CHINA – POLITICS

Commemorating June Fourth

Activities around China:

1. Beijing: hundreds rounded up to prevent them from marking anniversary.
2. Guizhou “Human Rights Window” successfully held two days of commemoration on May 27 and 28: Organizer: A surprise that no one stopped them, perhaps due to struggles within the higher leadership. However, Ming Pao reported on June 1 that some were taken away by police and held afterwards.
3. Shandong Jinan: Held activity in late May; university students made to talk to “tutors”.
4. Fujian Nanping: Held two-hour demonstration on May 30; voiced support for Wen Jiabao’s reform. Also rounded up by local police: “支持溫總理政治改革和平反六四是違法犯罪行為”

Overseas:

1. Chai Ling on Huffington Post: “I forgive Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng. I forgive the soldiers who stormed Tiananmen Square in 1989. I forgive the current leadership of China, who continue to suppress freedom and enforce the brutal One Child Policy.” “Forgiveness does not justify wrong, but rather yields the power of judgment to God.”
2. Wang Dan’s urgent statement (緊急聲明) on Facebook: “對柴玲的個人信仰導致的這個意見，我表示尊重，但是完全不能同意。我認為，在殺人者還沒有任何懺悔，道歉，甚至還在繼續殺人的時候，被害方的原諒是沒有根據的。這樣的原諒，對六四死難者是很大的不公平。我希望外界知道，柴玲的這番談話只代表她自己以及她的信仰，並不能代表廣大的八九同學。”
3. Other responses to Chai see ISun Affairs
4. US State Department
5. Human Rights Watch

Hong Kong:

5. Hong Kong vigil: Record turnout (Organizers: 180,000; police: 85,000), record amount of donation: HKD2.32 million. Younger post-1989 generation as an emerging political voice.
6. Ming Pao commentary:
   1. 今年六四前夕，已知內地一些地方，例如山東濟南、貴州貴陽、福建福州等，都有民間人士公開舉行悼念六四的活動。往年，當局對這類活動大力打壓，今年未見即場採取行動，有人認為，這是反映中央對處理六四出現了鬆動。最近幾個月，不時傳出總理溫家寶提出平反六四但未獲接納的消息，英國《金融時報》3月間引述中共高層消息稱，溫家寶曾經3次建議中央平反六四事件。
   2. 六四事件的一些傳聞和表面寬鬆舻象，雖然不能推論平反在望，但是內地原本對六四的鐵板一塊，是有些微變化了。 中共掌握全國資源，應該有能力處理好六四傷痛，推動與人民和解，毋須一步到位，可以先從人道主義覑手，撫平六四死難者家屬的傷痛，協助有需要者解決生活問 題，准許去國異見人士返國等，只要開展了這些工作，人民感受到當局願意解決六四糾結，氣氛將頓然改觀，和諧局面於焉浮現；至於事件真相、追究責任問題，可 以在更適當時候處理。

Li Wangyang

Found dead in the morning of June 6 in Daxiang Hospital, Shaoyang, Hunan province. Body found hanging from window frame by brother in law Zhao Baozhu at 6.50am; police claimed Li has committed suicide by hanging himself.

1. Suspicions:
   1. No motivation to commit suicide: Close friend Zhu Chengzhi spoke with Li on June 4, “Wangyang is a tough man. Even with unbearable pains, he would never choose suicide to end his life.”
   2. On the night before the “suicide” the patient next to Li was moved out of the room to sleep in the corridor.
   3. Insufficient evidence:
      1. “The bandage loop is loose, and Mr. Li’s face shows no signs of distortion. His feet touch the floor with his slippers still on. All in all, he shows no traces of struggle often seen in death by hanging.”
      2. Blind and deaf, Li needed help just to walk.
   4. He was watched 24 hours: how could he have committed suicide under surveillance?
   5. Police prevented people from taking pictures and took the body away. The body was later incinerated “according to the family’s requests”, according to local authorities.
2. 25,000-strong demonstration on June 10 in Hong Kong to Central Liaison Office. Police number: 5,400.
3. Latest situation: Li’s body sent to autopsy; Li’s sister and her husband Zhao are missing; supporters placed under surveillance.

Chen Xitong

Conversations with Chen Xitong 《陳希同親述》, by Yao Jianfu, published by New Century Media, released in Hong Kong on May 25. Book contains eight interviews Yao conducted with Chen.

1. Tiananmen tragedy
   1. “A regrettable tragedy that could have been avoided”; “Nobody should have died if it was handled properly” (一场应该不死人，可以不死人的事件)
   2. The tragedy “stemmed from the internal power struggle at the top level”
   3. His role in Tiananmen:

2. His corruption charges: “I was never handcuffed and never signed any confession letter”, unlike Chen Liangyu.
   1. The conviction was “the biggest injustice since the Cultural Revolution”
   2. Accusation of using public money to build luxury villas: just two guesthouses
   3. Charge of transferring gifts from foreign dignitaries to Beijing People’s Art Theatre: An instruction by Jiang after he found out BPAT was short of funding. “Everything was properly recorded and comes with receipts.”
3. On top leaders:
   1. Praised both Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang
   2. Jiang Zemin: “I did not participate in power struggles; I never treated Jiang as an political enemy”; Jiang as “power crazy”
   3. Li Ximing, Beijing’s party secretary in 1989: “hardline conservative”. Li did not pass on crucial information about top leaders’ decisions on June 4. Jiang picked Li as scapegoat for lack of reform and sidelined him.
4. Extending sympathy to Bo: “Bo Xilai’s fate is so similar to mine and that of Chen Liangyu. The party secretaries of Beijing, Shanghai and Chongqing all suffered the same disgrace.”

