條款。而深圳、杭州、成都則限車輛註冊地,對司機的要求放寬到持本地居住證也可從業。廣州、重慶則要求,限車輛註冊登記地是本地,但不限制駕駛員戶籍。南京、合肥要求司機為本市戶籍或持本市居住證,但對車輛歸屬地沒有要求。惠州對司機戶籍、車輛歸屬地均無要求,但提出,司機不得同時加入2個或以上網約車平台。[…] 相比之下,成都網約車新政則顯得更包容。網約車駕駛員有成都市戶籍或居住證均可。車輛排氣量不小於6L或1.4T即可。還規定符合巡遊車駕駛資格的司機,可以跨過其他程序,直接申請網約車司機資格。// Source: United Daily News, 18 October 2016.

The draft regulations attracted criticisms from commentator of the state-owned media the People’s Daily (Overseas Edition) as well, urging the cities in question to make the final regulation friendlier to the rising industry and to non-local residents.

  • //之所以对此类规定这样反感,还因为其无视时代潮流。本质上说,网约车属于分享经济。真正让它改变城市交通生态的,并非在手机上打车,而是让人们将手中资源合理利用。这本是你情我愿之事。出行需求和闲置车座间,终于开始有了对接的可能性,即便正规出租车也得此便利。此时政府强力介入,必然发现其无所适从。因为在政府的管理经验中,只有应付出租车的经验,稳妥起见,最终制定出的,就是接近于出租车的管理政策。这看上去或许安全,却实在平庸。[…] 很难不想起乔治·奥威尔,在《动物庄园》中他絮絮叨叨重复一句话,“所有动物生来平等,但有些动物比其他动物更平等”。如今看来,这话似乎不无道理。我在北京、上海打过的网约车,大部分是外地年轻人在开。他们如我一样,对城市怀有梦想。我们的特大城市当然需要控制人口,但我深信,只有北京、上海户口的人居于其中,这两个城市将难以运转。何况,我们已经有了房价、户口等诸多手段,难道特大城市真打算将多余的梦想驱逐出境?通常来讲,北上广深具有极强的示范效应。这次我由衷的希望,其他城市制定出更人性化的方案。过去许多年里,大城市极强的虹吸效应,让其他城市失去不少色泽与活力。眼前是不错的弯道。过去两年间,在正规出租车上我听过足够多怨言。直到如今,在北京这个移动支付几乎深入毛孔的城市,我依然不敢只带手机出门,就是因为,不少出租司机连移动支付都不想有,即使其中有些人开车时在聊微信。进步不应抛下弱者,不意味着应当放弃进步。// Source: People’s Daily (Overseas edition), 09 October 2016.

China Digital Times pointed out another aspect of the problem with the migrant workers in big cities who, as claimed by Didi Chuxing, make up the majority of its car-hailing workforce.

  • //China’s local residency system, also known as the hukou or household registration system, has long been a source of controversy for limiting migrant workers’ access to essential public services in the cities in which they toil, and for encouraging them to leave children in their rural hometowns. Migrant workers, according to Didi, make up the lion’s share of its drivers in urban areas, and the draft rules would essentially prevent them from working while also negatively impacting China’s emerging ride-sharing economy.// Source: China Digital Times, 13 October 2016.

Prof. Zhang Weiying from Peking University argued that the draft regulations did not take into consideration many factors, particularly ignoring the right for the poor to earn money this way.

  • //我只讲一个问题,就是网约车监管不能漠视穷人的权利,不能跟穷人过不去。在我看来,上述三大城市新规定的基本特点就是漠视穷人的权利,非要跟穷人过不去。这包括漠视穷人作为服务提供者(网约车司机)的权利和作为服务接受者(网约车用户)的权利。比如限制网约车司机户籍就是用外地人补贴和养活北京人,而且是用外地的穷人补贴北京的富人。对于网约车车型的限制具有同样的特点。根据新的规定,一个收入相低对的人,只能花得起8万块钱买车的人,开网约车不行,必须花得起18万元以上买车的人才有资格当网约车司机。这就是对穷人的歧视。从用户的角度来看,限制车型也是歧视穷人。如果网约车只能是豪华车,很多普通老百姓就坐不起,坐网约车就成为富人的特权,但富人自己有司机,坐网约车的机会不多。为什么穷人就没有坐经济型车的权利呢?// Source: Caixin, 18 October 2016.

Wang Chenxi, a transport service analyst at Beijing-based research firm Analysis International pointed out that the strict draft regulation managed the online car-hailing service identical to taxi business, which may in effect protect local taxi companies from competition.

  • //Should the rules come into effect, they will curtail service providers like Didi Chuxing, which beat Uber out of China, and turn an internet-based business model into an old-school urban taxi operation subjected to excessive licensing requirements, analysts say. “The rules try to regulate the car-hailing business as taxis, and show a tendency to protect local cab firms,” said Wang Chenxi, a transport service analyst at Beijing-based research firm Analysis International. “This goes totally against the concept of the sharing economy.”// Source: SCMP, 11 October 2016.

From a user’s perspective, Prof. Fu Weigang from Shanghai Institute of Finance and law pointed out the problems of the traditional taxi business in Beijing and the improvement made after the introduction of online car-hailing service. In particular, the latter has alleviated the difficulty in getting a taxi and the rude attitude of taxi drivers due to the previous high entry threshold for the taxi business.

