Keywords: Panama Papers, open letter, Guo Boxiong, Internet Domain Name Management Rules, questionable vaccines in China, Hong Kong National Party, Demosistō, Joshua Wong, Kuomintang, Hung Hsiu-chu.

CHINA – POLITICS

1. Panama Papers and its relevancy to China

On 3 April, The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) published some of the information leaked out from the Panama-based law firm Mossack Fonseca which help incorporating companies in offshore jurisdictions and managing wealth. The company runs a worldwide operation with a global network of 600 people working in 42 countries. The leaked information revealed offshore companies linked to the families of China’s President Xi Jinping and other current and former Chinese leaders. For the details of the names and their relations to various companies revealed so far, please see the interactive report by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) in English or the report by the Initium in Chinese. The Chinese state-run newspaper Global Times denounced the move as an attack on non-western countries backed by Washington without mentioning of its relevancy to China’s leaders.

• //Those reportedly named in the leaked database from the firm include Deng Jiagui, the brother-in-law of the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, and Li Xiaolin, the daughter of former premier Li Peng, a Communist party hardliner who became known as the “Butcher of Beijing” for his role in ordering the 1989 military crackdown on Tiananmen protesters. But a leaked censorship directive from one provincial internet watchdog informed Chinese editors they were forbidden from covering the Panama Papers leak. […] “Find and delete reprinted reports on the Panama Papers. Do not follow up on related content, no exceptions. If material from foreign media attacking China is found on any website, it will be dealt with severely,” read the directive, which was obtained and published by China Digital Times, a website affiliated with the University of California, Berkeley. “Please act immediately,” the censorship order reportedly added. A second directive, published by the same group, demanded that an article published on Monday focusing on revelations about the hidden riches of Russian president Vladimir Putin’s inner circle be removed from the homepage of one website. […] According to China Digital Times, the social media network Sina Weibo had blocked searches for terms including: “Panama + offshore”, “offshore + finance”, “Panama + Deng Jiagui”, “Panama + Li Xiaolin”.// Source: The Guardian, 05 April 2016.

• //[t]he Global Times, an influential tabloid published by the ruling Communist Party’s official People’s Daily, suggested in an editorial on Tuesday that Western media backed by Washington had used such leaks to attack political targets in non-Western countries. “The Western media has taken control of the interpretation each time there has been such a document dump, and Washington has demonstrated particular influence in it,” the paper said. “Information that is negative to the US can always be minimised, while exposure of non-Western leaders, such as Putin, can get extra spin,” it added. The editorial, in both its English and Chinese editions, made no mention of the China connections in the Panama Papers.// Source: SCMP, 05 April 2016.

• //At least eight current or former members of China’s Politburo Standing Committee, the ruling party’s most powerful body, have been implicated, according to reports. Mossack Fonseca operates branches in eight Chinese cities, including Hong Kong, its website showed Tuesday. The British-based Guardian newspaper said an internal Mossack Fonseca survey found the biggest proportion of its offshore company owners came from mainland China, followed by Hong Kong.// Source: AFP, 05 April 2016.

Impacts of the Panama Paper revelations on the Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party:

• //None of this will come as much of a surprise in China, where corruption is rife, and where the children of senior officials are among the country’s most successful businesspeople. But the scandal is nonetheless embarrassing for the leadership. The papers provide clear evidence of covert financial dealings by leaders’ families. Hitherto these had been widely suspected but difficult to prove. True, the papers may not provide evidence of corruption involving these families. But they will strengthen perceptions that the elite enjoy enormous wealth and privilege, despite Mr Xi’s massive anti-corruption drive. Moreover, the material comes not from individual media firms, such as Bloomberg or the New York Times, both of which have investigated the wealth of Chinese leaders, but directly from a company hugely involved in offshore business. […] Even if the leaders’ relatives were involved in nothing illegal, Chinese officials are required to uphold the party’s rules as well as the country’s laws. The party bans officials from registering or investing in companies abroad. And high-ranking ones can be held responsible for the business dealings of relatives. In 2004, when he was party chief of the coastal province of Zhejiang, Mr Xi urged his fellow leaders to “rein in” their spouses, children, relatives, friends and staff. The revelations could therefore pose a dilemma for Mr Xi. Does he push his anti-corruption campaign harder against some of the most influential families in China, or does he go easy on them, and tone down the anti-corruption campaign, which he has said he will not do? //Source: The Economist, 07 April 2016.

Sarah Cook, China specialist from the Freedom House:

• //The Chinese president has also ordered party officials to avoid public demonstrations of wealth in an attempt to improve the party’s image. “This kind of blows a big hole in that effort because it exposes how the top political leaders and their families are, at the very least, super, super rich – even if this money had been obtained legally, which of course is a big question mark as well,” […] But Cook said the revelations came at an unfortunate moment for Xi, who has been facing growing signs of resistance to his rule, including a recent public letter calling for his resignation. […] “I think there is particularly a sense that [the Panama Papers revelations] could be damaging for him and his authority at a time when he is already facing challenges to his authority both from critics within the party and people outside of the party,”// Source: the Guardian, 07 April 2016.

Andrew Nathan, Professor of Political Science at Columbia University:

• //We knew about Xi Jinping’s wealthy brother-in-law from Michael Forsythe’s reporting for Bloomberg; and about the wealth amassed by descendants of the P.R.C. founders from a team Bloomberg report; and about the wealthy wife of former Chinese premier Wen Jiabao from a report by David Barboza in The New York Times. The Panama Papers add more names to the list and give us new information about how the Red Aristocracy plays its money games, while still leaving a lot of questions unanswered. […] As well, the Panama Papers tell us more about the one-foot-in, one-foot-out strategies of politically connected Chinese families. With their connections, they should be able to earn much higher rates of return in the go-go parts of China’s economy than in the strait-laced West, but still they send relatives and assets overseas. They don’t feel secure at home, but what exactly do they fear? Is it political strife within the regime, or the fragility of the regime itself? When corruption started to sprout in China in the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping defended his policy of opening to the West by saying, “If you open the window, some flies will get in.” Today it is hard to blame Chinese corruption on Western influence. The behavior revealed in these papers is the structural product of the Chinese system of power concentration and information control.// Source: China File Conversation, 06 April 2016.

