Keywords: Xi-Trump Summit, Xinjiang, rights defense lawyers in China, assault for an insulted mother, Chief Executive of Hong Kong, Occupy Movement.

CHINA – POLITICS

 1. Preparation for the Xi-Trump Summit in April

Observers noted that the Xi-Trump Summit might discuss some pressing issues such as North Korea, bilateral trade, etc, and it is good for the stability of the relationship between the two countries to such have high-level meeting. The Summit will be held during 7-8 April 2017.

• //“The news about the summit sends out a big positive signal,” said Diao Daming, a researcher at the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. “An early meeting between the two leaders would push Sino-US relations to complete the debugging and test-running period as soon as possible before entering the track of healthy and positive development.” […] Scott Kennedy, deputy director of the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said in a commentary that the Xi-Trump summit would provide the two leaders with “an opportunity to quiet the doubts and articulate a clear vision”. But he also warned that the “volatile winds of competing nationalism” might make US-China relations bounce around “like a kite”. […] A number of senior Trump administration officials have records of talking tough on China. Trump’s chief strategist Steve Bannon has predicted a war between the two nations in the South China Sea and Peter Navarro, the director of his National Trade Council, has described the Sino-US relationship as a “zero-sum game”. […] Dennis Wilder, a former director for East Asian affairs at America’s National Security Council, said addressing the threat posed by North Korea would “top the list” at the summit. But he said the meeting would also be important because “President Trump has a starkly different set of domestic priorities (particularly on economic and trade issues) than the last US president, which have large implications for Sino-US relations going forward”. Wang [former US State Department Asia-Pacific specialist Robert Wang] said the most likely positive outcome of the summit was on the trade front, where the two leaders might be more willing to make compromises. “For example, Trump may agree not to designate China a currency manipulator,” he said. “China might look at the possibility of investing in US infrastructure as Trump pledges to bring manufacturing jobs back to America.”// Source: SCMP, 29 March 2017.

Wang Xiangwei analyzed that the informal meeting between Xi and Trump revived the art of personal diplomacy and the informal nature of the meeting does not give undue pressure on both sides to yield results.

• //The late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) set an example for breaking the ice in 1979 when he donned a cowboy hat at a rodeo in Texas.The next most memorable moment was in 2002 (also in Texas), when former president Jiang Zemin (江澤民) was invited to lunch at the then president George W. Bush‘s family ranch where the two rode in a truck and enjoyed a barbecue.While Jiang’s successor Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) invariably stuck to scripted points, President Xi Jinping (習近平), who replaced Hu in 2012, appears to have embraced the art of personal diplomacy. So it should come as no big surprise that Xi and his American counterpart, US President Donald Trump, are planning to meet in the latter’s Mar-a-Lago resort in Palm Beach, Florida, next month, according to US media reports. The venue is also a good choice. The relaxed setting of the Florida resort will give Xi and Trump ample time to see if they can nurture a high-level working relationship, if not friendship. The results of the meeting will set the tone for the trajectory and strength of bilateral ties in the years to come. Moreover, the informal setting, rather than the typical formal trappings of a state visit, will not put undue pressure on either side to yield concrete results, which is unrealistic under the current circumstances.// Source: SCMP, 19 March 2017.

2. Increased security measures against religious extremism in Xinjiang

Recently a new law was passed in Xinjiang to expand the religious activities deemed related to extremism by the state alongside with a series of mandatory anti-terror drills taking place in Western Xinjiang region. People with Islamic face coverings and robes or long beard were targeted by the state. The government argued that the increased security measures aimed to make everyone safer in the run-up to the OBOR summit in Beijing in May, some residents complained it was a massive surveillance on their daily lives. The stepped-up security measures came after a video showing Uighur fighters training in Iraq by the Islamic State and vowed attack on China.

• //China will step up a campaign against religious extremism in the far western region of Xinjiang on Saturday by implementing a range of measures, including prohibiting « abnormal » beards, the wearing of veils in public places and the refusal to watch state television. […] New legislation, passed by Xinjiang lawmakers on Wednesday and published on the region’s official news website, widens existing rules and will come into effect on April 1. Workers in public spaces like stations and airports will be required to « dissuade » those who fully cover their bodies, including veiling their faces, from entering, and to report them to the police, the rules state. It will be banned to « reject or refuse radio, television and other public facilities and services », marrying using religious rather than legal procedures and « using the name of Halal to meddle in the secular life of others ». « Parents should use good moral conduct to influence their children, educate them to revere science, pursue culture, uphold ethnic unity and refuse and oppose extremism, » the rules say. The document also bans not allowing children to attend regular school, not abiding by family planning policies, deliberately damaging legal documents and « abnormal growing of beards and naming of children to exaggerate religious fervour ». A number of bans on select « extremist behaviours » had previously been introduced in some places in Xinjiang, including stopping people with head scarves, veils and long beards from boarding buses in at least one city. The new rules expand the list and apply them to the whole region. While Uighurs have traditionally practiced a more relaxed form of Islam, the popularity of veils for women in particular has grown in recent years in what experts say is an expression of opposition to Chinese controls.// Source: Reuters, 30 March 2017.

• //Three times a day, alarms ring out through the streets of China’s ancient Silk Road city of Kashgar, and shopkeepers rush out of their stores swinging government-issued wooden clubs. In mandatory anti-terror drills conducted under police supervision and witnessed by Reuters on a recent visit, they fight off imaginary knife-wielding assailants. Armoured paramilitary and police vehicles circle with sirens blaring. China says it faces a serious threat from Islamist extremists in this far Western Xinjiang region. Beijing accuses separatists among the Muslim Uighur ethnic minority there of stirring up tensions with the ethnic Han Chinese majority and plotting attacks elsewhere in China. A historic trading post, Kashgar is also central to China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) Initiative, President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign and economic policy involving massive infrastructure spending linking China to Asia, the Middle East and beyond. China’s worst fears are that a large-scale attack would blight this year’s diplomatic setpiece, an OBOR summit attended by world leaders planned for Beijing in May. State media say the drills, and other measures such as a network of thousands of new street-corner police posts, are aimed making everyone feel safer. But many residents say the drills are just part of an oppressive security operation that has been ramped up in Kashgar and other cities in Xinjiang’s Uighur heartland in recent months. As well as taking part in drills, shopkeepers must, at their own expense, install password-activated security doors, « panic buttons » and cameras that film not just the street outside but also inside their stores, sending a direct video feed to police. For Uighurs like the owner of an online multimedia company facing one of Kashgar’s main streets it is not about security, but mass surveillance. « We have no privacy, » said the business owner who, like almost everyone Reuters spoke to in Kashgar, did not want to give his name. « They want to see what you’re up to. » A Chinese security source, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Reuters the new security measures in Xinjiang were not politically motivated, but based on fresh developments and intelligence. He declined to elaborate. […] Hotan authorities offer 2,000 yuan ($290) rewards for those who report « face coverings and robes, youth with long beards, or other popular religious customs that have been radicalized », as part of a wider incentive system that rewards actionable intelligence on imminent attacks. Xinjiang lawmakers this week approved legislation extending a prohibition on « abnormal » beards and the wearing of veils in public places across the whole region. The new rules come into force on Saturday. This month a video purportedly released by the Islamic State group showed Uighur fighters training in Iraq and vowing that blood would « flow in rivers » in China. The architect of the anti-terror drills and other new measures in Xinjiang is Chen Quanguo, appointed Communist Party boss in the region in August in what analysts said was an implicit endorsement of his hard-line management of ethnic strife in neighbouring Tibet. […] They are present on almost every intersection in Kashgar, typically just hundreds of metres apart, in what Chen calls a « grid-style social management » system he pioneered in Tibet. Local state media have praised the initiative as a new benchmark in community-based policing. Critics, including Uighur and rights groups, say the real purpose of the convenience police stations is to spy on the population.// Source: Reuters, 31 March 2017.

James Leibold, an expert on China’s ethnic issues at La Trobe University in Australia, commented on the recent development in Xinjiang:

• //James Leibold, an expert on China’s ethnic issues at La Trobe University in Australia, said the law was part of a broader trend aimed at legislating the government’s existing practices in the ­region. Some local officials had been enforcing many of the law’s restrictions for years, but adherence and enforcement had been patchy, Leibold said. “By creating a [region] wide regulation, the new regime of Xinjiang party secretary Chen Quanguo is seeking to strengthen [Communist Party] control and root out any acts of non-compliance,” he said. “In the process, however, many aspects of Uygur cultural and religious life are now being deemed ‘abnormal’ and ‘manifestations’ of extremism, and thus subject to punitive ­enforcement.” Leibold warned that forcefully imposing Han-defined norms on the Uygurs was likely to “increase their sense of cultural insecurity and thus ultimately undermine the party-state’s attempts to create a more social cohesive and stable society in Xinjiang.”// Source: SCMP, 30 March 2017.

