CHINA – POLITICS

1. Attack in Kunming

   • A group of unidentified knife-wielding people attacked the Kunming Railway Station in Yunnan province at around 9 pm on last Saturday evening (March 1). Officials said that at least 29 people were killed and more than 100 injured, and called it “an organized, premeditated violent terrorist attack”.
   • Identities and motives of the perpetrators remain unknown till now, but suspicion fell on Uyghur extremists. The coordinated involvement of multiple attackers sets these incidents apart from other recent cases around China, which were generally individual acts driven by individual grievances.
   • Reuters’ Ben Blanchard reports apparent efforts to suppress online speculation, it also quoted Global Times editor Hu Xijin who argued that only the release of more information will effectively achieve this
   • Xinhua now reports that, according to local authorities, “evidence at the crime scene showed that the Kunming Railway Station terrorist attack was carried out by Xinjiang separatist forces.”
   • Xinhua later reported that, of an eight-member group (six men, two women), four were shot dead by police at the scene, a wounded woman was arrested and the other three have been captured. Officials are also blaming Internet users for spreading rumors after the attack, and have arrested 45 people for “creating a panicked mood and disturbing social order.”
   • A Global Times editorial called for stronger society-wide security measures: “To guard against the terrorists from East Turkestan [Xinjiang] doing evil things, we must introduce additional measures for Chinese society outside Xinjiang. It is expensive, necessary and especially sensitive, and it will bring a series of inconveniences, and result in some controversy.”
   • What do the experts say?
     1. Months ago, James Palmer published the “Blood and Fear in Xinjiang” on the China File, which is now republished on Foreign Policy. It is a vivid primer to the strained ethnic relations between the Han and the Uighurs. Palmer points to the complication of the issue, which is worsened by the lack of government transparency.
     2. The Diplomat interviews Dr. Sean Roberts, an associate professor at GWU’s Elliott School of International Affairs, on the implications on the Kunming attack.
     3. New York Times and Reuters both note the Han’s population’s intensified distrust of Kunming’s Uighur population.
     4. BBC’s Martin Patience draws attention to the cross-fertilization of terrorist activities. He refers to an article by Philip Potter, an expert on terrorism at Michigan University, who said that China’s ongoing security crackdown in Xinjiang has forced the most militant separatists into neighbouring countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan and they were forging strategic alliances with jihadist factions affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Potter concluded that this was leading to « cross fertilisation » that has the potential to « substantially increase the sophistication and lethality of terrorism in China« . But Patience also pointed out the other side of the view that China plays up the threat in order to justify its heavy-headed security policies in the region. When he was in Xinjiang, he was told by a Uighur that « the walls have ears » and that « no-one was allowed to talk out about what was going on ».
     5. On New Yorker, Evan Osnos looks at how the recent incident in Kunming will likely widen “China’s ethnic divide”: the ties between ethnic groups are rooted not in Communism but, for lack of a better word, in “G.D.P.-ism”—faith in economic growth and the push for prosperity. But that is a fragile bargain. Militant Uighurs are motivated largely by resentment of their relationship to Han Chinese. Xinjiang’s Uighur population has dropped from ninety-five per cent, in the early twentieth century, to forty per cent, in 2008, thanks to an explicit migration policy intended to bind the country more tightly. On the ground, the development policy has created vast new infrastructure and economic activity, but, crucially, it has also accentuated the socioeconomic gaps between Hans and Uighurs. In Xinjiang today, Hans hold more than thirty five per cent of the region’s the high-income jobs, while Uighurs hold thirteen per cent. The ratio is widening by the year, fuelled by, and creating, even more resentment and suspicion. The events of 3/1 will make that worse.