Brief introduction of the Panama Papers:

• //The disclosures have been made possible by the biggest data leak in history – 11.5m documents detailing the activities of more than 200,000 offshore companies, about two-thirds of the total incorporated by Mossack Fonseca. Obtained from an anonymous source by the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung and shared by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists with other media organisations, the files are a mine of emails, shareholder registers, bank statements, internal reports, passport scans and company certificates.//Source: The Guardian, 3 April 2016.

2. More than one open letter asking President Xi Jinping to resign

On 4 March, the Wujie News (无界新闻), or Watching, the state-run website posted an open letter which asked President Xi Jinping to resign from the position of Party’s leader. The letter was signed by “loyal Communist Party Members”. The incident happened during the “Two Sessions” meetings. Employees of the Watching News Agency were detained. On 29 March, another open letter of similar content appeared on the Mingjing News, a US-based Chinese language news website, and also signed by ‘Chinese Communist Party Members’. All the records of the two letters have been deleted from their original website hosts now. The Watching News is reported to face liquidation and shutdown after the incident. A number of persons are detained. The content of the first open letter can be viewed here in Chinese and in English prepared by China Digital Times.

• //An even more brazen act of resistance to the control of public and Party opinion was an open letter calling for Xi Jinping’s resignation from all state and Party leadership positions, posted to state-linked Wujie News website on March 4, the day that the annual “Two Sessions” political meetings began in Beijing. Signed by a group of “loyal Party members,” the letter blames Xi for an atmosphere of political, economic, ideological, and cultural anxiety currently sweeping China, and mentions that the “personal safety” of the president and his family could be in jeopardy if he does not comply. […] Several search term combinations related to the letter and calls for Xi’s resignation are now blocked from Weibo results.] //Source: China Digital Times, 16 March 2016.

• //The new letter published on Tuesday was apparently signed by “171 Chinese Communist Party members” and asked for Xi to be relieved from all his duties. “Given the grim situation of the extremely abnormal party organisational life caused by Comrade Xi Jinping’s personal dictatorship and personality cult, we, anonymously for now, publish this open letter to the whole party, army and people,” the letter read. The letter listed Xi’s five gravest errors, including condoning personal worship, dictatorship, and neglect of citizen welfare. It also mentioned the case of the Hong Kong booksellers and alleged that Xi was behind their disappearances. “Because the Hong Kong bookstore published the book Xi Jinping and His Six Women, he used the Chinese police to kidnap all of its shareholders and staff members across borders,” the letter alleged.// Source: Hong Kong Free Press, 30 March 2016.

• //Four of those detained work for Wujie News, or Watching, the state-run website that posted the letter on March 4, the first day of an annual political conclave in Beijing, according to a person tracking the inquiry who asked not to be identified. They are the two top editors and two technicians. In addition, Wen Yunchao, a Chinese activist living in New York, said in a telephone interview that his parents and younger brother in southern China had been missing since Tuesday, after police officers and officials warned his parents that Mr. Wen should tell them what he knew about the letter. […] Another person detained by the police was Jia Jia, 35, a freelance writer who recently finished a stint as a visiting scholar at Sun Yat-sen University in the southern city of Guangzhou. […] Jia is also a friend of Ouyang Hongliang, editor in chief of Wujie. People with knowledge of the situation have said Mr. Jia called Mr. Ouyang to ask him to take the letter off Wujie after he noticed it circulating online. Mr. Ouyang is one of the website employees who have been detained.// Source: New York Times, 25 March 2016.

• //A Chinese media company which published an open letter asking Chinese President Xi Jinping to resign is facing shutdown, Apple Daily reported on Thursday. A source told the newspaper that Watching is to be closed and the company liquidated following a meeting held on Wednesday. Staff members have also been allowed to hand in their resignations.// Source: Hong Kong Free Press, 25 March 2016.

• Andrew J. Nathan, Professor of Political Sciences at Columbia University:// It was not unexpected that he would concentrate power in his own hands. The C.C.P. wanted a strong leader to deal with all the challenges it confronted simultaneously—rising corruption, a slowing economy, a growing debt overhang, the need for military reform, slippage in Beijing’s control of Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, and a perceived encirclement by the U.S. and its allies—and it chose Xi to play this part. His efforts seemed to have pleased the Party elite. Until now. Evidently he has gone too far in creating a cult of personality that has sought to place him beyond criticism even by cronies and elite supporters. China is no longer a country of peasants. The Party is no longer an organization of semi-literate ex-guerrillas. […] Asking a leader to resign is a sign of opposition, and in a party of 86 million it is not necessarily a sign of danger that a few members have ideas of their own.// Source: China File Conversation, 18 March 2016.

Background of the Wujie News Website:

• //Watching was set up last March by the government of Xinjiang, Alibaba, as well as SEEC Media Group. According to Apple, it was poised to be supportive of the “One Belt One Road,” a trade network initiative which the Chinese government hopes will connect China with the rest of Asia, Africa and Europe via land and sea.// Source: Hong Kong Free Press, 25 March 2016.

• //The website began operations in September, and its main investor is the Communist Party committee of the western region of Xinjiang. Other investors include Caixun, which owns the financial magazine Caijing, and Alibaba, the e-commerce giant. Wujie was started to report on news of Mr. Xi’s economic plan of “One Belt, One Road,” aimed at helping China increase investment and trade across Asia and Europe, said Qiao Mu, a journalism professor at Beijing Foreign Studies University.// Source: New York Times, 25 March 2016.

3. Amount of bribes received by the Former Vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission Guo Boxiong was revealed

• //China’s former top general who used to run the world’s largest army has been charged with taking bribes totalling 80 million yuan (HK$96 million), a source close to senior military officials told the South China Morning Post. Guo Boxiong, the retired military chief of the People’s Liberation Army, had been under investigation for corruption since last year and was expelled from the Communist Party in July. […] Military prosecutors had wrapped up the criminal probe into Guo and the case had been filed to a court, the source said. Senior officials and others have been briefed on the matter over the past week. According to the source, military prosecutors had played down the amount of money involved in Guo’s case. The official number was just a small fraction of the amount Guo actually received, the source said. Recent trials of top officials on graft charges have often involved bribes paid to the family members or close aides of the officials, rather than directly to the officials themselves. The trial of former Politburo member Bo Xilai, whose wife Gu Kailai was involved in the murder of British businessman Neil Heywood, found that most of the 20 million yuan in illicit gains Bo received had been channelled through Gu or other family members.// Source: SCMP, 04 April 2016.