 3. Australia-based Chinese scholar Feng Chongyi barred from leaving China after a research trip related to human-rights lawyers

• //An Australian academic researching human rights and barred from leaving China by state security agents on suspicion of endangering national security has been told not to reveal the details of his ordeal. Chongyi Feng, a professor at the University of Technology Sydney, was stopped twice at immigration checkpoints at the weekend while attempting to take flights to Australia from the southern Chinese city of Guangzhou, his lawyer said. He has not been formally detained or arrested and is still living at his hotel with his wife. […] When reached by phone at his hotel, Feng, 56, was tight-lipped about his current situation, saying only he had been advised not to talk to the media, but did say he was unsure when he would be able to return to Australia. “State security is questioning him about who he met while in China, about human rights lawyers,” Chen Jinxue, a friend and Feng’s lawyer, said. “They want to know more about his research into human rights lawyers and he has been barred from leaving China on suspicion of harming national security.” […] Since he was stopped at the airport, Feng has been repeatedly questioned by national security officers. He was born in China and is a permanent resident in Australia but not a citizen, Chen said. […] Feng has long been involved in research over China’s political future and has advocated for liberalisation of the current Communist-controlled system. He has also spoken out against Chinese government attempts to exert influence over Australia’s Chinese community, especially through Chinese-language media. “Since Xi Jinping came to office, he has not only failed to lead China forward in reform and opening up and constitutional government, he has made an historical U-turn,” he wrote last year in response to the 2015 crackdown on rights lawyers. “He has restored totalitarian values and destroyed existing achievements in the rule of law.”// Source: The Guardian, 27 March 2017.

On 02 April, Reuters reported that Feng was allowed to travel back home in Sydney. Feng made comments on his experience:

• //Subjected to daily interrogations and blocked from leaving China for more than a week, Australia-based academic Feng Chongyi arrived home in Sydney on Sunday, vowing to return to the mainland later this year to complete his research. […] “If they wanted to scare me they failed miserably,” Feng, a well-known China Studies expert at the University of Technology Sydney, said via telephone. “I’m not scared of them. I did not do anything illegal.” The project, which is partly government-funded via the Australian Research Council, touches on sensitive subject matter for the Chinese government. […] Feng said his case, as well as interviews he conducted before being interrupted, showed the space for government criticism or dissent had been tightened further. He said he had been unmolested when he met with what he described as “sensitive contacts” on a trip to China a year ago. “In terms of rule of law and human rights it’s getting worse and worse. It’s clear their control of Chinese citizens has become harder and harder,” he said. “It’s a reflection of their [the Chinese government’s] insecurity. They can shut you down.”// Source: SCMP, 02 April 2017.

In another development, two rights-defense activists Su Changlan (苏昌兰) and Chen Qitang (陈启棠) were convicted of “incitement to subvert state power” and received jail terms of three and four years and six months in cases seemingly related to the Occupy Movement in Hong Kong.

• //Two activists who voiced support on social media for Hong Kong’s pro-democracy Occupy protests in 2014 have been sentenced to jail terms by a court in Guangdong, south China, on Friday. Su [Su Changlan] was found guilty of “incitement to subvert state power” by the Foshan Intermediate Court and sentenced to three years imprisonment. She was also stripped of her political rights for three years. […] Another activist Chen Qitang – a freelance writer – was sentenced to four years and six months for the same charge, in a closely related case. He took photos of the Occupy camp in Central and uploaded them on Chinese social network WeChat, and also voiced support for Su, according to RTHK. […] Su was detained in October 2014 after making comments on social media in support of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy Occupy movement. She previously worked as a volunteer for the New York-based Women’s Rights in China group, and has been a long time campaigner for women’s and children’s rights. […] The pair were targeted as part of a nationwide crackdown in mainland China between September and November 2014, which saw at least 100 people detained for expressing support for Hong Kong’s pro-democracy Umbrella Movement, the NGO said in a press release. The Chinese government views the Occupy protests as illegal acts backed by “foreign forces.” Nine Occupy activists in Hong Kong learned earlier this week that they would be charged with public nuisance. They received phone calls from police more than two years after the demonstrations ended – and just a day after Sunday’s chief executive election.// Source: HKFP, 31 March 2017.

Amnesty International research Patrick Poon responded the verdict:

• //Amnesty International researcher Patrick Poon told HKFP: “Su Changlan and Chen Qitang shouldn’t have been detained in the first place. They were just exercising their freedom of expression. The definition of ‘inciting subversion of state power’ is extremely vague. It’s just difficult to imagine how writing articles online and posting messages in chat groups can incite people to subvert a state power which has been ruling China for over 60 years.” “[W]hen they were first detained, they were accused of supporting the Hong Kong protests,” he said. “However, that’s not mentioned in the indictment and verdict. By sentencing them on the same day and the pre-arranged arrest of the nine people leading the Occupy protests, the Chinese and Hong Kong governments seem to be sending messages to discredit the Umbrella Movement.” “The repeated delay in the court hearing is also incomprehensible, and violates the international human rights principle of fair trial.”// Source: HKFP, 31 March 2017.

Su’s defense lawyer Liu Xiaoyuan (刘晓原) believed that the true reason for the arrest and verdict was due to their activities in rights defense over the past years because in the prosecution has mentioned “Occupy Central” in the document and the verdict was based on a few online articles which were deemed attacking the ruling party. Liu also suspected the timing of the verdict was set at this moment after a number of delays.

• //劉日前接受《蘋果》訪問時表示，劉稱，蘇昌蘭當時被捕確因轉發佔中圖片；而陳啟棠則是送兒子從香港往美國讀書時，經過佔中現場，後來又為蘇出頭而被捕，但相信真正原因是二人活躍於維權圈多年，「抓了就不輕易放」。檢方對二人的起訴書沒提佔中，控罪依據僅是蘇的3條微信和幾篇文及陳於幾年前的6篇網文，指他們攻擊執政黨。蘇昌蘭2014年10月27日因在網上聲援並轉發香港佔中照片被刑拘，至今被羈押已2年5個月。廣東自由撰稿人陳啟棠（天理）因聲援香港佔領運動，而於2014年11月25日被刑拘，先後已被羈押2年4個多月。// Source: Apple Daily, 31 March 2017.

• //劉曉原認為該案多次延期，選擇這個宣判時機是有統一安排。劉曉原還透露，檢方對二人的起訴書中並未提及「佔中」，控罪依據僅為蘇昌蘭的3條微信帖文與幾篇文章，以及陳啟棠幾年前的6篇網文，檢方指控二人攻擊執政黨。判決書指，蘇昌蘭在2013年曾經多次通過電郵，在「中國婦權」等境外網站發表關於維權人士失踪、被虐致死及打擊政府等文章。法院認為，此舉為網上造謠和誹謗，旨在攻擊共產黨和社會主義制度。[…] 蘇昌蘭原為小學教師，因參與土地維權運動失去工作，而後一直從事社會維權活動。2014年佔中期間，蘇昌蘭在微信朋友圈聲援佔中並轉發佔中圖片，同年10月，蘇昌蘭以「尋釁滋事罪」遭公安傳召，後以「煽動顛覆國家政權罪」被捕。陳啟棠自1998年以來，以網名「天理」活躍在網絡論壇上，曾發表時事評論文章逾2000篇，且經常聲援維權人士。2014年12月31日，陳啟棠因涉嫌嫌「煽動顛覆國家政權罪」被捕。香港「雨傘運動「 發生於2014年9月至12月，事隔兩年，香港警方以「串謀公眾妨擾罪」、「煽惑公眾妨擾罪」等罪名控告「佔中三子」、學聯前成員等至少9人。在傘運期間，已有逾百名內地公民、維權人士因聲援傘運被帶走，約有10人被判刑。// Source: Hong Kong 01, 31 March 2017.

CHINA – ECONOMY

 New book by government think-tank shed light on reasons for reform delay

A new book titled “The Phenomenon of the Reform Obstruction in China: The Performance, Origin, and Solution” (改革梗阻现象：表现、根源与治理) published by the Economic System and Management Institute of China’s National Development and Reform Commission has outspokenly identified the “top-level design” of economic policy as one of the reasons for the slow economic reform progress. New York Times reporter Chris Buckley argued that it was rare for a government-affiliated think-tank to publish a report like this.

• // China’s ambitious plan to revamp its economy has bogged down. Flabby state conglomerates have thwarted attempts to whip them into commercial shape. Rules that treat millions of city-dwelling rural migrants like second-class citizens have barely budged. Such criticisms are common from skeptical foreign economists who have long argued that President Xi Jinping’s efforts to remake China’s economy and fix pernicious social problems have been too slow and tepid. But these withering findings on China’s reforms come from a startling place: from within the government itself. Just as striking, this unflattering report card from a Chinese state think tank — published this month with little fanfare — faults misconceived “top-level design” in policies, as well as local bureaucrats and state managers reluctant to change. It concludes: “Reform has to some extent fallen into stalemate.” The report brings into focus a sharpening debate in China about economic priorities. Experts inside and outside China say the country’s economy needs to be overhauled to continue growing fast enough to provide jobs and higher incomes for its people. […] The new report, a 217-page study titled “The Reform Obstruction Phenomenon,” was written by researchers from the Economic System and Management Institute of China’s National Development and Reform Commission, which steers policy on industry, energy and many other sectors. The head of the commission, He Lifeng, and his deputy, Liu He, both have ties to Mr. Xi. But nothing in the report suggests that it had their blessing. The authors declined to be interviewed. Chinese leaders say they have struck the right balance between maintaining robust economic growth and jobs and fixing problems threatening long-term growth, such as excessive dependence on state investment. Their catchphrase is “progress through stability.” But critics argue that the policy changes have slowed or foundered. The report, together with recent comments from a couple of senior officials, indicates that some government insiders agree. “There must be more political courage and wisdom,” the report said. Despite the vision laid out in 2013, it said, “it’s been quite difficult to reach consensus on specific reform measures, and there have even been policies at odds with this general direction.” […] State companies — many of which suffer from overcapacity and heavy debt, burdening the broader economy — have resisted plans to rein them in while rival agencies have bickered over the direction of change. Over all, progress in every reform of state-owned firms has been quite sluggish,” it said. Above all, the report said, local officials have been besieged by conflicting demands to be both cautious and courageous, and have become allergic to taking risks that could end their careers or even land them in detention on charges of violating party discipline. “It’s an inescapable objective fact that the enthusiasm of many local governments to get things done has fallen greatly,” said the report. “The lack of vigor in implementing reform plans has become the most pressing difficulty in our country’s efforts to comprehensively deepen reform across the board.” But the authors do not blame the sluggishness just on foot-dragging cadres and state executives, an impression sometimes left by state-run news media reports. […] Instead, they say that the “top-level design” of promised reforms in state-owned business and other areas has been marred from inception by confusion, vagueness and unrealistic or conflicting demands. “Currently, a bigger reason why reforms in some of our country’s key sectors have had difficulty moving forward may lie in the thinking behind the top-level design of these reforms,” the report said. It added, “the source of the obstructions lies in the policy making.” […] China’s former finance minister, Lou Jiwei, said at a forum in Beijing this month that governments were using debt sustained by lax monetary and financial policies to delay making difficult changes. He didn’t name China but did not exclude it, either. “This has made people unwilling to endure the pain of reform,” said Mr. Lou, who stepped down from the ministry in November and now runs the state agency that manages social security funds. Xi said in 2015 that his reforms faced “obstruction,” and the party has said that his elevation to “core” leader — a vague but powerful title he received last year — was intended to help push through difficult economic changes. But the researchers also urge the government to become more open and consultative in drawing up policy — something that may not come easily to Mr. Xi, who has centralized power and warned officials against bending orders.// Source: New York Times, 27 March 2017.