  • //凡是在北京有过乘坐出租车经验的人大都知道,北京的出租车属于典型的车况差、服务差,有个网络女作家曾经说过:“上了北京的出租车,就好像钻进了司机的被窝里。”如果只是服务态度差倒也罢了,关键是要用车的时候总是打不到车。为什么消费者能忍受这么差的服务?原因就在于政府对出租车实施严格的数量限制和价格限制。数量限制使得整个行业准入门槛极高,一旦迈入出租车业,很多公司无论经营好坏,都可以坐收其成,因为在目前的管理体制下,很少有出租车公司会因为服务恶劣而被取消牌照。同时,数量限制还养成了出租车司机挑客和拒载的坏毛病,有过在北京首都机场打车经历的乘客大都遭遇到司机的白眼:“路途这么近,我这单是白做了,你多给点吧?”为什么司机会给乘客翻白眼?原来是司机嫌弃乘客路途近。在绝大多数情况下,遇到出租车司机的这种牢骚,乘客只能诺诺称是。在这个已经能打上车就已经大不易的城市,你怎么还有资格对司机挑三拣四?网约车的出现改变了现状。只要在手机上安装一个App,你就可以获得出行服务,不仅如此,你还可以在App上对司机的服务进行点评,从而约束司机的行为,“打车难”和“服务差”的情况开始改观。也正是从那时候开始,我在机场就再也没有遇到过司机刁难。相反,还会因为飞机晚点而对那些一直在机场候机的专车司机道歉。// Source: Caixin, 10 October 2016.

 Current affairs commentator Tang Yinghong (唐映紅) criticized the process through which the policy on the car-hailing service is made of being behind closed door, and the policymakers also failed to understand the situations in the industry. She argued the real goal of the policy is to resist the flow of people from outside the cities but not to regulate for the convenience and safety of the people.

  • //這是缺乏正常的博弈過程的閉門決策。從滴滴方面對新規細則的反應可以看出,參與決策的官僚既沒有聽取網約車平台的意見,更沒有了解過業已形成的網約車行業生態,只是根據決策官僚的喜惡及偏見以及更為顢頇的上級要求就輕率拍板。儘管決策的目的被冠以冠冕堂皇的理由,但從決策事實來分析,其目的既不是為了老百姓的方便和安全,也不是為了規範行業管理,根本上是為了滿足更上級官僚對城市外來人口的排擠。 // Source: The Initium, 09 October 2016.

In response to the criticisms, officials from Beijing argued that the draft regulations will solve the problem of population growth without management, and officials from Shanghai contended that the draft requirements are reflections of road and environmental capacity considerations.

  • //面對質疑,北京、上海等地主管部門也做出回應,官方專家也提出理論依據。北京市交通委運輸局副局長馬瑞表示,實施「京人京牌」是從首都功能定位、人口調控和功能疏解以及京津冀協同發展等方面進行考慮的。「政策的制定不能光看一個行業,還要從城市的功能定位來考慮。」馬瑞表示,北京「城市病」主要原因之一是人口無序過快增長,嚴重影響首都核心功能的發揮。而規定網約車「本市戶籍、本市車輛」就是從治理「城市病」、疏解非首都功能的要求上考慮的。在官方研討會上發言的專家更明言,網約車就是應該和出租車分出檔次:「出租車主要滿足老百姓日常的出行需求,網約車則定位於滿足對高品質出行有需求的人群。」而上海則解釋,要求網約車在當地註冊登記,是為從綠色角度考慮道路承載能力與環境容量條件等影響因素。// Source: The Initium, 09 October 2016.

Beijing lawyer Zhao Zhanling doubted that whether the restriction based on residency in a city is in line with the existing laws.

  • // Some questioned whether it was legal for municipal authorities to effectively ban people from working as taxi drivers based upon their residency. Beijing lawyer Zhao Zhanling said many clauses in the published drafts were against existing laws, on top of employment discrimination. For instance, China’s Administrative Licensing Law prohibited local governments from banning non-local competitors, which the draft taxi-hailing rules appeared to violate, Zhao said. In Beijing, transport authorities invited public feedback on the draft rules by October 14, allowing people just six days to give their views.// Source: SCMP, 11 October 2016.

2. New study suggests a fresh look at the children in poor rural villages in China

A recent study derived from the decade-long, multi-sampled surveys by Prof. Scott Rozelle and his team from the Rural Education Action Programme (REAP) of Stanford University finds that children in poor rural villages have various needs, implying that left-behind children whose parents are both out of home village for work are not the only group of children that requires attention. The research team has conducted 19 surveys over the past decade with about 100,000 samples surveyed. From their surveys, it is found that 56% of children in rural area are living with both parents, whereas 15% of them are left-behind children with both parents away and the rest of them are children living with one of their parents. The findings suggest that the impact of migrant parents on children in poor rural villages varies across regions. In rural villages of better economic conditions, children with parents at home score better in school subjects and health compared to left-behind children, while in impoverished rural villages, left-behind children actually fare better in school subjects and health but not psychological health compared to those with parents at home. Prof. Rozelle analyzed that the findings could be understood with the children’s need for a balance of material care and psychological care. He argued that migrant parents can offer better material care for left-behind kids in severely impoverished rural villages, thus making the left-behind kids better in school subjects and health, while the lack of parents at home for kids in better-off rural villages could lead to a potential dearth of psychological care for them. He further suggests that the state policy should not focus solely on left-behind children but also children with parents at home which make up of the majority of children in rural areas.