Military reform announced in January 2016 is significantly related to the anti-corruption campaign by President Xi Jinping, as Dr. Ying Yu Lin from the Ming Chuan University points out:

• //The biggest change in the functions of General Political Department (GDP) is the removal of its control over the military legal system to the new Politics and Law Commission. It signifies a breaking up of the discipline, security, and personnel functions that GDP used to monopolize. The Politics and Law Commission, together with the Discipline Inspection Commission, can stop personnel functions from being controlled by a single agency while contributing to Xi’s goal of rooting out corruption rings in the military, as shown in the case involving ex-CMC vice chairman Xu Caihou. Guo Boxiong, the other ex-CMC vice chairman who also fell from power in Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, was closely linked to the General Armaments Department (GAD), which was downgraded considerably in this round of military reforms. […] In the current reshuffling of power, the four general departments were weakened via the deactivation of some of their units. Some generals have even been removed from their positions. These signs are sufficient to conclude that the ongoing military reforms are in part based on Xi’s desire to consolidate his own position as leader of the military. […] To deal a further blow to the corruption rings formed by the two fallen ex-CMC vice chairmen, Xu and Guo, Xi has turned to the hitherto less-privileged air force and navy to select lieutenants from among generals. For one, General Xu Qiliang of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force has been promoted to the CMC vice chairman position, which has traditionally occupied by army generals. That Xu had worked together with Xi years ago when the two were assigned to Fujian Province around the same time helped him. The military reforms, highlighting a downsizing of troops, could be used to relieve certain generals of their positions and power, which might be the real reason for Xi to push for the restructuring.// Source: The Diplomat, 07 March 2016.

4. China’s draft new regulation for domain name management

On 25 March 2016, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) posted a draft “Internet Domain Name Management Rules” for a one-month consultation period. Due to technical and vague terms used in the draft regulation, it stirred up some misunderstanding and public panic and prompted further clarification from the authorities. MIIT clarified that only those websites hosted in China must have their domain names registered in domestic DNS service providers, while those websites hosted overseas can continue to use their foreign domain names when they enter the Chinese market. Scholars argue that this move can be out of China’s urge to exert greater control over the online content and to raise the bar for foreign companies in getting into the Chinese market. For the English version of the draft regulation, please see here.

Séverine Arsène, the CEFC researcher who specializes in Internet issues in China, points out in one of her articles that the Chinese authorities have long been critical of the existing global architecture and management of the Domain Name System (DNS), and trying to localize the online content as part of the censorship system. For her December 2015 article relating to the Internet Domain Names in China, please see here.

With regard to the motivation behind the draft regulation, she argues that this move might serve as an attempt to enhance business for Chinese registries and registrars, to reduce the cybersecurity risks related to domain names registered abroad, and to facilitate identification of website owners and removal of website content which add one additional lever for the Chinese bureaucracy to take quick action for censorship purposes.

• //The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology said in its proposed revisions to domain name management regulations Chinese websites must use domestic domain registration services or risk being cut off in China and facing fines up to 30,000 yuan ($4,600). “Internet service providers must not provide network access services for domain names connected to the domestic network but which are not managed by domestic domain name registration service bodies,” the ministry said in a draft of the rules posted on its website last week. The ministry told Reuters on Wednesday there was “misunderstanding” about the regulations which “did not fundamentally conflict” with global practices. The rules “do not involve websites that are accessed overseas, do not affect users from accessing the related Internet content and do not affect the normal development of business for overseas companies in China,” it said in an email.// Source: Reuters, 30 March 2016.

• //3月25日，中國工業和信息化部推出新版《互聯網域名管理辦法（修訂徵求意見稿）》（下稱《辦法》），進行公開意見徵集。《辦法》提出，在中國大陸境內進行網絡接入的域名應由境內機構提供域名註冊服務及運行管理；而在境內進行網絡接入、但非境內機構管理的域名，則不得為其提供網絡接入服務。相關消息出台後，引起中國網民及業界人士質疑，許多人認為這是中國政府進一步加強網絡審查的具體行動。//Source: The Initium, 31 March 2016.

• //因为在我这么一个【不懂IT】的普通人看来，这第37条规定的意思，基本上就是在说：“那些境外的网站啊，如果你们想在中国境内被中国网民访问，就必须在我们国内进行注册登记，否则我们就封杀你们!” 所以，也难怪网民们都那么激动了。[…] 不过，就当耿直哥也想在网上破口大骂政府“开历史倒车”的时候，我突然注意到有学IT的网友在网上留言说：“第37条并不是大家以为的那个意思!你们要冷静啊!!!”于是，我连忙跑去看了这位网友的观点，然后很快我就闭嘴了。原来，在工信部那个征求意见稿的第37条中，我们这些不懂IT的人，都完全忽视并误解了一个很重要的“专业术语”。但实际上，“在境内进行【网络接入】”这半句话真正的意思却是：“服务器在境内的网站”… 原来，在IT领域，对于一个网站来说，进行【网络接入】的意思是：网站方面找到一家“网络接入商”，然后通过对方把自己网站服务器里的内容“放到”互联网上，供大家访问和浏览。——所以，“在境内进行【网络接入】”，也就意味着网站服务器首先是在境内，才能通过一个境内的“网络接入商”上线。// Source: Global Times (Chinese Edition), 29 March 2016.

Rogier Creemers, a lecturer in China’s politics and history at the University of Oxford argues that this move would enhance China’s level of control over the content hosted by Chinese servers.

• //But experts say the rules would enhance China’s ability to censor, and allow it to target sites that are hosted on Chinese servers but have registered their domain names overseas, where they cannot be completely shut down by Beijing. “The draft rules aim to ensure that content hosted on Chinese servers is accessed through a domain name managed by a Chinese registration service provider,” said Rogier Creemers, a lecturer in China’s politics and history at the University of Oxford. “This points to an increased level of control.”//Source: Reuters, 30 March 2016.

• //在中國目前的網站備案系統中，雖然服務器被要求必須在境內，但域名可以在境外。因此一些網站就算服務器被封，其域名擁有者還有機會進行重建。但新的《辦法》使得境內網站的服務器和域名可以同時被封，徹底失去重建的機會。牛津大學中國政治學講師 Rogier Creemers 認為，新規定將讓中國政府能更密切地管理網站經營者的真實身份，也將有助於組建一套重要網站的註冊系統，「如果中國想脱離統一互聯網的全球註冊系統的話」。// Source: The Initium, 31 March 2016.