2. The Two Meetings (lianghui) convened last week

   • The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), China’s top political advisory body, opened its session on March 3 and met until March 12.
   • The National People’s Congress started last Wednesday (March 5) and will meet until March 13. Li Keqiang delivered his first annual government work report, in which “reform” was the catchword. It vowed to “deepen reform”, maintain steady economic growth rate, bolster defense spending, “carry out people-centered urbanization”, and fight pollution. Overall, the language use seems to be more specific, concise and catchier than work reports presented by Wen Jiabao, which was lengthier and full of slogans. Also released during the NPC meeting were the Ministry of Finance’s budget report and a draft plan for national economic and social development.
   • The full report is scanned and uploaded by China Real Time. Summary of the work report:
     1. Target GDP growth of 2014 set at “about 7.5%”, which has been the figure three years in a row. Inflation is set at 3.5%. Is this the end to the GDP worship? On the other hand, the report placed great emphasis on ensuring employment. This is in line with what the Finance Minister Lou Jiwei said previously: It is alright for China to slightly miss the government’s 7.5 percent economic growth target this year as long as enough jobs are created. The three economic goals are: create jobs, control inflation and boost the economy.
        1. Many economists, however, see the GDP target challenging as the government also needs to speed up reform, manage debt risks, slow investment and fight pollution.
     2. Government functions: Li mentioned “strengthening the invisible hand of the market” while also calling for the “better use of government’s visible hand”; continue to slash items for administrative approval from the State Council; promote consumption and push ahead with key fiscal and financial reforms that should reduce dependence on the fixed asset investment.
     3. People-centered urbanization: Li vows to solve what he calls the problem of the “three one-hundred-million” generated during urbanization – one-hundred-million of those who migrate from rural to urban areas, one-hundred-million of those who live in urban villages and slums (Penghu 棚戶) and one-hundred-million of those in central-western regional experience in-situ urbanization.
     4. War on pollution: focus on mega cities and regions with frequent occurrence of smog, increasing energy efficiency and reducing emissions. Specific goals are set:
        1. 50,000 “small coal-fired furnaces” would be shut down in 2014
        2. Coal-burning power plants with a production capacity of 15 million kilowatts will undergo “desulphurization”
        3. Plants with a production capacity of 130 million kilowatts will undergo “denitrification”
        4. Plants with a production capacity of 180 million kilowatts will undergo “dust removal”.
        5. Six million older, high-emission motor vehicles will be removed from the roads and high-quality diesel fuel will be provided nationwide
        6. Promised energy conservation measures and “a sound system of tiered pricing for household water and gas consumption” to help safeguard resources
        7. More about the war on pollution on CDT