  • //“留守儿童是境遇最遭的群体”这一公众认识需要得到修正。农村教育行动计划(REAP)十余年13万样本调查以及最新的细分研究显示,农村儿童的状况需区别看待。该计划发现,在经济状况不同的贫困农村,留守有不同的影响。在经济较差的贫困农村,父母外出对孩子更有益;而在在经济较好的贫困农村,父母外出对孩子有负面影响。此外,父母中的一方外出,对孩子有益;而父母均外出,对孩子有负面影响。[…] REAP项目负责人、长期研究中国教育问题的美国斯坦福大学教授罗斯高称,贫困农村包括了中国中部近半数农村和所有的西部农村,以此标准测算的贫困农村儿童数量庞大。据2010年人口普查数据,中国贫困农村的0-3岁幼儿人数约占总数的一半。而往往被大众忽略的是,在贫困农村,与父母一同居住的儿童占多数。农村教育行动计划(REAP)在过去约10年中开展的19项调查,共调查了13万中西部贫困农村小学生样本。其中与父母一同居住的儿童占比约56%,父母均外出的儿童占15%,此外为父母一方外出的儿童。通过把父母均在家和留守儿童两类儿童数据进行比较发现:除了心理健康,贫困地区留守儿童在健康和学业成绩等其它各方面,均略好于父母双方在家的儿童。健康方面,留守儿童的体重、身高、体质指数比非留守儿童高。父母均在家的儿童的肠道蠕虫感染率甚至达到了39%,而留守儿童为25%;学业方面,调查发现,留守儿童数学、语文、英语三门课学习成绩稍好于父母均在家的儿童。只在心理健康方面,约37%留守儿童有高度焦虑,33%留守儿童感到“孤独”;父母在家儿童此两指标比例均略低。细分后的研究发现,父母外出打工的行为对孩子的影响因地而异。[…] 研究发现,在一年之中,父母外出(父母一方或双方外出)的留守儿童的英语成绩的增长,显著高于父母从未外出的儿童。罗斯高说,这是因为,在这些地方,父母从未外出的家庭多以务农为业,“外出打工三个月的收入或许就抵过在家一年的收入”,由此,父母外出带来的收益可以明显改善孩子的生活,从而积极地影响他们的健康和学业。而在经济状况相对更好的贫困农村情况有所不同。在陕西省安康市,REAP随机选择了72所六年制小学3年级和5年级学生共计约5000人,分别于2011年6月和2012年6月,对样本学生进行标准化的数学考试、父母外出历史的调查、基本情况调查。结果显示,父母中的一方在调查期间外出打工,对孩子的成绩没有负面影响。但父母双方均外出,对孩子的成绩有显著的负面影响罗斯高分析,在本质上,这是在收入和照料两方面寻求平衡。在非常穷的地方,外出打工的收入对留守儿童的正面影响很大。但在陕西的安康,经济水平已达到农村的平均水平,父母外出打工,照料缺失的影响更大,因此孩子是受害的。[…] 几年过去,罗斯高在乡村调研发现,“如今几乎每个农村学校都有留守儿童办公室”,但其效用值得怀疑。罗斯高等人认为,制定近针对留守儿童的政策导向有误,对留守儿童的过度关注,会导致对中国农村地区其他弱势儿童的忽视。上述细分研究建议,针对留守儿童面临的困境,应改革户籍政策,让留守儿童有更多的机会进入城市学习;而对于贫困农村的大多数儿童,罗斯高认为,政府应加大0-3岁幼儿早期养育的投入,因为这一时期的投入效率最高。而目前,政府在这一领域的财政预算几乎为零。// Source: Caixin, 17 October 2016.

3. Fierce competition for some civil servant positions in 2016

The national civil service recruitment in 2016 attracted similar number of applicants this year. Applicants are required to take two papers in order to be eligible to various posts offered by the national civil service system. Some positions, such as a post in the official reception office of China’s Democratic League, received near 10,000 valid applications while some received zero application. The national taxation system continues to be the department that offers the largest number of posts, constituting about 65% of the total number of civil service positions on offer.

  • //2017年度國考報名正式截止,根據統計,中國民主同盟(簡稱民盟)中央辦公廳接待處主任科員及以下”一職,一共有9837人通過報名審核,成為貨真價實的萬中選一“人才”。民盟其實就是中國共產黨之外的8個中共所容許存在的“民主黨派”之一,境外媒體均形容這些黨派是中共“多黨合作和政治協商制度”的政治花瓶。根據中新網報導,民盟是主要由從事文化教育以及科學技術工作的高、中級知識分子組成的,具有政治聯盟特點的,接受中國共產黨領導、同中國共產黨通力合作,進步性與廣泛性相統一、致力於中國特色社會主義事業的參政黨。民盟的最高領導機關,是全國代表大會。全國代表大會閉會期間,由其所產生的中央委員會領導全盟工作。而民盟中辦就是民盟中委會下設的職能部門,屬於中央黨群機關。除了接待處,辦公廳還設有秘書處、綜合處、財務處、老幹部處、安全保衛處等部門。根據報導,這個最熱崗位”的職位介紹是“從事機關公務接待的服務工作,機關會議和活動的籌備工作”。據記者從辦公廳工作人員處側面了解到,這個崗位的工作主要是會務籌備和機關的後勤工作,類似於行政崗位,日常工作內容比較瑣碎。另外,這個崗位主要是在京辦公,出差情況不太多。但這個普普通通的行政崗位,卻總共有超過9800人通過報名審核。而按照招考簡章,該崗位的面試比例為5:1,也就是說最後只有5個人有資格進入面試,第一輪考試的淘汰率就超過9%// Source: RFI (Chinese Edition), 26 October 2016.
  • //从大的系统来分析,历年国考,国税系统都是招录大户,今年的情况也不例外。今年国税系统招录职位有9455个,计划招录17476人,占总招录人数的58%截至22日的统计,本次国考报名还剩两天的时候,报考国税系统的人数就超过50万。目前,本次国考报名中,报名人数最多的十大部门全部来自国税系统,这其中报名人数最多的是广东省国税局。本次国考招录中,广东省国税局共有342个职位计划招录900人,而截至22日的统计显示,报考广东省国税局的人已接近3万人。据统计,吸引报考人数最多的前十大部门中,除了广东国税,还有山东、四川、贵州、江苏、甘肃、河南、浙江、新疆和内蒙古的国税局,这十个部门吸引的报名总数已超过24万人。// Source: Sina News, 25 October 2016.