Oiwan Lam, who has established an independent online media platform called Hong Kong In-Media, argues that the draft regulation would have the effect of raising the entry bar for foreign companies which try to get into the Chinese market.

• //In February 2016, China released new Administrative Regulations for Online Publishing Services requiring all foreign-owned media which has mainland Chinese people as part of their target audience to host all of their content — “text, maps, games, cartoons and audio files” — on servers located inside China. The only alternative for foreign media companies would be to distribute their contents through project-based cooperation with local partners with prior approval from the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television. The regulation not only bolsters the legality of the Great Firewall, a mechanism that blocks overseas websites, but also raises the threshold for foreign media companies that want to enter the Chinese market. Since 2014, the foreign IT companies have been compelled to sign a pledge known as the Information Technology Product Supplier Declaration of Commitment to Protect User Security. The pledge requires technology companies to store user data within China’s borders. Since its inception, IT giants including Apple, Microsoft and LinkedIn have started storing their user data in local data centers. Even more companies have joined the China market clubs in the past two years. Establishing content servers was just another step in the same direction. But the new Internet Domain Name Management Rules take this regime of control to a new level, as they require all websites hosted in China to have their domain names registered in domestic DNS service providers. Companies that fail to do this will simply not be connected to China’s domestic network. […] All of this means that foreign technology companies must now pay a price for entering the Chinese market. We can only expect that the number on the price tag will get higher and higher over time.// Source: Hong Kong Free Press, 10 April 2016.

Jiang Bojing, an IT analyst explained to a party affiliated news outlet, the Paper, shared the view that the new draft regulation involves both political and economic rationale.

• //First of all, it further bans those harmful and dangerous websites from connecting to the domestic network. Secondly, it promotes China’s top domain name. Thirdly, it sends a signal to overseas corporates that if they want to develop their business in China, better cooperate with domestic authorities.// Source: Hong Kong Free Press, 10 April 2016.

CHINA – SOCIETY

Problematic vaccines spread across China

On 23 February 2016, it was reported that the police from Jinan, Shandong Province, in April 2015 burst the illegal operation of selling questionable vaccines worth 570 million yuan over the past 5 years. It was further revealed on 18 March that the vaccines were potentially hazardous to health as stored improperly, and they were already distributed to more than 18 provinces. The case caused a massive public outrage on social media. On 21 March, China Food and Drug Administration (中國食品藥品監督總局), Ministry of Public Security (公安部)、National Health and Family Planning Commission (國家衞生和計劃生育委員會) announced joined hand to tackle the issue by asking local health-related bureaus to investigate and handle the situation. Some parents whose children had been affected by questionable vaccines intended to file a complaint in Beijing, but they were arrested by the authority, facing the charges of picking quarrels and provoking troubles. After the announcement, some media in Mainland China suggested parents to bring children to Hong Kong for vaccinations. On 31 March, the Hong Kong SAR government responded by setting a quota of 120 non-local children each month in order to secure the vaccine stock in the city.

• //It started as a piece of good news on February 23 when Xinhua reported that police in Shandong had arrested a mother and daughter on suspicion of having illegally sold improperly stored or expired vaccines worth more than 570 million yuan (HK$679 million) across 24 provinces since 2011. But the news failed to capture the public’s attention until a news website controlled by the Shanghai municipal government published a follow-up report on March 18 with a catchier headline that noted the vaccines could cause death. It was immediately picked up by the social media accounts of mainstream media such as the People’s Daily and China Central Television. It has since fermented rapidly into the biggest health care scandal of recent years. Premier Li Keqiang ordered a thorough investigation and even the World Health Organisation issued a statement. Local media suggested some mainland mothers planned to bring their children to Hong Kong for vaccinations, raising concerns over whether local facilities could cope with the influx.// Source: SCMP, 27 March 2016.

• //山東非法疫苗案持續發酵數日後，中國食品藥品監督總局（食藥監總局）、公安部、國家衞計委三部門於3月21日晚聯合發出通知，要求各地食品藥品監管、公安和衞生計生部門立即成立聯合工作組，進行非法經營疫苗案件查辦及涉案產品處置工作。[…] 去年4月28日，山東濟南警方破獲了一起非法經營疫苗的案件，兩名疫苗販子以低價購進存在過期風險的多種人用疫苗，加價售往全國各地，5年內涉案金額高達7億元人民幣。此案案發後，被中國公安部、食藥監總局列為督辦案件，並在內蒙古、河南、河北、山東等地破獲相關案件21起，逮捕犯罪嫌疑人6人、刑事拘留10人。[…] 事件公開後，引起輿論高度關注。3月19日，山東省食藥監局發布了《關於龐某等非法經營疫苗案有關線索的通告》，公布了300名參與買賣非法疫苗人員的名單，並指嫌疑人龐氏母女的上線及下線分別多達107人和193人，涉及安徽、北京、福建、甘肅、廣東、廣西、貴州、河北、黑龍江、湖北、湖南、江蘇、遼寧、內蒙古、河南、吉林、江西、重慶、浙江、新疆、四川、陝西、山西和山東等24個省市。截止21日，北京、上海、山西、廣東、江蘇、湖南、雲南、浙江、海南、四川、安徽和河南等省市相關部門作出回應，稱並未在轄區內發現問題疫苗。不過，據南方日報報導，在官方公布的300名嫌疑人名單中，有3個手機號的歸屬地來自廣東，其中1人為上線，2人為下線。// Source: The Initium, 22 March 2016.

• //山東非法疫苗案涉案嫌疑人龐某原是山東省菏澤市牡丹人民醫院的醫生，有非法倒賣疫苗的前科。2009年，她曾因非法經營涉案金額達489萬元的人用二類疫苗，被判3年有期徒刑 ，緩刑5年。就在緩刑期間，龐某聯合自己從醫科學校畢業的女兒孫某「重操舊業」。銀行賬戶往來資金顯示，5年內涉案賬戶累計收款1億元。若以每支疫苗售價150元計算，龐某購進、銷售的疫苗累計超過200萬支。// Source: The Initium, 22 March 2016.