CHINA – URBANISM

 China is now estimated to have over 100 cities above 1 million people

• //China now has more than 100 cities of over 1 million residents, a number that is likely to double in the next decade. According to the Demographia research group, the world’s most populous country boasts 102 cities bigger than 1 million people, many of which are little known outside the country – or even within its borders. Quanzhou, for example, on the south-east coast of China, was one of the most cosmopolitan cities in the world a millennium ago, when it served as a hub for traders from across Asia and the Middle East. It is now home to more than 7 million people, nearly 800,000 more than Madrid. […] The scale of China’s urban ambitions is staggering: it now has 119 cities bigger than Liverpool. By 2025, according to a report by the McKinsey Global Institute, that number is predicted to have more than doubled. One reason is that the government is actively encouraging rural residents to urbanise. China aims to have 60% of its people living in cities by 2020, up from 56.1% currently, and the World Bank estimates a billion people – or 70% of the country’s population – will be living in cities by 2030. Thousands of government officials have campaigned across the country to convince farmers to move to newly built urban districts, turning centuries-old villages into ghost towns. Another factor? China’s centre is moving west. Guiyang, for example, topped a few lists of the best-performing Chinese city last year, as the once-sleepy capital of the country’s poorest province saw a boom in cloud computer servers and telecommunications, with e-commerce giant Alibaba a major investor. Factories are moving inland from the coastal regions in droves. Xiangyang and Hengyang, both now home to more than 1 million people, are swelling as low-end manufacturing moves to cities with cheaper labour. […] Measuring the population of a city in China is not an exact science. Chinese cities often administer sizeable rural areas beyond the city centre and surrounding suburbs, and the Chinese word for city – shì or 市 – is typically used to describe a sub-provincial region. […] In one extreme example, Chongqing municipality covers an area almost the size of Austria, but the urban area covers only about a quarter of that, according to Demographia. Analysis shows that while the total population living within the city limits is close to 50 million, only about 7.4 million people live in the urban area. Another issue is that Chinese cities are growing so large that it has become difficult to determine where one begins and another ends. Guangzhou, formerly known as Canton, has an underground line that snakes into the neighbouring city of Foshan. Does that make it one city or two?// Source: The Guardian, 20 March 2017.

In relation to the growing cities in China, commentator on Sixth Tone Liu Chang argued that the declining trend of the “floating population” did not quite match the rising trend of “migrant workers” because the current policies of attracting migrant workers to transfer their hukou to cities favored “talented migrants” or university graduates only.

• //Every year, the Chinese government publishes two numbers for its millions-strong army of migrant workers. But what to make of the fact that one of these numbers is growing, while the other is shrinking? One figure, called liudong renkou, or “floating population,” stood at 245 million people in 2016, and has been shrinking since 2014. However, on Tuesday the vice minister of human resources and social security, Qiu Xiaoping, said the country’s population of nongmingong, or “rural laborers,” grew to 282 million last year, increasing by 4.24 million compared to 2015. Both demographics overlap — that is to say, many migrant workers are rural laborers who are simultaneously a part of the floating population. The reason the numbers differ and trend in different directions lies in semantics, and in the policies of Chinese cities that favor skilled migrants. […] A 2014 policy document, for example, set the goal of granting 100 million “floating” Chinese a local registration in their adoptive cities by 2020. Many cities have relaxed their policies for granting local hukou status, Zhuang Ya’er, a senior researcher at the China Population and Development Research Center in Beijing, told Sixth Tone. She said such policies could be one of the reasons why the floating population has been shrinking. People who were once counted as part of the floating population have been given local registrations, and are now permanent residents of the cities where they work. However, rural laborers, who theoretically should also benefit from these policies, are still growing in numbers. The reason is that most cities still throw up regulatory roadblocks that favor “talented” migrants, said Yang Ge, an assistant researcher at the Institute of Population and Labor Economics of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, also in Beijing. “The main beneficiary of these policies is the well-educated floating population,” Yang told Sixth Tone. Cities such as Shanghai and Shenzhen use point systems that make it much easier for university graduates to become urban citizens than people with a middle school education or lower, as is the case for most rural laborers.// Source: Sixth Tone, 16 March 2017.

In relation to urban development in China, the Chinese government approved mega-city plans such as the “Beijing-Tianjin-Hubei” metropolis plan for sustainable and innovative economic development over the next century. For a more detailed analysis, see here by David Ji on SCMP.

• //China’s rulers are planning a megacity that would be home to 130 million people and cover an area the size of New England. Sitting on the northeast coast of China, Jing-Jin-Ji — which stands for « Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei » — is a central plank of the country’s economic development plan over the next century. The sheer numbers are startling. In November, the government approved $36 billion to build 700 miles of rail within three years. […] In the longer term, 24 intercity railways are planned for completion by 2050 — eight alone by 2020. The goal is a « one-hour commuting circle » across the area, according to the government. « The biggest change is in transportation, » Zhang Zhongmin, a humanities professor and environmental campaigner based in Shijiazhuang, the capital of Hebei, told NBC News. « It used to take almost one day to travel from Hebei to Beijing, but now it’s only a few hours. » […] The government is expected to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on transportation and infrastructure projects that would connect about 130 million people living in Beijing, the bustling port city of Tianjin and 11 other cities in Hebei province. A crucial part of the strategy is the revitalization of Tianjin as a base for advanced manufacturing and international shipping. Beijing would remain as the nation’s capital and its political and cultural center, while Hebei province would shift to clean manufacturing and wholesale trading. […] « The biggest advantage of Jing-Jin-Ji is that we can have a more coordinated development and better environmental plan over a wider area, » said Zhang Chao, an official at the Tianjin Free Trade Zone. […] According to a strategy detailed in a report released Wednesday, the megalopolis is one of three key projects aimed at boosting China’s economy over the next 100 years along with the Yangtze River Delta Economic Region, led by Shanghai in the south, and the « One Belt, One Road » program in the west, which was created to promote China’s trading links with Asia, Europe and Africa. While it is supposed to become a motor for innovation and growth within China, some experts think Jing-Ji-Ji could also become a model of sustainable growth for the rest of the country and the world. « All eyes are on the Jing-Jin-Ji region as a testing ground for innovative solutions, » according to an October 2015 report by the Paulson Institute, a think tank founded by former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. Hebei, China’s most industrialized and polluted province and the main source of smog in Beijing, also has strong winds and higher-than-average sunlight. Thats could translate into wind and solar power and ease the transition to low-carbon manufacturing.// Source: NBC News, 25 March 2017.

In addition to the “Beijing-Tianjin-Hubei” metropolis plan, it was recently announced that the county of Xiong (Xiongxian in Chinese), Rongcheng, and Anxin will together form the “Xiongan New Area”, a newly designated centre of special economic zone within Hubei province. The area was regarded as the “backwater spot on China’s economic map” but suddenly became the focus of property investors after the official announcement. Former Shenzhen mayor Xu Qin was appointed Hebei’s deputy Communist Party secretary on 01 April to help the new district’s development.