According to one official from the national civil service bureau, the reason for the popularity of the post in the China’s Democratic League is that the post does not have much professional requirement and have low threshold for application.

  • //至於為何崗位報名如此火爆,報導引述國家公務員局考錄司副司長彭忠寶的解釋:“往年出現報名人數較多,比如一個職位一千人,甚至幾千人報名的,往往都是因為相關條件設置比較寬泛,比如學歷只限本科及以上,專業和工作經歷等沒有要求的職位。”而民盟中央辦公廳的這個崗位,恰恰就符合了上述特徵。報導又指出,該崗位對於專業、政治面貌都沒有限制,學歷要求也只是本科及以上,且面試階段不組織專業能力測試,唯獨限定了2年的基層工作最低年限,報導說,這樣的低門檻,難怪會吸引大量考生報考。// Source: RFI (Chinese Edition), 26 October 2016.
  • //Zhu Lijia, a professor of public policy at the Chinese Academy of Governance, said government reception departments would continue to downsize because of the anti-graft campaign, but the remaining posts would still attract young people by offering an easy and stable career path. “At reception, they have the chance to meet different people, including those of high ranking,” Zhu said. “That could bring them good career prospects.”// Source: SCMP, 26 October 2016.

While there are some positions with fierce competitions, some of them received zero application. These positions are usually either in remote area or require high level of professional knowledge.

  • //一边是万人乱挤独木舟,一边是“零审核”岗位无人问津,今年,国考报名“冰火两重天”现象再次出现。目前全国“零审核”岗位为244个,多分布于偏远地区的基层岗。这些岗位工作地点条件相对艰苦,岗位偏基层,对于考生而言报考吸引力较小。”华图教育数据中心资深专家亢文琴分析,虽然近年来铁路公安系统对基层工作经历基本没限制,但其中大多职位仅限或更适合男性报考,且很多岗位工作地点分布在县级城市,还有些备注岗位需要经常加班等,这都使得铁路公安系统的报名受到限制。从河南职位来看,“零审核”岗位为3个,审计署驻郑州特派员办事处、郑州海关、中国银行业监督管理委员会河南监管局。“跟铁路公安系统相反的是,这些职位报考门槛较高,使得报考受限。”亢文琴分析。// Source: Sina News, 25 October 2016.

Prof. Wang Wencheng from Zhengzhou University pointed out that the craze for civil service positions in China has been ongoing for a while. Joining the civil service is still one of the important options for fresh university graduates.

  • //2016年国考报名,曾被称为“史上三年最好考国考”,竞争比例三年来创新低,表面看似国考“遇冷”,但今年并没有延续“遇冷”状况,这在郑州大学考试与人才测评研究中心主任王文成教授看来,2015年至2017年竞争比的一减一增,并不能说明“公务员热”的降温或者升温,“这样是不科学的,大学毕业生始终把考公务员作为一项重要选择的现状并没有改变。王文成认为,就业压力客观存在,毕业生就业观念没有断崖式转化,每次国考、省考、事业单位招考,千军万马过独木桥的现象也不足为怪,这是作为一种就业机会来把握的。不过,王文成还是建议社会及毕业生理性看待公务员热现象。随着国家对公务员制度和队伍的加速变革,有关公务员工资低,以及公务员隐性福利缩水的讨论一直在持续,“干活多拿钱不多”“天天加班没休息”“舆论压力大”……“考生报考公务员,动机不要庸俗化,统筹考虑自己的所学专业、职业兴 趣、价值追求、能力素质,理性选择公务员这个特殊职业。”王文成说。// Source: Sina News, 25 October 2016.

HONG KONG – POLITICS

Controversy over the insulting words expressed in oaths taken by pro-independence lawmakers in Hong Kong

On 12 October, when the Legco members swore in their offices by taking oaths that pledged their allegiance to the People’s Republic of China, some pro-independence lawmakers resisted by not reading out the oaths normally. In the case of two lawmakers, Leung Chun-hang and Yau Wai-ching, used the word “Shi-na” (支那) to refer to “China, which many found it offensive as the word was used by the Japanese government to insult China during World War II. Some other localist lawmakers’ oaths were also declared invalid as they showed intention to amend the meaning of their oaths. Some of them managed to swear in office while Leung and Yau remained barred from doing so. For the background of the rise of localist movement in Hong Kong, please refer to the current affairs article by Ying-ho Kwong in China Perspectives No. 2016/3. For the background and discussion on the Legislative Council Election this September, please refer to our previous press highlights, in particular about the scholarly comments on the Central Government’s policy towards Hong Kong SAR.

  • //A blue banner bearing the words “Hong Kong is not China” took centre stage as two localist lawmakers used it as a protest prop to pledge loyalty to the “Hong Kong nation” at the opening of the new Legislative Council on Wednesday. The pair, and a third lawmaker who inserted his own words into the official script, saw their oaths rejected. Four localist and seven pan-democratic legislators protesting similarly played it safer by either shouting slogans or making extra statements before or after taking their oaths as the city’s 70 lawmakers were sworn in.// Source: SCMP, 12 October 2016.
  • //Youngspiration’s Sixtus Baggio Leung Chung-hang and Yau Wai-ching, along with Edward Yiu Chung-yim of the Professionals Guild, had their oaths declared invalid by Legco secretary-general Kenneth Chen Wei-on, who ruled that the trio could not vote in the subsequent election of their president. “There’s a clear double standard,” Leung complained, referring to Chen’s decision in 2012 to allow a lawmaker to vote for the president despite problems with his oath taking.// Source: SCMP, 12 October 2016.