• //目前，除了有關官方部門聲稱將嚴查此事外，維權家長亦遭受打壓。山東爆出問題疫苗後翌日的3月12日，正值全國兩會期間，使用問題疫苗患兒的家長易文龍、金玲、史桂芹、裴雪、楊丹及惠傑6人，身披「中國青年報義工」字樣的緞帶，在北京西單長安街排隊行走，每個人手持該報刊登的〈被惡魔選中的家庭：8歲兒童因接種疫苗致癱〉一文，沿途派發。最近，其中5人確認被警方以「涉嫌尋釁滋事罪」刑事拘留。[…] 正在代理一宗疫苗受害者家長被羈押案的北京律師余文生稱，中國涉及問題疫苗的案件很多，但索賠一直十分困難，不少受害者家長甚至會遭到當局打壓。// Source: Ming Pao Daily, 28 March 2016.

Analysts argue that the case shows a huge loophole in the implementation of supervision over vaccines with the barcode registration system:

• //中国医药企业管理协会副会长牛正乾向财新记者表示，这起疫苗非法经营案涉及18个省份，可见并不是“偶然发生”的，其中存在制度缺陷和监管人员的不作为。牛正乾指出，目前疫苗产品的可追溯体系不完善。电子监管码制度虽然在被叫停之前实施已久，但并没有落实到位，也没有发挥作用；如果有完备的流向追溯体系，疫苗就很难流入非法商贩手中，“因为一切链条都是清晰的”。北京鼎臣医药管理咨询中心创始人史立臣则告诉财新记者，按正规渠道，疫苗生产出来以后都要到相关部门备案，接着交给经销商，由经销商销售至省疾控中心。省再到市、市再到县一级，在封闭体系中层层配送。但从济南警方破获的这起案件看，两名疫苗贩子显然走得不是正规渠道。// Source: Caixin, 18 March 2016.

• //清华大学医疗管理研究中心研究员曹健对财新记者表示，该事件“暴露出国家在药品监管码的执行方面存在很大的漏洞”。药监码制度始于2005年，本意是通过药品电子监管码全流程覆盖，实现药品追溯信息化监管，打击假药、二手药问题。尽管已实施了十余年，但中国医药企业管理协会副会长牛正乾认为，药监码制度并没有落实到位，也没有发挥作用；如果有完备的流向追溯体系，疫苗就很难流入非法商贩手中。2016年1月，湖南养天和大药房企业集团有限公司以“强推药监码违法”为由起诉食药总局，此后，药监码是否必要、药监码的运营商阿里健康是否涉嫌不正当竞争引起争议。2月20日，食药总局宣布暂停药监码。曹健对财新记者说，政府原本希望通过推广药品电子监管码管理系统，来解决药品在生产及流通过程中的状态监管，实现监管部门及生产企业产品追溯和管理，但这次事件表明，药监码“并不能够实现药品的全过程监管”。// Source: Caixin, 19 March 2016.

The Commentator Zhao Han(赵晗) from Caixin points out that the loophole lies in the fact that the supervisory body, Food and Drug Administration, is lower in administrative rank than the vaccine distribution body Centre for Disease Prevention and Control in the local context:

• //在《条例》规定，总则写得清楚：“国务院药品监督管理部门负责全国疫苗的质量和流通的监督管理工作。”但财新记者获悉，在实践中，由药监部门来监督、管理疾控部主导的分发、配送过程却很难做到。其中一个主要原因是，按照行政级别设计，地方药监局往往比主管疾控中心的地方卫计部门要低半级。一位曾经在地方药监局工作过的官员无奈地对财新记者表示：“让我们管卫计委，我们根本管不了。下级怎么管上级？”这种“管不了”的尴尬，还体现在疫苗的使用管理上，卫计委系统往往有各种内部方针标准。目前，所有的一类疫苗全都由疾控中心监管；二类疫苗中的大部分，也是由疾控中心监管。所以，当绝大多数的疫苗，进入卫计系统主管的疾控体系之后，各个省市的药监局就难以再深入监督，止步于墙外。“疫苗进了疾控系统后，发生什么我们都不知道，监管存在漏洞。”上述知情官员如此告诉财新记者。这一体制设计，也是为什么当庞某卫主导的疫苗非法流出事件爆发后，各省市卫计委率先表态的缘故。 //Source: Caixin, 18 March 2016.

Wang Xiangwei from SCMP criticizes that the authorities know the seriousness of the situation but act slowly to address the public concerns, prompting the public distrust in the government:

• // Subsequent reports have suggested massive corruption and lack of effective supervision by the government authorities in production, transport, storage, and sale of vaccines. As the official China Daily commented: “The authorities have nobody but themselves to blame for the disbelief and mistrust they face.” […] But even with the latest reports focusing public attention and anger on the snowballing scandal, regulators have been slow to react. Even the WHO acted faster. On Tuesday, it acknowledged the reports and said the improperly or expired vaccines seldom caused any toxic reactions and thus posed minimal health risks. […] It was only after Wednesday when state media reported that Li had ordered a thorough probe and a timely response to the public concerns that the regulators shifted into high gear, holding their first press conference on Thursday, nearly a week after the reports began to cause panic among the public. At the press conference, the officials admitted most of the problematic vaccines had been used and flaws in the supervision of vaccine distribution were to blame. They tried to reassure the public by echoing the WHO’s statement that the health risk was minimal. But it was too little, too late given the public’s anger and distrust. They have had too many experiences of officials attempting cover-ups or downplaying scandals that are a matter of life and death – such as the melamine-spiked milk powder scandal and the Sars epidemic.// Source: SCMP, 27 March 2016.

HONG KONG – POLITICS

1. Panama Papers and its relevancy to Hong Kong

News reports reveal that the Panama Papers is at least in three ways relevant to Hong Kong. First, Hong Kong is reported to have the largest number of intermediates (2,212) working with Mossack Fonseca to set up offshore companies. Second, the largest proportion of offshore companies (37,675) is set up by Hong Kong-based intermediates. Third, the owners of the offshore companies from Hong Kong are ranked second, only after China, out of a sample of about 13,000 according to the report by The Guardian. It is also reported that the Hong Kong office of the Mossack Fonseca is the busiest branch globally.