• 1. Anti-corruption efforts: “make the government more accountable by implementing new anti-corruption policies and instituting a “mass line campaign” to increase government responsiveness. Report stressed the success of these efforts, noting that central government spending on “official overseas visits, official vehicles, and official hospitality” dropped by 35 percent in 2013. More on corruption crackdown on CDT
     1. Li vows to “strengthen research on national defense and the development of new- and high-technology weapons and equipment” and “enhance border, coastal and air defenses”. Defense budget is up 12% to 808 billion yuan ($132 billion) for 2014. Responding to Japan and Taiwan’s concern over the lack of transparency over defense expenditures, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang said that “the Chinese People’s Liberation Army are not Boy Scouts with spears. Some foreigners always expect China to be a baby Scout. In that way, how can we safeguard national security and world peace? How can we ensure stability in the country, region and the world?… Even as a Scout grows up, his former dress and shoes will not fit anymore and thus he will have to change into bigger ones.”
     2. The International Institute for Strategic Studies suggests that real defense spending has been around 40% higher than stated in recent years, according to Andrew Erickson and Adam Liff’s 2013 paper Demystifying China’s Defence Spending: Less Mysterious in the Aggregate, which extensively examines the issue.
     3. Edward Wong explored other outlays aside from weapons procurement, such as pay rise and training.
     4. Zachary Keck at the Diplomat notes both the bad and good news about China’s increasing military spending. The bad news is that the gap between China and US spending is narrowing. The good news (for the West) is that gap between China’s official defense budgets and its actual defense spending might be quickly shrinking, and that the PLA is corrupted.
     5. But Erickson and Liff added that China’s continued double-digit increases may not be sustainable for much longer, as economy is slowing and personnel/equipment costs are surging.
  2. The public security budget, on the other hand, is withheld this year, after three consecutive years in which it outstripped that on external defense. “The government last year announced at the annual session of the National People’s Congress that the domestic security budget would rise 8.7 percent to 769.1 billion yuan ($130 billion), the third year in a row it outstripped defence spending.” Scholars said the reason of withholding the figure is to avoid public criticism that China spends more on controlling its own people than on guarding against foreign threats only underscored this impression.
  3. CDT notes that the comparison is potentially misleading. “China’s enormous population naturally incurs high policing costs, but does not automatically increase the range or severity of external dangers. Moreover, estimated understatement of China’s defense spending is around ten times larger than the gap between the two security budgets: domestic security spending was a mere 3.8% higher last year. Perhaps the biggest “missing” item from the defense budget according to Erickson and Liff is the roughly 100 billion yuan spent on the People’s Armed Police (see pages 811 and 820), which is counted instead under domestic security. Reallocating even a small portion of this to external defense in recognition of the PAP’s multiple roles would shift the balance on its own.”
  4. But this year, the budget only included spending on domestic security which comes directly from the central government – 205 billion yuan – rather than the full figure which includes spending by provincial and regional governments.
  5. When speaking on work regarding HK/Macau, the report no longer uses the phrase 港人治港、高度自治, which has been there for a decade,: 我们将坚定不移贯彻“一国两制”方针，全面准确落实基本法，保持香港、澳门长期繁荣稳定。支持香港特别行政区、澳门特别行政区行政长官和政府依法施政，大力发展经济、有效改善民生、依法推进民主、维护社会和谐。进一步扩大内地与港澳合作，促进港澳自身竞争力提升。使国家全面深化改革和现代化进程中，香港、澳门一定会实现更好发展。
  6. Apparent change on Taiwan policy: 我们将全面贯彻对台工作大政方针，坚持“九二共识”，维护一个中国框架，巩固增进两岸政治互信，促进经济融合，推动交流合作，开展协商谈判，秉持“两岸一家亲”的理念，维护骨肉情谊，凝聚同胞心力，为建设中华民族美好家园、实现祖国和平统一大业贡献力量。我们期待双方越走越近，越走越亲，使两岸关系和平发展成为不可阻挡、不可逆转的历史潮流。
  7. In light of the Kunming attack, the report specifically drew attention to China’s “harmonious ethnic relations”: 我国是统一的多民族国家，各民族都是中华民族的平等一员。要全面正确贯彻党的民族政策，坚持和完善民族区域自治制度，促进民族团结进步、共同繁荣发展。认真落实中央支持少数民族和民族地区发展的政策措施。扶持人口较少民族发展，继续实施兴边富民行动。保护和发展少数民族优秀传统文化。中华民族大家庭的各族儿女和睦相处、和衷共济、和谐发展、心心相印，一定会更加幸福安康、兴旺发达。It is worth noting that at a session at China’s National People’s Congress, a top official says loopholes that allow Internet users in China to break past online censors are to blame for terrorist violence following a recent attack at a train station that left 29 people dead.
     1. For Zhang, the main reason of terrorism is the flow of information via the Internet. Zhang said that nearly all terrorism in Xinjiang was aided by terrorists jumping the Great Firewall constructed by China’s state censors. To do so, the terrorists — just like the state-media journalists in the Xinjiang Room accessing Google, Twitter or other banned sites on their laptops — had used virtual private networks, or VPNs. Zhang said terrorists had used VPNs, many of which are paid services, to access jihadi videos.”
• Critics on the work report
  1. The Diplomat’s Shannon Tiezzi: “… it’s important to note that the problems they identify aren’t new, and the current Chinese regime certainly isn’t the first to notice them. Besides noting these issues in his 2012 work report, Wen Jiabao listed these same problems back in 2008. Six years later, these same problems are again a focal point of a NPC work report by China’s Premier.”…but “Xi and Li seem serious about reform, and Xi’s ability to control the various levers of power has already outstripped Hu Jintao’s. … In this sense, it’s heartening to note one big difference between Li’s work report and Wen’s—Wen focused on extolling past government successes, while Li was more concerned with the direction of future progress”.

3. China establishes Internet security committee

   • The CCP held the first meeting of the newly formed Central Internet Security and Informatization Leading Group (中央网络安全和信息化领导小组). The new working group is responsible for dealing with cybersecurity and information security, a sign that Party views the issue as one of the country’s most pressing strategic concerns. Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang and Liu Yunshan, will head the group, help draft national strategies and develop major policies in a field that might include protecting national secrets and developing digital defenses, among other goals. Xi said in a statement released after the first meeting of the group: “Efforts should be made to build our country into a cyberpower…No Internet safety means no national security. No informatization means no modernization.”
   • Official news: http://news.sina.com.hk/news/20140228/-9-3200644/1.html
   • The Washington Post outlines state media coverage of the new working group, which will focus on bolstering cybersecurity, the control of online public opinion, and technological innovation in China.
   • SCMP: « Many have expressed fears that the launch of such a high-level task force would deal another blow to press freedom which had already been suffering after Xi’s administration tightened controls on the internet in recent months. […] Many also speculated that Lu Wei, the bureaucrat handpicked by the new administration as the country’s internet tsar and a member in Xi’s steering group, will likely impose tougher censorship on social media and online forums. »
   • WSJ: « But creating more committees to centralize policy-making is only part of the job. The other part is winning the race for relevancy where social media and public opinion is concerned. And as long as the focus is on security, rather than service, it’s a race the party could be in regular danger of losing. »
   • Forbes’ Adam Segal offers an explanation of how Internet technology and cybersecurity made it onto the policy agenda
     1. A growing chorus that China needed to better coordinate its highly contested and fragmented Internet security policies
     2. Other countries are developing new offensive and defensive cyber capabilities and studying new ways of cyberspace governance