The Chief Executive and the Secretary for Justice, before the Legco meeting on 19 October, applied for the leave for judicial review of whether the president of the Legco has the power to witness the oath-taking process according to the law. The court scheduled a hearing of the case on 3 November but refused to ban the oath taking the next day. Some observers criticized the Hong Kong Government for intervening the affairs of the Legislature and violating the principles of separation of powers.

  • //[l]awyers for the chief executive and justice secretary ­accused the duo of “exhibiting to the world” that they would not uphold the Basic Law recognising Hong Kong as an inalienable part of China. The lawsuit effectively places the executive and legislative branches on a collision course. In court, the lawyer for Andrew Leung argued that the government’s move was a “serious deprivation of the constitutional rights” of the two lawmakers-elect. “I want to emphasise the ­president has an important institutional duty … to protect the institution elected by different sectors of society,” Jat Sew-tong SC, acting for the Legco president, told the court. “[He has to] safeguard the interests of all elected councillors.”// Source: SCMP, 18 October 2016.

Not only did the pro-establishment camp staged petition campaign against them, local community including history scholars also co-signed a separate petition, urging their apology to the Chinese community around the world.

  • //Indeed, public sentiment has grown against the Youngspiration pair since last Wednesday. Various pro-establishment and Beijing-friendly organisations have run more than a dozen adverts in local newspapers, urging the duo to apologise or even resign. One of the statements was issued by more than 200 historians and educators, including former chief curator of the Hong Kong History Museum Joseph Ting Sun-pao.// Source: SCMP, 20 October 2016.
  • //包括香港歷史博物館總館長丁新豹在內逾300名歷史教授、校長、教師及文化工作者,發表聯署聲明,要求青年新政立法會候任議員游蕙禎和梁頌恆,就上周三宣 誓就任期間將「China」讀成日本侵華時期辱華讀音「支那」,公開向全港市民和全球華人嚴肅道歉,及公開所持護照,如屬特區護照而又不承認香港是中國一部份,必須立即選擇放棄議員職位及特區護照。// Source: Hong Kong 01, 18 October 2016.

On 20 October, the pro-establishment camp took a political move to prevent them from re-taking the oath by refusing to attend the Legco meeting amass, which results in the lack of sufficient quorum to continue the meeting.

  • //In denying the localists a second chance to be sworn in, after they insulted China and referred to Hong Kong as a “nation” when they modified their oaths last week, pro-establishment politicians were hailed yesterday as “lawmakers who love the country and love Hong Kong” by state news agency Xinhua. But their political opponents accused them of siding with the administration in letting it interfere in the legislature’s operation – using, in an ironic role reversal, the same tactics that the pan-democrats are known for. […] Pro-establishment legislators said their walkout was targeted at Youngspiration’s Sixtus Baggio Leung Chung-hang and Yau Wai-ching, who caused offence by ­pronouncing China as “Chee-na” in their oaths last Wednesday, using what sounded like the ­derogatory term “Shina” that Japan employed during war time. […] The Legco president said it was “unfortunate” he had to ­adjourn the meeting, but added “we are far from a constitutional crisis”. Andrew Leung insisted he had the constitutional duty to let the duly-elected localists perform their duties, but noted that the pro-establishment camp also had the right to express their views by leaving their seats.// Source: SCMP, 20 October 2016.
  • //One lesson the camp has learned this time is to make sure the four Liberal Party lawmakers are on board before the final showdown. The pro-business Liberals, who were strong advocates of the “ABC” or “Anyone but CY” drive, did not join the walkout last year, but this time they played ball.// Source: SCMP, 20 October 2016.

As a turn of event on 25 October, the Legco President Andrew Leung Kwan-yuen decided to postpone the agenda of taking oath for Leung and Yau until the court ruling on 3 November, while two other lawmakers have successfully re-taken the oath. This has created strong opposition from the non-establishment camp, and the Legco general meeting was adjourned for the second time on 26 October in the new session.

  • //Hong Kong’s Legislative Council was thrown into tumult yet again on Wednesday with a meeting adjourned for the second time in three weeks, as two localist lawmakers barred from attending stormed into the chamber with the help of other pan-democrats. As the finger-pointing between pan-democrats and pro-establishment legislators continued, Legco appeared on course for further paralysis for at least another week or two after the Youngspiration pair vowed to repeat their tactics at another meeting next Wednesday. The latest descent into chaos came a day after Legco president Andrew Leung Kwan-yuen made a dramatic U-turn to defer the second oaths of Sixtus Baggio Leung Chung-hang and Yau Wai-ching – who used insulting language towards China in their initial swearing-in – pending a court ruling on a judicial review filed by the government. The administration earlier mounted an unprecedented legal challenge against the president’s initial decision to give the pair a second chance. The Legco president also banned the duo from entering the chamber on Wednesday, to no avail. […] Unable to control the situation, the Legco president announced an adjournment, shortly after a temporary suspension failed to force the pair, who sat stony-faced, to vacate their seats. “I already announced the decision [on Tuesday] to delay the oath-taking process of the two lawmakers, and they have refused to leave even upon my order,” said Leung, who said he regretted the development. “I have no choice but to adjourn the meeting as order could not be restored.”// Source: SCMP, 26 October 2016.
  • //Legco president Leung has cited Article 72 of the Basic Law which allows the Legco president to decide on the agenda. He is using this Article to reshuffle the agenda and defer the oath-taking to a later stage. This is so, even though according to Rule 18 of Legco’s rules of procedures, oath-taking is designated as the first priority of the order of Legco’s business.// Source: SCMP, 26 October 2016.
  • //University of Hong Kong law professor Johannes Chan Man-mun said the Legco president had the discretion to postpone the taking of oaths for a reasonable time, but it should not be for too long as it was a matter of constitutional importance.// Source: SCMP, 25 October 2016.