• //Nearly a third of the business of Mossack Fonseca, the law firm at the centre of the Panama Papers scandal, came from its offices in Hong Kong and mainland China, reports say – making the Asian giant its biggest market. Shell companies incorporated through the Hong Kong and the mainland offices of the Panamanian law firm accounted for 29 per cent of its active companies worldwide, said the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), which co-ordinated a year-long investigation of the 11.5 million leaked documents. […] ICIJ said Mossack Fonseca’s Hong Kong office was the firm’s busiest branch globally.// Source: SCMP, 08 April 2016.

• //One of the reasons there are so many firms in Hong Kong involved in setting up offshore trusts and companies is because of Chinese citizens’ lack of trust in the country’s laws and courts, said Jason Sharman, an offshore tax jurisdiction expert and professor at Australia’s Griffith University. Wealthy individuals who own property via an offshore company could be doing so for legitimate reasons of privacy and security, or to skirt China’s notoriously stiff restrictions on capital leaving the country, for example. Meanwhile, businesses may establish offshore holding companies due to Chinese rules restricting foreign ownership in certain industries. Chinese technology giant Alibaba Group Holding Ltd., which went public in New York in 2014 in a record-beating $25 billion offering, is incorporated in the Cayman Islands, for instance.// Source: Wall Street Journal, 06 April 2016.

• //密件披露，巴拿馬律師行Mossack Fonseca與全球超過100多個國家與地區的14,000間銀行、律師樓等合作，為客戶設立空殼公司及基金；而與MF合作的中介公司中，香港佔2000多間，數量是全球之首，而這些香港中介公司，開設的離岸公司數目亦是文件統計中最多，其次才到瑞士及英國。// Source: The Stand News, 05 April 2016.

• //在莫萨克·冯赛卡发生的事情也在别的地方被复制。富有的中国人利用香港作为跳板，将资金挪到海外，以便保护他们的财产。在香港的独立中国分析员安德鲁·科利尔（Andrew Collier）说：“把钱放在中国通常有两点担心。第一，中国经济放缓；第二，中国领导层试图清理腐败，有些人担心钱放在中国不安全，因此要把资金挪到海外。”香港成为中国封堵资金外流的焦点。上月，中国反贪官员表示，外流的资金大多途经香港，并表示要阻止这一势头，尽管这可能很难做到。// Source: BBC, 06 April 2016.

2. New Political Party that advocates independence from China

The Hong Kong National Party is recently created and overtly advocates for the independence of Hong Kong. According to the convener of the Party Chan Ho-Tin (陳浩天), the party’s fundamental action plans include: 1) to establish an independent and free Republic of Hong Kong, 2) to defend the interests of Hongkongers and place their interests as the fundamental, 3) to consolidate the national consciousness of Hongkonger, and clearly establish the definition of Hong Kong citizens, 4) to support and engage in all sorts of effective resistance campaigns, 5) to abolish the Basic Law which was never authorized by the Hongkongers, and to re-draft the constitution by the Hongkongers, and 6) to support political forces which support the independence of Hong Kong by establishing Hong Kong-centered associations and political pressure groups in the economic, cultural, and educational arenas in order to lay the power foundation for Hong Kong’s autonomy. The Party plans to field candidates in the Legislative Council Election in September.

• //根據「香港民族黨」描述，建黨目標為「民族自強，香港獨立」，六大綱領則是：1）建立獨立和自由的香港共和國 2）捍衛港人利益，以香港人利益為本位 3）鞏固香港民族意識，確立香港公民的定義 4）支持並參與一切有效抗爭 5）廢除未經港人授權的基本法，香港憲法必須由港人制訂 6）建立支持香港獨立的勢力，在經濟、文化、教育各方面成立以香港為本位的組織和政治壓力團體，奠定自主的勢力基礎。至於「香港民族黨」最終目標，是「建立獨立自主的香港共和國，脫離中國殖民暴政，令港人重回正常生活。「香港民族黨」指出，雨傘革命後新思潮冒起，加上今年2月立法會新界東補選中，主打本土的本土民主前線梁天琦獲逾6萬票，可見人心思變，香港本位已成潮流。該黨續說，將參與各種有效抗爭，不論地點，與港人一同「反抗暴政」。// Source: MingPao Daily, 28 March 2016.

• //陳浩天說，香港獨立是「必然會發生」的歷史進程，並表示香港民族黨會使用包括議會抗爭、街頭抗爭在內的任何有效抗爭手段，抗爭底線是「保衛香港人利益」。雖然不會主動傷害他人，但若受到威脅會用「對等武力」阻止。他還表示，香港民族黨正考慮參與9月的立法會選舉，願與支持港獨的本土派組織合作。青年新政召集人梁頌恆也出席了3月28日的香港民族黨建黨記者會。[…]目前香港民族黨仍未完成登記註冊。陳浩天表示，此前曾以「香港民族黨」和「Hong Kong National Party」的名義向公司註冊處登記，但對方因「政治原因」拒絕，陳浩天稱會繼續想辦法註冊。召集人陳浩天畢業於香港理工大學，去年曾擔任理工大學退出學聯關注組召集人。他自稱目前已辭去工程公司的工作，全力處理黨務。// Source: The Initium, 29 March 2016.

3. Suspension of the operation of Scholarism and the establishment of new political party Demosisto

The Scholarism, which was established to oppose the implementation of national education in Hong Kong in 2011, was announced to suspend its operations. Core members revealed that they considered establishing two new organizations, one as a political party to run election and another as a student-based association which focuses on educational issue just as Scholarism was first established. Joshua Wong accused HSBC of political censorship as his application for a current account together with another core member of the new party Agnes Chow was rejected twice by the bank. On 10 April 2016, a new political party with ex-core member of the Scholarism was announced to be established with the name Demosisto (香港眾志).