• //For residents of the sleepy county of Xiong in smoggy Hebei province, Saturday’s announcement by China’s state news agency that it would become the centre of a new special economic zone, handpicked by President Xi Jinping, was a bolt out of the blue. The county, called Xiongxian in Chinese, rocketed overnight from a forgotten backwater spot on China’s economic map to the darling of mainland investors after Xinhua said the Xiongan New Area, covering three rural counties – Xiong, Rongcheng and Anxin – would be as important for China in the future as Shenzhen in the 1980s and Shanghai Pudong in the 1990s. […] Luxury vehicles with Beijing or Tianjin number plates filled the dusty streets of Xiong county, causing traffic jams at main intersections and parking beside small noodle shops and donkey burger stalls. […] A potential investor from Beijing, who gave his surname as Hong, said he drove all the way to Xiong county, 120km south of the capital, to explore business opportunities. “After all, it is a zone created by our top leader,” he said. […] It is not clear why Xi picked the underdeveloped area as the spot to bring his vision of a futuristic city to life. […] Shen Jianguang, the chief Asia economist at Mizuho Securities, said the Xiongan New Area was at the heart of Xi’s Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei integration plan. The “Jing-Jin-Ji” plan is one of the president’s two main development initiatives, alongside the “One Belt, One Road” trade and infrastructure strategy. […] Former Shenzhen mayor Xu Qin was appointed Hebei’s deputy Communist Party secretary on Saturday to help the new district’s development, which will change the face of Xiong county. […] According to the limited information published so far, the new zone will be home to “non-capital functions” from Beijing, a term that covers institutions, schools, hospitals, markets and factories. […] replacing the local economic and social landscape with Xi futuristic vision will require massive government investment and intensive state planning, such as ordering certain households in Beijing to relocate. “The development of new districts is partly up to their own economic foundation and growth,” Shen said, pointing out that China had created four special economic zones in the early 1980s but only Shenzhen had caught the tide, leaving Shantou, Xiamen and Zhuhai behind, even though all four were blessed with similar preferential policies.// Source: SCMP, 05 April 2017.

CHINA – SOCIETY

 A case of assault for the an insulted mother attracts public concerns

In recent weeks, the court case of a man Yu Huan (于欢) who has assaulted and later killed a moneylending thug Du Zhihao (杜志浩) for his insulted mother Su Yinxia (苏银霞) has stirred up a nationwide discussion. The case was first brought to the spotlight by Southern Weekly with the article (in Chinese) on 24 March 2017 which explained the context of the case. It soon attracted commentaries on state-owned media and others, as well as a wider online discussion which reflected public sympathy towards the convicted man. A number of issues were exposed in this case. First, some argued whether Yu should have been punished for his motive to save his mom from the moneylending gang, which is perceived as filial piety in Chinese culture. Second, some questioned whether the policemen have been acting negligently in preventing the killing from happening, especially when it was revealed that Du had a background of triad society and has practically imprisoned Su and her son with his insulting words and actions toward them. Third, some showed pity for Su who has to borrow money from illegal loan shark due to the economic downturn and the difficulty for her to borrow money from legal channels which usually favored big, government-related firms.

The context of the case reported by Sixth Tone in English:

• // The moneylending case in which a man in Liaocheng, eastern China, killed a thug who insulted his mother has attracted nationwide attention — so much so that the Supreme People’s Procuratorate has decided to investigate. While a local court pronounced a verdict in the case back in February, a Saturday article in influential Guangzhou-based publication Southern Weekly has brought it to the forefront of public consciousness, with a storm of reactions both on social media and in newspaper commentaries. Beginning in 2014, the mother, Su Yinxia, borrowed what amounted to 1.35 million yuan ($196,000) at a monthly interest rate of 10 percent from a local real estate mogul, Wu Xuezhan. Su paid back 1.84 million yuan in cash, as well as a property valued at 700,000 yuan, but the amount was still not enough to cover her debt, which had ballooned due to the usurious interest rate. On April 14, 2016, a group of around 10 thugs showed up at Su’s place of business and restrained both her and her son in a room. One of the men, Du Zhihao, reportedly hurled expletives at Su and suggested she consider a new profession to pay off her debt. “If you don’t have the money, you can become a prostitute,” Du said, according to a witness quoted in the Southern Weekly article under the pseudonym Liu Xiaolan. “I’ll give you 80 yuan for each go.” The witness said Du then took off his pants and exposed his genitals. At 10:13 p.m., the police arrived. According to security footage, they left the room just four minutes later. For their part, the police say they were merely stepping out momentarily and had not concluded their investigation. When Su’s son, Yu Huan, saw the police leave, he became agitated and attempted to flee from the room. When the thugs restrained him, Yu brandished a kitchen knife and wounded four of his captors, who were reportedly unarmed. Du, one of the wounded, drove himself to the hospital, where he later died. Police eventually returned to the scene of the incident and detained the parties involved. On Feb. 17, 2017, the Intermediate People’s Court of Liaocheng gave the son, Yu, a life sentence for the crime of “intentional injury.”// Source: The Sixth Tone, 26 March 2017.

• //于歡的上訴代理人、河北十力律師事務所律師殷清利表示，根據目前掌握的情況，要證明于歡的行為屬於正當防衞的難度很大。中國《刑法》規定：「對正在進行行兇、殺人、搶劫、強姦、綁架以及其他嚴重危及人身安全的暴力犯罪，採取防衞行為，造成不法侵害人傷亡的，不屬於防衞過當，不負刑事責任。」但法律對防衞的起因、時間和限度都有非常嚴格的規定，例如要求防衞是在危害國家、公共利益和其他合法權利，並且達到了一定的緊迫程度的不法侵害時做出的，律師坦言，這中間的許多要求都很難找到證據證明。但中國刑法學研究會會長、北京師範大學刑事法律科學研究院教授趙秉志認為，于歡的行為屬於防衞過當，一審判決認為不存在防衞的前提，不構成防衞的緊迫性是不對的。他指出，于歡母子當時正受到三種正在進行的違法犯罪行為的侵害，一是非法拘禁，二是侮辱，三是在警察離開房間時，追債人員不讓于歡母子離開，並對他進行了毆打。他認為，于歡基於保護母親合法權益和制止不法侵害的目的，對圍毆自己的追債人員進行反擊，「完全是基於正當防衞目的的反擊違法犯罪行為的案件，不能否認其正當防衞的前提存在」。// Source: The Initium, 27 March 2017.

• //[警]察出警只是提醒了一句“要账可以，但是不能动手打人”即走开涉嫌渎职。于欢的家人报警，是因为亲人的人格受到严重侮辱和人身自由受到侵害，希望警察出手解救，而《人民警察法》明确规定，公安机关的人民警察有维护社会治安秩序，制止危害社会治安秩序行为的职责。[…] 其三，对于高利贷行为只有超过一定范围的利率不受保护的法律后果，不足以遏制其伴生的此类违法犯罪行为。我国的现行法律只是规定，民间借款的利率可以高于银行贷款利率，只是高出银行同期贷款利率4倍的部分，法律不予保护。拿本案为例，于欢母亲向高利贷者占借款135万元，约定月利息竟然高达10%，不到2年时间于欢母亲共还款254万元，还剩最后17万欠款无法还上，才引发了本案。[…] 这便提示，仅仅靠民事手段来制约高利贷行为远远不够，难以遏制其伴生的违法犯罪现象(如本案)，有必要将高利贷行为规定治安违法，严重的规定为犯罪，加大监管力度。// Source: The Beijing News, 25 March 2017.

The public outcry was so huge that the Supreme People’s Procuratorate promised to further look into the case to see whether Yu was acting in “self-defense” and to investigate whether the policemen have committed any wrongdoings, and the Shandong High Court also accepted an appeal from Yu. You Wei, director of the Justice Research Centre at East China University of Political Science and Law in Shanghai, suggested that the public opinion played a key role in the re-examination of the case, but judicial independence could be undermined by both public opinion and pressure from the higher-level authority.

• //近日，媒体报道山东省聊城市于欢故意伤害案即“辱母杀人案”，引起社会广泛关注。最高人民检察院对此高度重视，已派员赴山东阅卷并听取山东省检察机关汇报，正在对案件事实、证据进行全面审查。对于欢的行为是属于正当防卫、防卫过当还是故意伤害，将依法予以审查认定；对媒体反映的警察在此案执法过程中存在失职渎职行为，将依法调查处理。// Source: The Paper, 26 March 2017.

• // You Wei, director of the Justice Research Centre at East China University of Political Science and Law in Shanghai, told the South China Morning Post that it was up to the judges to decide whether Yu acted in self-defence. He conceded it was possible that “public opinion” could influence a court’s handling of prominent cases and he was “100 per cent” certain the attention the top prosecutor was now giving the case was the result of the intense interest the saga was receiving online, he said. […] However, You, the Shanghai professor, said he was worried about the loss of judicial independence amid the public uproar. “What I am most concerned about is whether judges will be affected by public opinion and upper-level authorities.”// Source: SCMP, 28 March 2017.

A commentator Lu Ran (陸冉) on The Initium observed that it is rare for the state-owned media to have a synchronized voice with the relaxed public discussion. There has been a conspiracy theory that the central officials might want to discipline the local officials in Shandong Province. Lu also observed that the commentaries on state-owned media were focused on legal technicality about whether to factor in morality when considering the case, ignoring the problems of real economy and local governance. Lu argued that it is beyond doubt that the judicial independence in China suffered as a result of the compromise between various powerholders.

• //一樁 2016 年發生的案件，在 2017 年 3 月突然成為公眾輿論焦點，直接誘因是《南方週末》刊發的報導。從來舉步維艱的深度調查與新聞曝光，在此案的採訪、刊發乃至網絡傳播上，都進行得頗為順利。官方輿論在短暫的沉默之後，也迅速轉向，無論是案發地的聊城政府，還是最高檢（最高人民檢察院）、山東省高級人民法院都發出了重新調查此案的聲音。司法之外的輿情，再一次成為了案件的轉折點。于歡案上，輿論的寬鬆與官方媒體的步調一致，在中國實屬罕見，以致有陰謀論稱，此案的曝光是中央欲藉機整肅山東官場。輿情背後是否有操控引導，無從坐實，但無可否認的是，輿情直接影響了司法，也直接將一樁地方司法按照常規方式處理的案件，變成了全民共討的對象。司法這一理應獨立運作的社會公器，再一次成為了利益平衡之後的犧牲品。如果認真檢視官媒的輿論導向，我們會發現：官媒無一例外的把于案視為單純的法律問題，呼籲判決時應更多考慮倫理因素。除了最高檢提出要對警察是否失職進行調查之外，一場高利貸濫行，警匪勾結，激起民怨沸騰的要案，就這樣被輿論導向化解成為了在法律框架內對法律和倫理關係的探討。而背後的實體經濟問題，地方治理問題，都似乎已經被刻意淡忘。// Source: The Initium, 27 March 2017.