On 02 November when the Legco meeting was resumed, the pro-independence lawmakers insisted on taking the oath but of no avail. The chaos created forced the President of Legislature Council to adjourn the meeting, after the last lawmaker Lau Siu-lai besides Yau and Leung successfully swore in office. Police was called to enter the premise of the Legislature by the President with some security guards injured.

  • //The fourth meeting of the Legislative Council was adjourned by Legco president Andrew Leung Kwan-yuen around 1.30pm today after four security guards were hurt when they tried to block localist lawmakers Yau Wai-ching and Sixtus Baggio Leung Chung-hang from entering a conference room where the lawmaking body had relocated. […] Localist Lau Siu-lai, whose original oath was invalidated because of the extremely slow manner in which she recited it, was successfully sworn in. […] Legco president Andrew Leung Kwan-yuen condemns the violent acts of the Youngspiration duo and their supporters. He says six security guards were injured in the row.// Source: SCMP, 02 November 2016.

Some observers suggested that the Beijing Government would take every measure to prevent the two pro-independence lawmakers from taking the oath, including the re-interpretation of the Basic Law by Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.

  • //The National People’s Congress might eventually have to interpret the Basic Law if the case involving the swearing in of two localist lawmakers ended up in the Court of Final Appeal, a Hong Kong academic warned. Professor Lau Siu-kai, vice-chairman of the semi-official Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macau Studies, also said on Wednesday that the new Legislative Council president would offend Beijing if he let duo retake their oaths.// Source: SCMP, 26 October 2016.

State-owned media such as Global Times and the People’s Daily (Overseas Edition) univocally urged to combat the two pro-independence lawmakers at all cost for their disrespect for the Basic Law.

  • //很明显,梁、游二人公开宣示了自己的港独立场,对《基本法》予以蔑视,从而突破了担任香港特别行政区立法会议员所需遵守的政治底线。取缔两人的候任议员资格,是法律应有的正义。如果两人得以带着现有立场成为香港立法会议员,必将对《基本法》的权威形成打击,并且让香港的爱国爱港力量感到沮丧。两人成为议员后也定将变本加厉地利用立法会舞台推动“港独”,“港独”将因此首次获得在体制内宣讲的空间。这是必须进行的斗争,即使它意味着一些可能的连锁麻烦,爱港护港的力量也应在所不惜。// Source: Global Times, 20 October 2016.
  • //香港立法会候任议员梁颂恒、游蕙祯在就职宣誓时,公然使用粗言秽语侮辱国家民族,并展示标语鼓吹“港独”,事后不仅轻佻回应社会谴责,还赴台湾宣扬“港独”,后又硬闯立法会议事厅致使议会瘫痪。多名专家学者表示,梁、游二人的言行已经违反基本法,不仅没有就任立法会议员的资格,而且必须负上相应的法律责任。全国港澳研究会理事、中国社会科学院法学研究所副所长莫纪宏接受记者采访时表示,梁、游二人这种具有主观恶意的辱国宣誓行为,明显违反了基本法,是对基本法的故意挑战,两人显然不具备立法会议员的就职资格。依据基本法第104条,拥护“港独”的人是不能够成为立法会议员的。此外,鼓吹“港独”涉嫌触犯多条《刑事罪行条例》,不为法律所容,必须负上法律责任。// Source: People’s Daily (Overseas Edition), 01 November 2016.
  • //身为香港候任议员,竟然口称“支那”,是否代表他们是站在侵略者一边,支持日本当年凌虐、屠杀中国人的行为?当时香港被日本侵占了3年8个月,港人也是惨遭蹂躏,梁、游二人难道也暗暗称快?如此行径即便出自本议员都不可原谅,更遑论是香港候任议员?支持外敌入侵言论,已触犯香港《刑事罪行条例》第3条意图叛逆罪,及第910条的煽动罪。若在战争年代,这就是活脱脱的汉奸典型,放到现在,也是赤裸裸的叛国行径。难怪连香港反对派人士都直斥二人“幼稚、无知、不知天高地厚”了,不是无知到一定程度,确实无法做到如此丧心病狂。// Source: People’s Daily (Overseas Edition), 02 November 2016.

The Hong Kong Bar Association raised concerns about the potential re-interpretation of the Basic Law before the court ruling on 03 November to disqualify the two pro-independence lawmakers, citing it would undermine the independence of the judiciary of the Hong Kong court and the confidence of Hong Kong people as well as the international community in the high degree of autonomy of Hong Kong:

  • //The Hong Kong Bar Association has said it is “deeply concerned” about reports that the mainland’s top legislative body may intervene in the row over two localist lawmakers’ oaths with an interpretation of Hong Kong’s mini-constitution. In a statement issued on Wednesday, the legal professional body said it would “deal a severe blow to the independence of the judiciary and the power of final adjudication of the Hong Kong court”, if the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress insisted on interpreting the Basic Law at this stage. […]It will also seriously undermine the confidence of the Hong Kong people and the international community in the high degree of autonomy of [Hong Kong],” the association said of the potential impact of the interpretation. The irreparable harm it would do to Hong Kong far outweighed any purpose it could possibly achieve, it warned. The Bar Association noted that the court had already granted permission for the Secretary of Justice to seek a judicial review over the legality of the oath taking by Youngspiration lawmakers Sixtus Baggio Leung Chung-hang and Yau Wai-ching.// Source: SCMP, 02 November 2016.

On 03 November, the court heard about the case of judicial review and decided to hand down the verdict as soon as possible.On 04 November, before the court’s release of verdict, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress announced its intention to re-interpret the Basic Law. The initiative was taken by the President of the NPCSC Zhang Dejiang.