• //於2011年成立、日前傳出解散消息的學生組織學民思潮，昨日正式宣布停止運作，為5年歷史劃上句號。學民日後將「一拆為二」，召集人黃之鋒和發言人黃子悅將分別籌組新參政團體和新學生組織，並分別擔任「重要角色」。黃之鋒表示，新政團將考慮派人出選立法會選舉，未來會着重政制改革議題，但否認學民出現分歧。黃子悅則承認，學民過去一年「高度政治化」，希望新學生組織能在未來專注教育議題，「拋低過往包袱」。[…] 黃之鋒在記者會上解釋，學民現時不是「解散」，因學民的145萬元銀行結餘，將分配予未來的新學生組織及新成立的「學民思潮法律援助基金」（見圖），但新學生組織在暑假後才能成立，而基金將會支援學民成員應付因過往行動所涉的官司，故學民只是「停止運作」。黃之鋒稱，新政團將於4月中推出宣言和政策綱領。被問及為何成立新政團的同時，不保留學民思潮，黃之鋒指學民現時高度政治化，令公眾有既定印象，對學民推廣中學生公民教育工作，造成一定限制。[…] 學民公布把145萬元款項分別撥予新學生組織（70萬）及基金（75萬），但成員承認曾討論把資金撥予黃之鋒搞的政黨，最終無採納這方案。對於學民被外界質疑將部分銀行餘款撥予新學生組織，黃子悅表示，新學生組織繼承學民的學生運動理念，認為當時市民捐款予學民，是因為認同學生運動理念，故相信學民撥款予新學生組織是恰當做法。// Source: MingPao Daily, 21 March 2016.

• //Oscar Lai Man-lok, a core member of the group, told the Post that he was considering running in the Kowloon East constituency to bring changes to the city’s youth policy and raise awareness about Hong Kong’s future after 2047 – the year when Beijing’s promises under the “one country, two systems” principle are due to expire. […] [S]cholarism, which made its name in 2012 when it led a campaign that forced the government to shelve its national education curriculum, has stayed away from elections. However, Scholarism leader Joshua Wong Chi-fung wrote on his Facebook page that they had been meeting “umbrella soldier” organisations on their plan to create a new party. Wong will not stand for election as he is 19 – two years younger than the age at which people can contest polls. Lai added that Wong and another core member of Scholarism, Agnes Chow Ting, were among about 20 people actively discussing the formation of a party and they would finalise their plan in April. He suggested that the new party could be formed by core members of Scholarism and several other young activist groups, but it had yet to be decided whether Scholarism would stay as a separate entity or merge into the new party.// Source: SCMP, 17 Feburary2016.

• //Student activist Joshua Wong Chi-fung has accused HSBC of exercising “political censorship” in rejecting his request to open a joint savings account to handle the business of his political party, which will soon be set up. Wong, formerly with the now-suspended Scholarism, also claimed the bank had rejected a bid to open a current account.//Source: SCMP, 05 April 2016.

• //Demosisto, a new party launched on Sunday by student activists who co-led the Occupy sit-ins in 2014, has pledged to advocate self-determination for Hong Kong and plans to field two lists of candidates in the upcoming Legislative Council polls.The new political party, chaired by former Hong Kong Federation of Students leader Nathan Law Kwun-chung, said social movements should not be divided by ethnicity and that it would be insensible to ignore the China factor – in contrast to the stance of other emerging localist groups seeking independence. “We don’t see ourselves as localists,” Law told a press conference on Sunday night, adding he did not see independence as a feasible way out in the short term. “There might be some discrepancies between our camp and theirs.” Law might run in Hong Kong Island alongside film director and party colleague Shu Kei, while Oscar Lai Man-lok, ex-spokesperson of the now-suspended Scholarism group, is eyeing a seat in Kowloon East. In its manifesto, the party stated it would hold a referendum in 10 years to let Hongkongers decide their own fate beyond 2047, when the principle of “one country, two systems” expires, and would adopt non-violent protest tactics. Joshua Wong Chi-fung, former convenor of Scholarism who is now the new group’s secretary, stopped short of backing independence, but stressed it should be one of the options listed in the plebiscite. The university student also said Demosisto would spend considerable time in lobbying international organisations on what he called the city’s right to self-determination.// Source: SCMP, 10 April 2016.

• //After disbanding Scholarism, the leader of the student group, Joshua Wong is set to launch his new political party – Demosisto – on Sunday. Wong is to unveil Demosisto – derived from Greek (“demo” for “people”) and Latin (“sisto” for “to stand”), meaning “stand for democracy”// Source: SCMP, 06 April 2016.

 4. Update on the case of Lee Bo

Lee Po returned to Hong Kong and announced that he would no longer publish “banned books” and would like to put his past behind. Political commentators believe that he spoke under pressure.

• // “I want to forget the past and start afresh. I am starting another page in my life.” He said he was allowed to travel freely between Hong Kong and the mainland, and was crossing the border again for tomb sweeping with his wife, Sophie Choi Ka-ping, in the next few days. “I did not dare to go to the mainland for a while previously. I heard that people had got into trouble for their [banned books] business. I was afraid. But after I went and solved all the problems this time, I can finally feel at ease now,” he said.// Source: SCMP, 25 March 2016.
• // Causeway Bay bookseller Lee Po said he’s feeling relieved for the first time in his life in a gushing Facebook post reportedly detailing his latest trip to the mainland. Sing Tao Daily, owned by Beijing loyalist Charles Ho Tsu-kwok, reported on Saturday night that Lee took to social media after going to Xiamen (廈門), where he visited the graves of his ancestors ahead of the Ching Ming festival.// Source: SCMP, 04 April 2016.
• //Causeway Bay bookseller Lee Po is walking away from the “banned book” business that he has devoted himself to for a decade. But as he made that declaration outside his North Point home on Friday – before jumping into a vehicle with cross-border plates back to the mainland accompanied by an unidentified man. […] “Lee Po deserves our pity because he is not truly free. Those words he said were for those up there [on the mainland], not for us,” said veteran China-watcher Ching Cheong, a former China correspondent for The Straits Times who was jailed on the mainland for three years on espionage charges he denied committing. “The ‘one country, two systems’ principle is under serious threat. Hong Kong people’s concerns are legitimate and it is not only about Lee’s personal safety,” Ching said. […] Veteran China-watcher Johnny Lau Yui-siu, a friend of Lee, questioned why the Hong Kong government allowed Lee to leave the city on Friday when the Immigration Department suspected he had committed immigration offences by not leaving the city through proper channels last December. He also accused the Hong Kong government of “acting totally according to the script put together by the mainland authorities” in the case of the five booksellers. “Such a joint effort could bring about the early demise of the ‘one country, two systems’ principle,” he warned. He believed that the mainland authorities had targeted the five booksellers not because of the banned books business per se, but because of a few Mighty Current titles. Lau said he knew some unidentified mainlanders had bought the copyrights of at least three books the booksellers planned to publish in a bid to stop the works entering the market. But the booksellers went ahead and published the books with new covers, Lau said, adding that this might have enraged the mysterious buyers. // Source: SCMP, 25 March 2016.