In a relation to the case, Manya Koetse observed that the topic of “shadow banking” received much attention lately. She quoted the content of a book talk and further elaborate on the nature of “shadow banking” in China.

• //What does the growth of the free shadow banking market mean in a country that stresses “socialism with Chinese characteristics”? Collier discussed the status quo of shadow banking during a special event at The Bookworm, Beijing, on March 28. […] On Sina Weibo, the topic of shadow banking (影子银行) has received a lot of attention lately, with some netizens expressing their worries about the phenomenon: “Shadow banking is becoming a chaos, there is an overflow of people lending money!” Collier also reinforces this message at The Bookworm, where he shares his experiences with the ‘game’ of shadow banking in China; a messy business where one of the most important questions is: where does the money actually go? […] Throughout the years, especially over the past decade, China has seen a huge growth of non-state lending from ‘mom and pop loans’ to huge state-owned bank trusts. It is a problem that mainly stems from a system that was not designed to handle so much cash and was under very limited control. Collier explains shadow banking as an overflow of water that is trying to find new channels within the PRC, with capital flows going outside of the banking system – through land sales or by borrowing from private markets. Non-bank channels don’t only have lower requirements for capital and liquidity, they also do not have the same low limits on interest rates as formal banks. In the 1998-2012 period, shadow banking had actually become so big that there was an 18 trillion RMB gap in local government revenues, of which shadow banking was a large part: “Basically it is an unsustainable financial system,” Collier says, with institutions scrambling to either lend the money or to receive it. […] A big problem that Collier repeats throughout his talk is that it is not just that important data is missing on shadow banking in China, or that few people actually know where the money goes, but that “nobody cares and everyone thinks it’s all fine; they’re taking a slice of something and have no idea what it means.” Collier stresses that China’s shadow banking is all about different actors who are halfway in the middle: it is not about state versus private. In China, it is all about partly state-owned parties versus partly private actors. The upcoming book and Collier’s Bookworm talk come at a time when China is cracking down on shadow banking. The crackdown is part of the balance that is kept on shadow banking within China, as the central bank of the PRC does not want pressures to get out of control and attempts to minimize risks.// Source: What’s on Weibo, 30 March 2017.

HONG KONG – POLITICS

1. Carrie Lam as the next Chief Executive for Hong Kong

• //A committee dominated by supporters of the Chinese government chose Carrie Lam as Hong Kong’s next leader on Sunday, opting for Beijing’s preferred candidate in a move likely to dismay residents who see the city’s freedoms as being under threat from China. Lam, a former No. 2 official in the city, received 777 out of 1,163 votes cast to become the next chief executive, as Hong Kong’s leader is called. She defeated John Tsang, a former finance secretary who polls indicated was more popular with the public. […] In a speech after the vote, Mrs. Lam, who will be the first female chief executive in Hong Kong history, vowed to prioritize mending social rifts. “Hong Kong, our home, is suffering from quite a lot of divisiveness,” she said. During her campaign, she added, “I heard so much more from people’s hearts and learned and experienced many new things as well as different angles to things. I see my shortcomings and understand that I must put in more efforts.” […] Mrs. Lam, who will take office on July 1, will have to manage not only the city’s political turmoil, but also a rapidly aging population, low social mobility, slowing economic growth and one of the largest wealth gaps in the world. Hong Kong’s housing is routinely ranked as even more unaffordable than London’s and New York’s, in part because of relentless demand from wealthy buyers in mainland China. Despite cooling measures enacted by the current government, average housing prices are at a record high, having more than doubled from a decade ago and far outpaced income growth. Such economic grievances have fed calls for greater public participation in elections, although no change in that area is likely to occur quickly under the new administration. Mrs. Lam has said she will not rush to restart talks on reforming the electoral process, citing a need to avoid confrontation.// Source: New York Times, 26 March 2017.

Premier Li Keqiang on behalf of the Central Government endorsed Carrie Lam as the next Chief Executive 4 days after the election. He praised the election and promised to support the Chief Executive and Hong Kong Government for “Governing according to the law, developing economy, improving the livelihood of the people, pushing ahead democracy, and fostering harmony” and to take concrete actions to deepen cooperation between the Mainland and Hong Kong.

• //國務院總理李克強昨簽署國務院令，任命林鄭月娥為下任香港特首，今年7月1日就職。李克強昨在國務院會議上形容，林太當選特首，充分表明香港社會各界廣泛認同、信任和期望，相信她能團結帶領香港政府和各界人士，「務實進取，奮發有為，保持香港長期繁榮穩定，開創更加美好的明天」。林太昨發聲明表示感謝中央任命，「既深感榮幸，亦知任重道遠」，自己將不負中央和香港市民所託。新華社及央視昨晚報道，李克強昨在會議上表示，是次特首選舉「體現了公開、公平、公正的原則」，而中央政府將繼續全面準確貫徹一國兩制、港人治港，和高度自治方針，嚴格按照憲法和《基本法》辦事，確保一國兩制在香港的實踐「不動搖、不走樣、不變形」，全力支持特首和政府「依法施政，發展經濟、改善民生、推進民主、促進和諧」，並採取切實措施，深化內地與香港合作。// Source: Ming Pao Daily, 01 April 2017.

Carrie Lam expressed concerns about not being able to get talented people to join the government as principal officials:

• //Executive councillor Bernard Chan said on Sunday that ­Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor faced a ­difficult task in forming a capable cabinet by July 1 and more had to be done to attract ­talented people. The three barriers Lam faces are: the ­demands of Beijing, the refusal of pan-democrats to join the administration and an ­increasingly ­politicised society that had put off many possible candidates. In a radio show on Saturday, the newly elected chief executive admitted: “I once had a nightmare that I did not have enough people to swear in on July 1.” […] While Lam attributed the difficulties to the “hot kitchen” of government, Chan, who managed Lam’s election campaign, said: “There is no system to encourage people to serve society. At present, it’s like you have to beg people to join you in the sea of flames.”// Source: SCMP, 03 April 2017.

After the election, a number of analyses emerged. Commentators observed that there were a number of issues revealed from the CE election this year. First, as there was no further political reform after the Umbrella Movement, the non-establishment camp in Hong Kong was divided into two sub-camps about how to achieve democracy. While one camp supported a temporary alliance with moderate figures from the establishment camp (e.g. John Tsang), which was termed as “strategists” and another camp insisted on a boycott of the CE election and makes a strong protest against it (e.g. the attempted participation in the CE race by Long Hair), which was labeled as “fundamentalists”.

Ivan Choy, Lecturer from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, explained the high public approval rating for John Tsang and the limited public support for democratic movement initiated by the “radicals” for the society’s fatigue in pushing for democratization after the Umbrella Movement.

• //雨傘運動是一場透支極大的運動。它把香港民主運動從九七後積累了近20年的能量，一下子迸發出來，亦同時消耗得七七八八，但卻無功而還，讓龐大的參與者，情緒上出現巨大的反差和失落。之後兩年，民主運動明顯進入一個低潮期，無論是民主派還是公民社會動員上街，都只得零星落索的群眾響應，與雨傘運動之前的10年相比，可謂天淵之別。群眾對政權進入一個消極抵抗的時期。[…] 在立法會選舉時，當形勢是兩陣對圓時，激進民主派和本土自決派總共拿到26%的選票份額，但今次特首選舉，當出現了曾俊華這個超越「黃」、「藍」的第三選擇時，他們共同推出「長毛」梁國雄擬代表民主派參選，卻在民調中只得低至2%至3%受訪者支持；就是在他們力爭的公民提名那部分，民眾一樣反應冷淡。他們原先的支持者大多數走了去撐曾俊華，甚至當他們呼籲選委投白票時，這些昔日的支持者反過來向他們「逼宮」。過去10多年，在幾場大的運動中，輿論往往站在這些民主派左翼人士那一邊。但今次特首選舉，卻讓他們嘗到淪為少數的苦澀。這其實都反映，不單是溫和民主派的支持者，就連很多激進民主派的支持者，到了今天，其實已經十分厭戰。這就是「薯粉」的基礎，渴望有一個人可以帶領大家休戰、和解、休養生息。// Source: Ming Pao Daily, 30 March 2017.

In relation to Choy’s observation, the “moderates” as represented by major non-establishment political parties in Hong Kong showed goodwill towards Carrie Lam and did not refuse to cooperate with her to mend the polarized society of Hong Kong. Unlike the previous CE, they as the non-establishment camp would not organize a procession against the newly elected CE, citing the lack of consensus on the theme of the protest as the reason.