  • //The Hong Kong government has confirmed that Beijing officials are to discuss handing down an interpretation of the Article 104 of the Basic Law at the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress meeting. It received the notice on Thursday night that the matter will be added to the agenda, after the hearing of the judicial review relating to lawmakers Baggio Leung Chun-hang and Yau Wai-ching concluded at Hong Kong’s high court. A spokesperson for the government said the Department of Justice has informed the court of the notice. The Department of Justice informed the court about the information on Friday morning, the spokesman said. Beijing is seeking to bar the two localist lawmakers from retaking their oaths as lawmakers. The Hong Kong government is also currently seeking an order from the court to bar Yau and Leung from the Legislative Council. The oaths they took during their swearing-in session were deemed invalid in October as they took them while carrying a flag stating “Hong Kong is not China” and pronounced the word China as “Chee-na,” which is considered derogatory. Article 104 of the Basic Law says that “the Chief Executive, principal officials, members of the Executive Council and of the Legislative Council, judges of the courts at all levels and other members of the judiciary in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region must, in accordance with law, swear to uphold the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China and swear allegiance to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China.”// Source: Hong Kong Free Press, 04 November 2016.

On 07 November, the NPCSC made the interpretation of the Basic Law Article 104 regarding the swearing-in incident:

  • //Chinese officials have defended Beijing’s interpretation of Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, saying that the move helps “protect the rule of law and improve the legal system” of the autonomous territory. Critics say that the interpretation sends a chilling message to Hongkongers. China’s top legislature, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC), voted on and passed The NPCSC’s interpretation of the Basic Law Article 104 of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region with unanimous support on Monday morning. This is the fifth Basic Law’s interpretation since the 1997 handover. […] Article 104 of the Basic Law stipulates that lawmakers, judges, the chief executives and top officials must, “in accordance with law,” swear allegiance to the Hong Kong SAR. Monday’s interpretation sought to define the term “in accordance with law.” It said oath-taking is a mandatory procedure for assuming public office, and it must “fulfil the statutory requirements in format and content” by “accurately, completely and solemnly” reading out phrases such as the full name of Hong Kong. Oath-takers are not allowed to retake their pledges and will be disqualified from assuming public office if they refuse to take the oaths, according to the interpretation. “Refuse” means deliberately reading out an altered oath or reading the oath in an insincere manner. The NPCSC also stated that the “oath administrator” has the duty to confirm that the oath-taking complies with Hong Kong law and the interpretation. It warns that those who make a “false oath” or break their oath – which it says is legally binding – will bear “legal responsibility.” […] Lawmaker James To of the Democratic Party said: “This should not have been done by the NPC. This will hurt the public’s confidence in the One Country, Two Systems policy.” “Beijing is effectively doing the work for the local government and taking away some of its power.” Pro-Beijing politicians such as lawmaker Priscilla Leung began showing their support for the Basic Law interpretation on Friday, when the Hong Kong government confirmed that the NPCSC will discuss interpreting the Basic Law at its current meeting. Many in the pro-Beijing camp refrained from expressing their support before the confirmation.// Source: Hong Kong Free Press, 07 November 2016.

As a protest against the interpretation of the Basic Law, lawyers in Hong Kong staged a silent march on 08 November:

  • //March organiser and legal-sector lawmaker Dennis Kwok said more than 2,000 people joined the protest Police put the turnout at 1,700. It was the fourth silent march staged by lawyers against Beijing’s intervention in the judicial system since the handover in 1997. Leading the march were senior counsel including Martin Lee Chu-ming, Audrey Eu Yuet-mee, Graham Harris, Alan Leong Kah-kit and solicitor John Clancey. Denis Chang, second on the Bar list, was also there. Lee said the latest interpretation, the fifth of its kind since the handover, was “the worst” of all. “It is like a tank crashing into Hong Kong’s legal system,” Lee, a member of the Basic Law Drafting Committee in the 1980s, said. “It is not an interpretation of the Basic Law – it is an amendment of Hong Kong law.” […] The lawyers say the ruling pre-empted a local court, which had heard arguments – and is yet to give a decision – over a judicial review sought by the government to disqualify the two localists who insulted China while taking their oaths last month. Some marchers said they did not agree with the localists, and had joined the rally to defend the city’s legal system. […] Bar Association chairwoman Winnie Tam Wan-chi, who had said the interpretation was not necessarily a bad thing, was not present. However, after the ruling was issued, the Bar expressed “deep regret” at the interpretation, which it said would “do more harm than good”. The Law Society said Beijing should “exercise restraint” in invoking its power to interpret the Basic Law because frequently doing so would give the impression that judicial independence was being undermined. Meanwhile, Basic Law Committee member and University of Hong Kong professor Albert Chen Hung-yee said it was up to the court to decide whether the Beijing ruling had retrospective effect, because the text did not touch on the issue. Chen noted that committee chairman Li Fei said he would respect the city’s common law principles when asked about whether it was retrospective.// Source: SCMP, 08 November 2016.

TAIWAN – POLITICS

A Party-to-party Meeting between Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Party between 30 October and 3 November

  • //A meeting between the leaders of the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang (KMT) party will be significant for safeguarding the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, a Chinese mainland spokesperson said Wednesday. An Fengshan, spokesperson for the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, made the remarks in regard to the upcoming visit of Hung Hsiu-chu, leader of the KMT in Taiwan. Hung is scheduled to lead a delegation to visit the mainland from Oct. 30 to Nov. 3, the mainland-based office said Monday. […] There have been many meetings between leaders of the two parties in the past. In 2005 when cross-Strait ties were at a critical moment, the heads of the two parties held a « historic meeting » confirming their adherence to the 1992 Consensus, which affirms the one-China principle and opposes « Taiwan independence. » An said the agreement to regularly communicate made at that meeting pointed to a « bright road » for the cross-Strait ties to develop. Since then, the two parties have maintained communication, which has contributed to peaceful relations, the spokesperson said.// Source: Xinhua, 27 October 2016.