• Xi Jinping has not been shy about consolidating power at the top. This is another high profile issue Xi seems determined to put a stamp on as he tries to make China a ”strong network country.”
• CDT provides a background for the group: « The group’s formation comes just over a year after information security firm Mandiant alleged Chinese state-sponsorship of hacking attacks against American media, government, and business organizations, and months after Edward Snowden’s leaks about American surveillance undermined U.S. high-ground and heightened Chinese concerns about its own cybersecurity. Meanwhile, Chinese tech companies have been facing hurdles in the U.S. due to security concerns, while foreign tech firms meet their own obstacles in China, and the Xi administration cracks down on free Internet expression. »

CHINA – DIPLOMACY

1. How Chinese media sees the Ukraine crisis

• Reuters reports (via the SCMP) that Russia may have overestimated China’s support of its military intervention in the Crimean peninsula: When asked about Ukraine at a regular press briefing yesterday, foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang answered indirectly. “China has always upheld the principles of[…] Niu Jun , a professor of international affairs at Peking University, said: “What this statement is really saying is, ‘what Russia did was not right and China does not want to support this military invasion’.” But China also wants to support Russia, so it came up with excuses such as Russia’s history with Crimea and Ukraine’s internal situation, he said. diplomacy and the fundamental norms of international relations.”
• Foreign Policy notes how China parted ways with Russia: Mid-level Chinese diplomat appeared before the United Nations Security Council to highlight Beijing’s support for the new pro-Western government, marking a rare diplomatic split from Moscow. « We respect the choice made by the Ukrainian people on the basis of national conditions, » Shen Bo, a counselor at China’s U.N. mission said in a Feb. 24 statement that went largely unnoticed by the international press.
• Bruce Einhorn at Bloomberg Businessweek predicts that China may give Russia a pass on this issue even though it has advocated for a political solution that respects international law.
• Joel Wuthnow outlines three main reasons for China’s relative silence regarding Russia’s involvement in the Ukrainian crisis.
  • Beijing has no desire to unnecessarily complicate its relations with Moscow
  • China has an interest in the long-term stability of Ukraine. China is Ukraine’s second-largest trading partner after Russia, with total trade in 2013 valued at $7.3 billion. China also has major stakes in Ukraine’s agricultural sector, with a September deal reportedly granting a PRC state-owned enterprise access to up to five percent of Ukraine’s arable land.
  • China has a broader interest in defending the norm of non-interference in states’ internal affairs. The reason is that Beijing fears that any erosion of the norm could have potential implications for outside meddling in China’s own claimed territories, including Tibet and Taiwan.
• At ChinaDialogue.net Alejandro Litovsky reiterates that China’s resource deals in Ukraine are “politically and ecologically vulnerable”.
• From the BBC
  • Xinhua news agency carries an article by Hong Kong-based pro-Beijing daily Wen Wei Po, which describes the Ukraine crisis as a « battle between great powers », with two opposing forces fighting over whether « to go East », towards Russia, or « to head West » and side with the EU.
  • A commentary in the Beijing Youth Daily is pessimistic about the future of Ukraine, saying that « external influence has encroached the country ». « Ukraine is not a player but only a pawn in the Eurasian game of chess… it does not have the freedom to design its own future. The ambitions of the EU and Russia are two chariots going in different directions, » it says.
  • Echoing similar sentiments, the Global Times notes that the West « is extraordinarily warm-hearted » towards Ukraine and « frequently interferes in its internal affairs by instigating the opposition to challenge the incumbent government ». It warns that China should draw « lessons from the mistakes of others ». The paper writes that if the streets of Beijing « become so radical and accept what the West asks us to do », then there « is a high possibility that we will experience long-term turbulence and have a divided nation ».
• ThinkBorders has a similar take on the issue: “The analysis of China’s official statements and media reports on Ukraine puts this claim [that China backs Russia] in doubt. China has thus far attempted to strike a balance by acknowledging the crisis without directly criticizing Russia’s moves. Rather than championing Russia’s cause, China has favored ambiguity. Its stance on Ukraine is largely a product of complex relations between China, Russia and the United States, as well as the importance of China’s domestic objectives in directing its international engagements. Russia should not count on China for a more direct support on Ukraine and neither should the international community expect China to become an active mediator. China is most likely to remain a passive observer.”