• //據了解，民陣原定明日（2日）或下周日發起遊行，計劃的遊行主題包括要求林鄭下台、聲援9名佔中人士等，惟最終因民主派未能就遊行主題達成共識而無疾而終。民陣決定不會牽頭籌辦遊行，交由其他政團自行商議會否遊行。然而，民主黨及公民黨均無意自行發起遊行，前者表示原本計劃參與民陣的安排，後者則指時間太倉促未能安排，只有社民連表示會再作考慮。有民主黨領導層表示，該黨會以務實的態度觀察林鄭，認為林鄭刻意沒有在當選後一天，便即到中聯辦作禮節性拜訪是正確的起步，至少反映她重視公眾的觀感。該人士又表示，林鄭與當年梁振英未上任便醜聞纏身的情況不同，梁振英捲入僭建、西九比賽項目漏報利益、出席江湖飯局等醜聞，形容梁振英是「自己唔俾機會自己」與民主派修補關係。另一名民主黨成員表示，不會在林鄭仍未開始施政時，便以「高度戒備」的態度杯葛與她溝通，形容「點都要交下手先知佢（林鄭）係點」。有公民黨領導層則表示，林鄭在當選後承諾會約見立法會各黨派議員，認為林鄭至少願意向民主派伸出橄欖枝，直言「單憑這一點梁振英已做不到」。他強調，該黨會「聽其言、觀其行」，期望可與林鄭有良好的互動，又謂至少現時民主派不抗拒與林鄭溝通，雙方可作嘗試。// Source: Hong Kong 01, 01 April 2017.

Law Wing-sang, an associate professor from Lingnan University argued that this CE election put a perfect end to the illusion shared by quite many Hong Kong people that Hong Kong people’s will could in some ways affect the powerholders in Beijing. Although some non-establishment politicians had hoped to get rid of C. Y. Leung and support a moderate establishment figure whom they regarded as “less evil”, the practical intervention of Beijing in the CE election showed that Beijing was not eager to give in. He also pointed out that the voice from another sub-group of non-establishment camp, the “radicals”/ “fundamentalists”, was marginalized by the “moderates”/”strategists” in the public discourse and soon lost in gaining the public support. He argued that both groups lost in the CE election.

• //今次特首選舉，絕大部分都沒有選票的香港人，不少都當成自己有票一樣熱情投入、廣傳競選宣傳訊息、真金白銀奉獻眾籌，還要加入網戰、塑造民意、影響民調，為的都是假戲真做，把自己不能投票參與的選舉，搞成像自己有票可投的「擬真選舉」，堅信「民望」可以影響選委以及背後操盤的北京當權者。可是，結果無情地展示，雖然今次關於「候選人民望」塑造出來的「虛擬（選舉）真實」是如此壯美，成為難忘的回憶，但當權者卻明明白白的告訴香港人，他們並無意願再像過去一樣，向這種民望遊戲妥協，與香港的虛擬自由主義者繼續跳探戈。[…] 事實上，在溫和泛民決定主力參與選委選舉，以 ABC 為目標，並且以選「較小之害」為行動準則之前，早有各種關於再次利用全民電子公投，推出「場外」一人一票的方式，又或者結合「公民提名」推出選委會外的民間特首候選人的各種想法。可是，這些想法並沒經過廣泛的討論和醞釀，很快就被公眾遺忘，最後都讓位給全力爭取在選委會選舉中增加泛民派代表的方案。泛民如何達成這項決定的過程當然有待更深入的考究，但北京在去年立法會選舉後重手打擊港獨激進派的同時，對溫和派釋放不少「和風」訊息：包括與民主黨重新接觸溝通，稱泛民派也是建制派，重新發放泛民議員的回鄉證等，在在都營造着中央在打擊港獨的同時，也會正視香港造成不安的深層次問題，並且以懷柔的姿態，重新開展「統戰」工作。[…] 過去數年，民主運動常常發生溫和派與激進派之間的衝突，激進派往往不滿溫和派的妥協路線。可是，這次溫和派投入小圈子選舉的行動，卻沒有受到激進派有力的挑戰。選委選舉初期，只有部分學者和社工提出異見，聲言參選主要是利用選委身份進場組織抗議，或者配合其他場外施加民意壓力的行動。可是，這項主張得不到支持，他們的訴求亦被簡化為只求投白票，被標籤為「白票黨」。而部分激進派則愈來愈全情投入「挺曾」的運動，慢慢形成「薯粉」現象，這時才見梁國雄及自決派等試圖再次制止。可是，這時挺曾的民意已成主流。梁國雄以反對參加小圈子選舉的名義出師，試圖循民間公民提名的途徑參選，被劃為「原則派」，惹來「策略派」的猛烈批評。然而，梁國雄並沒有看穿虛擬民主選舉會最終自行失敗的結局，反而堅持至最後一刻，仍然相信曾俊華才是真正被欽點者。所以，這次溫和派兵行險着參加小圈子選舉固然無功而還，但卻沒有令激進派得分。這種兩派皆輸的局面，近年罕見。// Source: The Initium, 31 March 2017.

Ngok Ma, an associate professor from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, argued that the non-establishment moderates were the greatest loser in the CE election because they failed miserably to generate a new discourse to support their groundbreaking move to vote for establishment candidate who actually supported the 831 Framework for CE election and urged to enact Article 23 of the Basic Law, which used to be the political principle that separated the establishment camp and the non-establishment camp. From a democratic perspective, he also argued that the political culture has regressed as many Hong Kong people put their hopes behind a mentality of “benevolent monarchy” but the discussion on how people could get involved in the CE election was largely missing.

• //這本來就是一場「死馬當活馬醫」，「不做白不做」的抗爭，不須期望過高，但過程中有很多人樂此不疲的就各種策略互相指摘，希望透過看見別人不成功來證明自己正確，抽離一點看其實相當無謂。從推進民主的角度看，泛民的失敗不是因為曾俊華輸了（本來大家就不應期望泛民支持的人在這制度下會選上特首呀），而是今次泛民在道德高地原則和務實政治策略之間進退失據。我相信很早泛民主流便希望透過支持曾俊華當選來製造更寛鬆政治環境，以致提高下一階段重啟政改的可能性，但沒有勇氣真正站出來這樣說，結果論述和策略都說不清楚，並且製造了相當的分裂。[…] 政治文化上，對民主運動而言今年是一種倒退，因為整個過程引領人把希望寄託在某種「明君政治」上，希望習大大體察民情聽到香港民意願意和解，然後欽點曾俊華；希望曾俊華個人可以修補撕裂和推動改革（說好的「換人換制度」呢？），甚至變為希望《成報》和《大紀元時報》是可靠的傳媒，希望大量建制派商界選委會在投暗票時「按良心投票」和違背北京意旨（比這更虚妄的希望實在不多了）。民主運動的主體——群眾，反而被忘卻，最後由曾俊華部分接收。[…] 特區政制的設計，不利有個人魅力的政治領袖出現。各種選舉制度的設計令管治權威和權力零碎化，也不鼓勵有社會基礎深厚的執政黨出現，目的是保證操控權力繩索的源頭，最終會掌握在北京或中聯辦的手裏。由上而下的政治控制需要，比有效管治更重要。// Source: The Initium, 29 March 2017.

David Zweig from the Hong Kong University of Sciences and Technology hypothesized a scenario about what if the 831 framework were accepted a few years ago for the CE election and its potential impact on the democratization in Mainland China:

• //As we look towards the rather bland, preordained chief executive election this Sunday in Hong Kong, let’s think about the election we could be having. Had the pan-democratic camp accepted Beijing’s constrained electoral system set out on August 31, 2014, this election would have been far more competitive, popular attention much stronger, the candidates’ links to the citizenry much closer, the extent of democracy deeper, and the potential impact for Hong Kong and China so much greater. Beijing did not offer us true democracy, as a nomination committee with a 50 per cent threshold would have prevented any pan-democrat from joining the territory-wide chief executive election. Under what at best could be called “Iranian-style democracy”, a coterie of appointed “mullahs” would have determined the candidates before allowing all the people to vote. But in Iran, the people have elected moderate clerics, greatly influencing Iran’s politics. […] Under the August 31 scenario, candidates would have to play to two constituencies: the 30 per cent who favour the government and Beijing, and the 60 per cent who favour further democratisation. Candidates would have to be careful to maintain support from people in the pro-government, pro-Beijing tent, as no one would want to surrender 30 per cent of the vote to their opponent. Then the winning strategy would have been to take a more moderate political position and propose policies attractive to members in the pro-democracy tent, for whoever got the majority in that tent would be the next leader. The run-up to the election would have been exciting, unpredictable and, as with any democratic vote, candidates would present competing views on policies. In Hong Kong, those would include policies on housing, pensions, education, and innovative ways to spend an excessive government surplus. Even political reform might have made it onto the agenda, something Lam under the current electoral format need not discuss. […] Beijing sees democratisation as dangerous and potentially destabilising; they look at the Arab spring, the civil war in Syria and Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost, or political opening. In their eyes, an unstable democratic transition could undermine 40 years of economic growth and end China’s aspiration (Xi’s “China Dream”) of re-emerging as a great power. They prefer to move cautiously. Reforms in China have always been tested through local experiments – think of the special economic zones – so if they fail, damage to stability is manageable. What better way, then, to experiment with democracy than to test it in Hong Kong under controlled conditions? Perhaps a successful election on Sunday, in line with the August 31 proposal, might have encouraged democratic experiments on the mainland. Then again, maybe not. But imagine if in every city in China, two local Communist Party leaders competed for the mayoralty and all citizens in the city were allowed to vote. That would be progress.// Source: SCMP, 24 March 2017.

Observers proposed different interpretations about the mixed signals about candidate preference by the Beijing government. Hung Ho-fung from Johns Hopkins University argued that it was plausible to regard the mixed signals as the factional differences within the Chinese Communist Party, but he argued that the general policy toward Hong Kong will be the same, after the publication of the White Paper on the One Country Two Systems by the State Council in 2014.