TAIWAN – POLITICS

Kuomintang has its first female leader elected after electoral defeat in January

• //Members of Taiwan’s beleaguered Kuomintang have redeemed former deputy legislature speaker Hung Hsiu-chu by electing her the first female leader of the century-old party during a by-election on Sunday. […] The mainland-friendly Hung, 67, captured 78,829 votes, or more than 56 per cent of votes cast, beating acting chairwoman Huang Min-hui by 23 percentage points and two other competitors to win the top post in the fiercely fought four-way election. In October, in the middle of running for president, she was abruptly stripped of her nomination by the KMT so that former chairman Eric Chu could run for president in January. But the late showing Chu failed to stop his opponent Tsai Ing-wen and her DPP colleagues winning crushing victories in presidential and parliament polls. Chu later resigned as chairman to take responsibility for the electoral rout, which for the first time saw the KMT lose its parliamentary majority. […] Analysts said there is no time for Hung to celebrate as she must immediately deal with a spate of thorny issues, including the KMT’s multibillion dollar party assets that are constantly under criticised by the public, frequent infighting among local factions, debates over whether the party should define itself as the Taiwanese KMT instead of KMT dating back to its time on the mainland in the first half of last century.// Source: SCMP, 27 March 2016.

Political commentator from the Initium Qiao Xiaqing (喬俠青) pinpointed the reasons for the victory of Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱). For one thing, Hung represents the ‘deep blue’ faction within the KMT and gain support from the faction of Huang fuxing (黃復興) composed of retired soldiers with origins outside Taiwan. This faction is famed for their high level of unity, high level of mobilization capacity, and turnout rate in party election as a group. As such, their support for Hung plays a key role for Hung’s victory. Second, while the KMT members in the party’s leadership wanted to prevent Hung from being elected, they are outnumbered by the ‘grassroots’ members who show sympathy to Hung who has been replaced by the former KMT party leader Eric Chu as presidential candidate last year. Third, the members in the leadership avoid engaging in the election because they do not see a chance of winning it. Forth, another contestant against Huang Min Hui (黃敏惠), resorted to ineffective campaigns which failed to attract support within the KMT. He further points out that the victory by Hung may poses a challenge to KMT in its long-waited reform to suit the new political environment in Taiwan and the Hung’s victory also reveals the increasingly clear gap between the few political heavyweights in the party leadership and the grassroots members in massive number.

• //這場主席選舉像是1月總統大選的「同場加映」，代表國民黨參選的朱立倫因敗選辭去主席職務，因而有了這場補選。這場補選投票日在當時「黨高層」的操作下，刻意從2月底往後延了一個月，希望爭取時間築起一道「防洪堤」，但這股「洪潮」洶湧澎湃，夾雜着「還洪秀柱一個公道」的強大訴求，競選時程過半時「黨高層」就心裏有數，誰都檔不住洪秀柱了。[…] 洪首先表態參選，黨內議論紛紛亂成一團，十多位中常委公開跑去求見副總統吳敦義，希望吳跳出來參選。說穿了，黨內都很害怕，也很憂慮，萬一洪秀柱真的當上黨主席，「沒有人知道，國民黨會變成怎樣！」結果，吳敦義琢磨了半天，最後決定不選；藍營人士坦言，原因很簡單，「就是選不贏！」私下做了幾個民調，結果都是吳大幅落後洪，其他理由都是假的。[…] 台中某派系大老四處運作，打算力推新世代立委參選黨主席，結果因為「水煮不開」作罷，最後找上黃敏惠，算是最後關頭沒有選擇的選擇。藍營人士透露，黃敏惠出來「防洪」，背後不只是地方大老的力推，還有府、政、黨高層的共同默契。只是，黃真的太過於謹慎保守，根本不善於宣傳和媒體互動。 […] 黨政高層刻意運作，把補選從2月底延到3月下旬，目的就是以時間換取空間，眼看勢已難為，黃敏惠讓黨政高層很早就放棄了。這場主席選舉，洪秀柱拿下56%的選票，「黨高層」屬意的黃敏惠只有33%。為什麼洪秀柱在投票中聲勢強大、無人能擋？前頭提到的「黃復興黨部」是首要因素：這群具投票權，又能配合動員出來投票的黨員，極高比例都屬於「具有強烈意識形態的深藍黨員」，32萬多有資格投票的黨員中，軍系的黃復興黨部就有9萬多，將近三分之一。黨務人士分析，過去黨主席投票，黃復興黨部的投票率將近是其他黨員的兩倍，在實際的有效票中，比例逼近驚人的半數。但也不只是「黃復興」的大力相挺，而是去年遭遇「換柱」，黨政高層聯手「做掉她」，黃復興黨部以外的基層黨員，普遍都認為必須還給她一個「公道」。[…]「洪秀柱路線」令黨內相當一部分人憂慮的關鍵在於：敗選後的國民黨，未來何去何從？面臨的其實是活生生的「路線問題」。經濟政策上，國民黨應該要「向右走」？還是「向左走」？2014、16兩次大選突顯了台灣經濟資源「分配面」出了嚴重問題，青年世代要求以政策工具拉近貧富差距，但國民黨向來的政策路線和支持者的意識形態結構就是「重生產而輕分配」，洪秀柱要不要改正？如何矯正？更大的問題，其實是洪秀柱的老問題：兩岸關係。在當選記者會上，洪秀柱宣示了「國共平台」、「國共論壇」等機制照舊。但更令相當一部分黨內人士擔憂的，是洪秀柱自己的意識形態及政策幕僚，例如張亞中、謝大寧、王曉波等學者，他們對兩岸關係的主張，在任何機構、任何時間做的民調，都只有5%的認同度。[…]洪秀柱這次參選黨主席過程中，眾多的黨政高層、僅剩下35席的現任立委，沒有一個人站在她的身邊。以孤軍奮戰來形容顯得有些弔詭，因為國民黨有投票權的32萬多黨員同志，多數都站在「柱柱姊」這一邊，說孤獨好像對，不孤獨也對；這場補選，剛好切開了國民黨「上層結構」與「下層結構」之間，意志思維迥異、相互拉扯消耗的矛盾與荒謬圖像。// Source: The Initium, 28 March 2016.