HONG KONG – POLITICS

1. Ming Pao’s former chief editor stabbed six times, ringing alarm on press freedom

   1. Kevin Lau Chun-to, a 49-year-old veteran journalist who just stepped down as the chief editor of the respected Ming Pao Daily, was stabbed six times in a hit-and-run attack last Wednesday. Lau’s condition has stabilized following surgery. The case has attracted widespread attention from foreign media.
   2. Cause is still unknown. Attackers are believed to have fled.
   3. Lau was at the eye of a thunderstorm just two months ago when he was removed from chief-editorship after serving for only two years (compare this to his predecessor, who served for 15 years) and transferred to a non-editorial position. The plan is to replace him by a Malaysian editor who seems to have little experience in Hong Kong news reporting. Pundits have linked the unusual personnel move to the intention of Ming Pao’s owner, Zhang Xiaoqing, a Malaysian billionaire with business ties in China, to tone down the critical character of the newspaper. Although many Ming Pao journalists resisted the move, the soft-spoken Lau has accepted the move without open opposition. That is why people were shocked not just by the attack itself, but also by the disbelief that the target was Lau, who is seen among journalists as a moderate personality. Even though Ming Pao has largely retained its critical voice under his leadership, Lau, who is well connected in the political circle, is unlikely to be a “problem child”.
   4. Over the past few years, there were seven other reported incidents in which media professionals and outlets critical of the Hong Kong government and the Beijing authorities were threatened or attacked – none of which have been solved by the Hong Kong police.
   5. One of the most speculated cause is Ming Pao’s involvement in the ICIJ repot on Chinese officials’ offshore holdings when Lau was still the chief editor. Incidentally, similar reports that exposed the enormous wealth of high-ranking Chinese officials conducted by foreign media, namely the New York Times and Bloomberg News, have also resulted in reprisals – such as visa delays – from the Beijing administration.

2. NPC Chairman and head of HK affairs Zhang Dejiang commented on Hong Kong’s electoral reform
   1. On Wednesday, Zhang commented on One Country Two Systems, emphasizing that Hong Kong’s high degree of self-autonomy is not total autonomy: 特區實施高度自治，是中央、法律授權，但高度自治不是完全自治，表明中央並非在授權後便什麼都不管、不能管，強調中央對港澳有全面的主權，對特區實行高度自治有監督權，又表明中央權力除國防、外交外，亦有任命特區行政長官和主要官員的權力，而各級立法機關亦須向人大備案，若人大認為不符《基本法》，可將法案發回，便會立即失效。他指保持中央權力是對香港有利無害，又說中央若把權力放棄或會出現混亂、損害香港利益張德江在會上談及「一國兩制」問題，指一國實行社會主義，兩制則奉行資本主義，雖有很大差異，但必須尊重內地一套，強調要求同存異，不能因為香港奉行資本主義便否定社會主義、排斥國體和政制，認為特區除要堅持「一國兩制」原則，亦要擁護中央權力。
   2. During last Thursday’s NPC meeting, Zhang put forth 一個立場，三個符合: 「三個符合」包括普選要(1)符合香港實際情況、要(2)符合基本法和人大常委決定，以及(3)特首要符合「愛國愛港」條件。他指有些人「打著爭普選的旗號出來攪局……另起爐灶、另搞一套」，效果是阻礙香港民主發展進程，「影響2017年行政長官普選的實現」
   3. One HK delegate quoted Zhang saying that « you cannot just move or copy [the electoral system] from abroad, otherwise you might very easily find it can’t adapt to the local environment and become a democracy trap … and possibly bring a disastrous result. » Another delegate: « He said Hong Kong is not a sovereign state … so we cannot copy Western models. » he also said 市場上吆喝聲音最大的，往往是賣假貨 (fake goods) 的.
   4. Meanwhile, Zhang also raised concerns, for the first time, over Hong Kong’s tourism capacity and says recent protests were ‘derogatory and divisive’. He said the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of the State Council and the China National Tourism Administration should look at the issue with the Hong Kong government.