• //為何北京可以讓這些紛亂矛盾的消息、真假「聖旨」到處流傳而不早一錘定音？如果真是要自由競爭沒有「欽點」，為何不一早用更權威的方式表達，而等到臨投票前一個星期才通過一些不大不小的媒體以無從證實的「可靠消息」方式傳出？為何在這個信息傳出之後，不少建制人士和媒體仍可繼續營造「中央不信任曾俊華」、「曾俊華是英美勢力代理人」、「林鄭是中央唯一支持候選人」的氣氛？一個合理的推理，乃是中共對最後誰當特首沒有一致看法，有的本來支持梁振英的派系支持林鄭，一些派系則支持曾俊華。這個推論是否正確，恐怕只有中共自己才知道。但這與近來西方中國問題專家與媒體的觀察脗合 […] 2003年反23條大遊行引發中共治港思維的變化。中共在2014年初夏發表、指出「一國」大於「兩制」、為之後人大否決真普選奠定理論基礎的「一國兩制白皮書」，便是這個對港思維變化的結晶。這個思維變化，是中共長期研判、討論與決策的結果，底下是對香港問題的一套完整論述。中共任何派系得勢，恐怕都難以改變。中共對港路線十分一貫「白皮書」核心作者之一、北京大學法學院的強世功教授，在「白皮書」發表後，密密在中共官媒解讀「白皮書」背後的思想。他指出《基本法》源自中國憲法，而非作為正式國際條約的《中英聯合聲明》。這等於宣布這個中英條約無效，香港自治只是北京的恩賜。// Source: Ming Pao Daily, 27 March 2017.

Tammy Tam from SCMP argued that being trusted by the Beijing Government was an important element to be the Chief Executive, the lack of “official” endorsement of Carrie Lam over John Tsang amidst confusing rumors by Beijing leaders could be interpreted as that they did not want to push Tsang over to the opposition side.

• //One big question on many people’s minds, perhaps until today, is: why would Beijing trust Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor to lead Hong Kong, but not the more popular John Tsang Chun-wah, who was the city’s No 3 official for nine years? […] During the campaign period, while Beijing stressed over and over that only Lam was its preferred choice, some questioned why not a single Beijing official ever openly came out to say Tsang was not to be trusted and for what reason. At the same time, there was no lack of reports quoting sources listing various worries in Beijing’s mind. […] Now that the chief executive election is over, still there is no “official” explanation for Beijing’s reservations about Tsang. But if what some of those “sources” said earlier could be of any reference, it was understood that one major consideration for Beijing’s ambiguity was to try not to push Tsang too much over to the opposition side. […] If Beijing’s “unofficial” input during the campaign period failed to convince Tsang and his supporters regarding the “trust” issue, those who pinned their last hopes on the possibility of President Xi turning the tables in favour of the popular underdog were apparently blinded by their own wishful thinking.// Source: SCMP, 02 April 2017.

Hong Kong 01 reported that the establishment camp had about 860 (about 70% of 1194 EC Committee) and it interpreted the fact that Carrie Lam received 777 votes as the unity of the establishment camp and the growing influence of the Beijing government over the camp, compared to 5 years ago.

• //建制派消息稱，在1194名選委中，建制派佔約860人，當中有777人投票予林鄭，即佔了9成人，北京對這個結果感到相當滿意，視之為一場勝仗。北京最初擔心工商界陽奉陰違，但經過國家領導人及京官南下強力箍票後，建制派只「走票」80、90票到曾營，是可以接受的水平，研判那些承諾支持林鄭的工商界大老絕大部分都沒有食言，中央高層對商界的影響力比五年前有過之而無不及。// Source: Hong Kong 01, 27 March 2017.

 2. Participants in Occupy Movement prosecuted after 2 years of the incident

Nine Occupy Movement participants, including three initiators of the Movement, former student leaders and legislators, are formally charged by the government right after the Chief Executive Election.

• //The charges faced by nine Occupy leaders and protesters due in court tomorrow are rarely sought offences requiring prosecutors to prove the accused obstructed the public in exercising their rights, legal experts said. Three Occupy Central founders – academics Benny Tai Yiu-ting and Dr Chan Kin-man, and the Reverend Chu Yiu-ming – were arrested on Monday, each facing one count of conspiracy to cause public nuisance, inciting others to cause public nuisance, and inciting people to incite others to cause public nuisance. […] Lawmakers Tanya Chan and Shiu Ka-chun as well as former student leaders Tommy Cheung Sau-yin and Eason Chung Yiu-wah each face the two incitement charges, as does League of Social Democrats vice-chairman Raphael Wong Ho-ming. Former lawmaker Lee Wing-tat faces one charge of inciting others to cause public nuisance. Each charge carries a maximum sentence of seven years in jail. The nine are expected to appear at Eastern Court on Thursday. The case is to be transferred to the District Court. University of Hong Kong principal law lecturer Eric Cheung Tat-ming said public nuisance offences descend from common law and were seldom sought. Criminal defence lawyer Jonathan Midgley described the charges as “not at all common”. Public nuisance is defined in the influential British case R v Rimmington as an act or omission endangering the life, health, property or comfort of the public, or one obstructing the public in the exercise of rights common to everyone. Cheung said the present case would likely centre on obstruction.// Source: SCMP, 28 March 2017.

 Some non-establishment lawmakers regarded the timing of the prosecution as motivated by political considerations:

• //Civic Party chairman Alan Leong Kah-kit, who is a senior counsel, believed that political factors were behind the timing, questioning why police chose to charge the nine on Monday when the force was given advice by the Department of Justice months ago. […] Nathan Law Kwun-chung, lawmaker from the Demosisto political party, said on an RTHK programme that the move by police came at a “sensitive” timing just as chief executive-elect Lam had pledged to unite a divided city. Law questioned if the timing was planned by incumbent Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying so that many of those who held views opposing the government could be in jail by the time Lam officially takes over as the city’s leader in July.// Source: SCMP, 28 March 2017.

State-owned media regarded the prosecution as acting according to the law:

• //2014年爆发的非法“占中”活动持续79天，造成香港心脏地带中环陷入无序和瘫痪，更发生大量阻街、袭警、破坏公物、妨碍公务及违反法庭禁制令等刑事罪行。期间，共有955人因犯下不同罪行被捕，有216人须面对司法程序。警方这次的行动就是在接获律政司最终法律意见后展开的。据了解，“占中三丑”等9人被控犯下普通法下的3项公众妨扰罪，包括串谋公众妨扰、煽惑公众妨扰及煽惑他人煽惑公众妨扰罪等。对于非法“占中”主要搞手2年后终获检控，多名立法会议员给予充分肯定。民建联主席李慧琼表示，违法者被起诉，是依法办事，体现了法治精神，合法、合情、合理。[…] 警方预约拘捕的行动引发广泛关注。一些反对派利用时间节点开始大做文章，形容这是“政治打压”、“秋后算账”。一些发起和参与非法“占中”的人员，曾经自诩过“公民抗命”、“违法达义”的，事发后也开始肆意揣测、误导舆论，让香港各界感叹可笑。香港特区律政司发表的声明指出，警方依照有关意见展开刑事检控程序，完全基于法律和执法的考虑。检控人员恪守《基本法》第63条的宪制责任，以中立、专业和非政治化的态度处理检控工作，不受干涉，社会不应将刑事检控政治化。// Source: People’s Daily (Overseas), 29 March 2017.

• //看来香港法制的基础还是很不错的，拘捕这9人，没有出警车去抓，而是通过预约，让他们在规定的时间自己来警署接受逮捕。了解香港法制环境的人，都不难判断，逮捕9人是司法的独立决定，是因为9人在“占中”期间的表现触犯了香港法律的底线。香港法律如何追究这9人，是那个法律体系自己所应有的权力。作为内地媒体，我们只是希望他们的违法行为最终受到依法惩处，而且这一惩处向香港社会发出明确的信息：无论以什么样的名义都不可以蔑视法律，否则必须付出代价。[…] 香港需要尽快“修补撕裂”，一些泛民人士谈这个词，尤其让人高兴。然而修补撕裂的关键是要重塑法律的权威，给香港社会重描谁都不能逾越的法律底线。出于政治原因粗暴越界的情况少了，相关争议就会变少，社会团结的可能性就将增加。我们相信在拘捕9人后，香港法制有能力将他们的罪责审理清楚，并严格依法办理此案。依法办案恰是香港的长处，而非它的短处。我们期待看到香港的法官能够抵制住一些政治及舆论力量的压力和干扰，做出在专业性上无可挑剔的判决。// Source: Global Times, 28 March 2017.

In support of the prosecuted, over 400 scholars around the world have signed a petition which strongly opposed the government decision. In the petition, they stated that Hong Kong society was worried that this is only the first wave of political repression against those scholars, students, and citizens who have participated peacefully in the Occupy Movement. Also, they argued the prosecution will produce a chilling effect on local and international scholars, students as well as the youth, and will produce permanent damage to the liberal open society of Hong Kong.