 Some veteran KMT members have shown concerns about how the new chairwoman of KMT Hung Hsiu-chu would interpret the “1992 Consensus” in her meeting with the CCP’s leader Xi Jinping.

  • //前總統馬英九昨晚宴請他擔任黨主席任內的副主席,共商黨計,協助國民黨度過難關,有媒體報導,馬英九與洪秀柱為一中各表槓上。[…] 馬英九認為「九二共識、一中各表」8個字不可分開,蔡正元說,他以從政黨員身分,要向馬英九報告,馬英九說九二共識就是一中各表,措辭需要修正;九二共識必定包含一中各表,這是國民黨政綱基本立場,也是歷史文件的客觀事實。至於一中同表,蔡正元表示,國民黨政綱沒有一中同表在裡面,洪秀柱擔任主席以來沒有提一中同表,洪秀柱清楚認知到在競選總統時沒充分時間說明一中同表,已經被攻擊抹黑,一個已經被汙名化的名詞,洪秀柱就不再提及;國民黨也從來沒有通過一中同表的文件,一中同表立場不存在國民黨政綱裡面。// Source: Central News Agency, 25 October 2016.

 A Hong Kong-based commentator Jung Hur pointed out that Hung was generally regarded as pursuing quick re-unification with Mainland China and she raising similar ideas in recent time attracted criticisms from veteran KMT members.

  • //[早]在洪秀柱任主席之前,她曾代表國民黨參與今年總統大選,卻因其統獨立場不為黨友支持而被「偷樑換柱」,改由中央黨部「徵召」時任黨主席的新北市長朱立倫出戰。洪秀柱被視為「急統」而影響國民黨立委選情,矛盾觸發點是其「一中同表」訴求,終因黨內大力反彈,而被逼退選。近日,洪秀柱「一中同表」立場再度宣之於口,引起前副總統吳敦義等惡評;無怪乎到了募集「特別黨費」時,也不見黨內大佬熱切呼應、共渡時艱。事實上,「一個中國,各自表述」或「一中憲法」,一直是台灣中間派,或曰淺藍路線既定立場,沒有「各表」自然沒有「一中」。單純堅持「一中」,台北就成了中華人民共和國治下地方政府。即便統派之內的主流,亦無法接受。可見,「一中各表」在各方撕扯中被廢棄,最大責任在於北京。相關官員從來強調「一個中國原則」,而迴避不可或缺的「各表」。對1992 年本來極珍貴的會談歷史,作甚為片面詮釋,等同摧毀當年的有限共識。// Source: Hong Kong 01, 26 October 2016.

 A Taiwan-based report analyzed that the recent discussion inside the KMT may indicate a political struggle against Hung by the veteran KMT members is on the rise.

  • //國民黨主席洪秀柱即將飛往北京「洪習會」,原以為攀上個人政治生涯高 峰,讓她意氣軒昂,未料黨內接連質疑,面對競爭對手吳敦義開火也就算了,還得接受國民黨團的「行前口試」,甚至加碼奉送一份綿裡針式的聲明,提醒「本黨同 志應堅守『九二共識、一中各表』原則」,就連馬英九也下指導棋,要求「九二共識、一中各表」八字訣,一字不可少,儼然形成一場藍營路線之爭。這次洪秀柱登陸,確實由於個人政治色彩,才會引發黨內集體擔心暴衝的「藍色憂慮」,但不可諱言,背後隱藏一股反洪的政治鬥爭。// Source: Liberty Times Net, 27 October 2016.

 In response to Hung’s visit to Mainland China, the Presidential office of Taiwan made a statement urging all cross-strait talks should be government-led.

  • //台總統府發言人黃重諺指,正面看待所有正常的兩岸民間交流,兩岸雙方應該透過良性、不預設政治前提的有意義對話及交流,增進兩岸人民進一步的相互了解,並共同致力兩岸關係和平穩定發展。對於洪秀柱出訪大陸,黃重諺說,「我們認為不分朝野,台灣所有政黨應該秉持對內良性競爭、對外團結一致的基本原則,與台灣人民站在一起,全力支持由政府主導的兩岸關係。」任何涉及公權力的兩岸事務,必須由兩岸政府溝通務實解決,以確保國民福祉。// Source: Ming Pao Daily, 01 November 2016.

In the KMT-CCP Meeting in Beijing, both parties reaffirmed their commitment to the One-China Principle:

  • //In their widely watched meeting in Beijing, Communist Party chief Xi Jinping and Kuomintang chairwoman Hung Hsiu-chu also expressed strong opposition to independence for the island.“Our two sides share a common fate and we must resolutely uphold peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait based on the 1992 consensus and its ‘one China’ principle,” Xi said on the eve of a two-day forum between the two parties. It was the first time Xi and Hung had met in their capacity as leaders of the two parties. […] Stressing the need to uphold territorial integrity and oppose any moves to “separate the country”, Xi said it was the resolve of all Chinese people to create a Chinese renaissance and a prosperous future. “Such a historical trend cannot be reversed,” he said. Hung also said the consensus was the political foundation for cross-strait ties.“The consensus reached in 1992 sought to underline the one-China principle and wisely contained the different contexts of one China, thereby maintaining the mutual trust and the political foundation of our two sides,” she said. The consensus is an understanding that there is only “one China”, but each side has its own interpretation of what constitutes “China”.// Source: SCMP, 02 November 2016.
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