//聲明又表示，香港社會廣泛擔憂這次決定只是對曾牽涉雨傘運動的學者、學生和市民的政治迫害的第一波。這些對參與和平抗議的學者和市民的刑事檢控，不但會對國際和本地學界以至學子和青年人產生寒蟬效應，亦對香港作為一個自由開放社會的聲譽造成永久損害。學者有專業和道德責任維護及堅守一個開放和民主的社會，與及對公義、人權、集會和言論自由的追求。這些全都是學術研究、教學和交流的基礎。他們強烈反對特區政府向這批以非暴力方式爭取受聯合國《世界人權宣言》保障，並為香港《基本法》承諾的普選權利的學者和社運人士提出檢控的決定。9名被起訴人士包括「佔中三子」戴耀廷、陳健民及朱耀明、立法會議員陳淑莊及邵家臻、社民連黃浩銘、學聯前常委鍾耀華及張秀賢，以及前立法會議員李永達。// Source: Apple Daily, 02 April 2017.

TAIWAN – DIPLOMACY

Taiwan to strengthen ties with Japan and the United States ahead of Xi-Trump Summit

• //The U.S. and Japan are taking steps toward upgrading ties with Taiwan, risking a run-in with China as Donald Trump and Xi Jinping prepare for a first meeting in Florida next week. The two allies have made a series of moves signaling more-direct relations with the diplomatically isolated island even after Trump reaffirmed the U.S.’s long-standing policy recognizing that both sides are part of “One China.” In the last week alone, Taiwan has seen its U.S. envoy share a Washington stage with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and hosted a vice minister from Japan, its highest-level official visit in almost half a century. […] The Taiwanese president told a banquet hosted by the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei last week that she wanted an “upgraded strategic relationship between our two countries,” including deeper security cooperation and defense-industry ties. The U.S. and Japan — security allies with their own concerns about China’s growing might — have shown a willingness to oblige Taiwan. The island’s de facto U.S. ambassador Stanley Kao was among the representatives from a 68-member anti-Islamic State coalition invited to the State Department on March 22. Kao posed for a group photo with Tillerson. China was not represented. On Monday, China’s foreign ministry said it lodged a “serious” protest with Japan after Vice Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications Jiro Akama attended a cultural exchange meeting in Taiwan on March 25. On Jan. 1, Japan also changed the name of its mission in Taipei to the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association, which could be seen as implying state-to-state relations. […] Japan’s move was probably “coordinated with Washington,” said June Teufel Dreyer, a University of Miami political science professor, whose new book, “Middle Kingdom and Empire of the Rising Sun,” explores China-Japan ties. She said Kao’s attendance at the Islamic State summit represented a “real, if tiny, step up in U.S.-Taiwan relations.” Asked last week about Taiwan’s participation in the Islamic State summit, State Department spokesman Mark Toner said the U.S. appreciated contributions from coalition members “big or small.” Robert Lighthizer, Trump’s pick for trade representative, told senators overseeing his confirmation last week that he intended to “develop a trade-and-investment policy that promotes a stronger bilateral relationship with Taiwan.” […] Taiwanese foreign ministry spokeswoman Eleanor Wang said in a text message Tuesday that the island had a “solid friendship” with the U.S. and expected to be in close contact with Washington before and after any Xi summit. Wang called the visit Japanese vice minister’s visit a “meaningful” step toward enhancing communications. The National Defense Authorization Act signed by President Barack Obama in December gave Trump another way to upgrade Taiwan ties, since it would allow exchanges between senior military officials including the “assistant secretary of defense or above.” Trump could also deploy uniformed Marines at the yet-to-be completed American Institute in Taiwan complex, where plain-clothes troops have been stationed since 2005. An arms sale to Taiwan could also test relations with China, which delayed a visit by then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates for almost a year after the U.S. announced a $6.4 billion deal in 2010. The Washington Free Beacon reported this month that the Trump administration was preparing to provide more and better defensive arms to the island.// Source: Bloomberg, 29 March 2017.

TAIWAN – POLITICS

NGO worker Lee Ming-che detained in China for endangering national security

A volunteer of Taiwan Association for Human Rights as well as a program director of Wenshan Community College Lee Ming-che (李明哲) has been arrested around 18 March 2017 when he entered Mainland China via Macau. The Chinese government officially announced that he was arrested for charges of endangering national security. What he did for the arrest arose speculations. According to the president of the Taipei’s Wenshen Community College interviewed by the Washington Post, his teaching of the Chinese netizens on WeChat about China-Taiwan relations under the DPP government could be the cause:

• //A Taiwanese pro-democracy activist believed to be in Chinese custody may have attracted the attention of China’s security services after he used the social media site WeChat to discuss China-Taiwan relations, a colleague said Tuesday. Lee Ming-che, 42, disappeared after clearing immigration on March 19 in the semi-autonomous Chinese territory of Macau and never showed up for a planned meeting later that day with a friend across the border in the Chinese city of Zhuhai, according to Chiu Yi-ling, secretary general of the Taiwan Association for Human Rights, where Lee had been a volunteer. Cheng Hsiu-chuan, president of Taipei’s Wenshan Community College where Lee has worked for the past year as a program director, said it’s likely that Lee attracted the attention of Chinese security last year after using WeChat to “teach” an unknown number of people about China-Taiwan relations under the government of Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen. “For China, the material he was teaching would be seen as sensitive,” Cheng said. WeChat has millions of active users and is hugely popular as a means of communication in China. Lee had traveled annually to China for the past decade to see friends, Cheng said. He would discuss human rights in private but had never held any public events there, Cheng said. However, in mid-2016 Chinese authorities shut down Lee’s WeChat account and confiscated a box of books published in Taiwan on political and cultural issues, Cheng said.// Source: The Washington Post, 28 March 2017.

According to the United Daily News, There are two possible reasons for Lee’s arrest. First, he tried to contact rights defense lawyers in China. Second, Lee became a target of retaliation by the Chinese government for Taiwanese government’s arrest of a former Mainland exchange student Zhou Hongxu (周泓旭) at the National Chengchi University with membership in the CCP’s Youth League. Zhou was suspected of being a spy for Mainland China.

• //遭到拘留的李明哲本月中旬從澳門進入大陸珠海即失去蹤影，大陸國台辦昨舉行例行記者會，馬曉光在回應媒體記者詢問時，證實李明哲遭到調查。李明哲的妻子在台北舉行記者會，強調李無罪，希望大陸趕緊放人。李明哲為民進黨前黨工，民進黨也強調會全力支援家屬救人。[…]馬曉光表示，李明哲的案子，是因涉嫌從事危害國家安全活動，對李明哲的調查依司法程序在處理。至於李明哲妻子表示，李有一些慢性疾病，想轉交藥品等東西給他，馬曉光表示，「台灣家屬的一些訴求，國台辦看到了。」至於李明哲人在何處？是否能聘請律師？大陸方面是否向台灣有關部門或李的家屬通報相關情況等，馬曉光都未有直接回應。[…] 我方初步了解，李明哲疑似日前到對岸與大陸的維權人士有所接觸，由於正值敏感時刻，才遭對岸國安單位逮捕。情治人員指出，李明哲事件發生在調查局逮捕陸生共諜周泓旭後，周是共青團成員，李是前民進黨黨工，研判陸方是「以牙還牙」報復行為，除了達到恐怖平衡外，宣示叫陣意味相當濃厚，下一步可能鎖定軍情局派遣在大陸工作的台諜進行逮捕。// Source: United Daily News, 30 March 2017.

• //去年大陸全國人大通過「境外非政府組織管理法」，今年元旦上路，賦予大陸公安處置境外非政府組織更大權力。根據第四十七條規定，任何被懷疑有涉嫌「危害國家安全、顛覆政權、分裂國家、破壞國家統一」的ＮＧＯ組織活動，將被要求停止或驅逐出境。大陸公安可在「尚不構成犯罪下」，對ＮＧＯ人員處以最多十五天的拘留，也可對境外人士驅逐出境。李明哲是第一個台灣ＮＧＯ工作者入境大陸的失蹤個案，主因可能是上述新法規上路，北京意圖警告從事類似李明哲的ＮＧＯ工作者；但也不排除是民進黨前黨工的身分，對民進黨政府抓共諜還以顏色，這些因素都使李明哲事件籠罩在重重疑團中。不論如何，北京都需要對此案更具體說明，否則勢必衝擊甚至阻礙兩岸交流。// Source: United Daily News, 30 March 2017.

• //來台念大學的中國籍男子周泓旭，昨深夜遭台北地檢署以違反《國家安全法》聲請羈押，今台北地院上午開庭後，認為他有逃亡、串證之虞，將他收押禁見。周泓旭曾在政大就讀，政大校方今表示，周當時的入學資料顯示他為共青團，但政大不會因學生的宗教信仰、政治立場不同而有所影響。媒體報導，政治大學企管研究所學生周泓旭，涉嫌來台從事共諜組織發展，違反國家安全法，政治大學主秘王文杰說，該生於2012年9月入學，就讀政大企管所，並於2016年7月31日畢業，目前並非政大在學學生。// Source: Apple Daily, 10 March 2017.

Over 20 civic groups including Amnesty International in Taiwan called for the release of Lee Ming-che:

• //為了營救李明哲，國際特赦組織台灣分會發起連署，呼籲中國大陸公布李明哲下落，確保李明哲獲得保護，不受酷刑以及其他不人道待遇，且能夠和他的家庭、選任律師聯繫，並獲得足夠的醫療照護。除非有可靠證據顯示他可能犯下國際承認的罪行，否則，應該要立即釋放李明哲。台灣教授協會會長林秀幸直指，中國大陸想把台灣港澳化，以溫水煮青蛙方式讓台灣人自我思想審查，但北京錯誤形勢，台灣民心不甘心被馴服，北京的行動只會激起年輕世代更大不滿與拒絕。「逮捕他就是綁架台灣民心，不要低估李明哲效應。」// Source: United Daily News, 02 April 2017.