Chongqing updates

Investigations

1. Reuters (5/25): According to three sources, Hu declared Bo Xilai scandal as an “isolated case”. According to one source, “it’s been settled that this will be dealt with as a criminal case, not a political case.” Hu has backing from Jiang Zemin. A successful transition is now overriding concern: Party has already launched informal ballots to assess who will be promoted into the Central Committee.
   1. Wen Jiabao’s comments linking the Chongqing scandal and the Cultural Revolution chided by some other officials at recent party meetings.
   2. Party dissatisfaction with Wen shown in Tianjin election?
2. Reuters citing two sources: Gu Kai Lai has hired Shen Zhigeng (沈志耕), a partner in Beijing Zong Heng Law Firm. Shen has acted as lawyer for senior officials accused of bribe-taking and economic crimes, including former vice minister for public security Li Jizhou.
3. Boxun: Four-person committee (小组) formed to investigate Bo Xilai and Wang Lijun, including Central Discipline Committee secretary He Guoqiang, head of Ministry of Supervision (监察部) and head of National Bureau of Corruption Prevention (国家预防腐败局) Ma Wen (马馼), Central Organization Department head Li Yuanchao, and Public Security Bureau head Meng Jianzhu. Stage two of investigation will involve relevant persons such as former Dalian party secretary Xia Deren (夏德仁) and former Dalian vice mayor Dai Yulin (戴玉林).

Other movements

1. New “victim” of Bo’s downfall: Luo Lin (駱琳), former director of the State Administration of Work Safety, was stripped of his post by the Organization Department a day before polls for delegates for the 18^th Congress and was subsequently left off the list.
   1. Possible link to Bo: Covering for Bo Xilai in the 2009 landslide in Wulong, a county of Chongqing, caused by the operation of over 100 illegal mines in Jiwei Mountain. Luo allegedly defined the incident as a natural disaster to please Bo.
2. Senior police official, who was thought to have helped Wang Lijun in his escape to the US embassy, had resigned according to Chongqing sources cited by SCMP. Wang Pengfei tendered resignation as Yubei district Public Security Bureau. He reported provided Wang Lijun with vehicle which the latter drove from Chongqing to Chengdu.
   1. Chongqing deputy police chief Guo Weiguo, detained in early April, also reported to be standing trial soon in Guizhou province.

Boxun: Zhang Ziyi scandal; Zhang considering legal action against Apple Daily.

Bo’s ties with the military

Open Magazine report on close ties between Bo and “red progeny” or “red successors” (紅二代), many of whom now have significant power within the army (少壯派將領).

1. Family ties between Bo Xilai and Liu Yuan (劉源), son of Liu Shaoqi. Bo Yibo and Liu Shaoqi shared close ties. According to sources cited by Open Magazine, the younger Bo and Liu, along with other red descendants, were plotting to bring Xi Jinping down by grooming the rise of Bo Xilai
2. What brings Bo and other red successors together: “jiangshan mentality” (江山意識)
   1. 他們認爲共産黨的江山是他們的父兄打下來的，只有他們才是繼承江山的真命天子，即文革時一度盛行的「老子革命兒接班」的血統論。
   2. 錢理群《對老紅衛兵當政的擔憂》： 「老子拿下了政權，兒子就要接過來，這叫一代一代往下傳」，「幹部子弟要掌權，天下是我們的」，「二十年後的世界是我們幹部子弟的」

• 北京學者：雖然中國和世界在文革後已發生天翻地覆的變化，中共紅二代許多成員穿西裝，飲紅酒，安排子女到哈佛讀書，但思想非常僵化，他們的思維方式和語言表達還停留在過去，和他們一些人談話，可以說簡直無法溝通。

1. 薄的垮台是件大好事，中斷了一批法西斯主義傾向的紅二代的權力夢。因爲這批人一旦上台，中國將倒退回毛式極權社會。

Another potential twist in China-US relations:

1. China detained a security official early this year suspected of spying for the US government.
2. Reporting:
   25. First reported by Chinese-language news organizations outside mainland China that “sometimes dispense rumor as fact”: New York-based World Journal report on 5/27; New Way monthly report on 5/25.
   26. Reuters, BBC, WSJ report on 6/1; NYT/IHT report on 6/4
3. Reuters: The official was “an aide to a vice minister in China’s security ministry”. The aide was recruited by the CIA and provided “political, economic and strategic intelligence”. The aide “had been paid hundreds of thousands of U.S. dollars and spoke English”.
   1. The case was kept quiet for several months as China and US “strive to prevent a fresh crisis relations”.
   2. The case “could represent China’s worst known breach of state intelligence in two decades”, and “ranks as the most serious Sino-U.S. spying incident to be made public since 1985 when Yu Qiangsheng, an intelligence official, defected to the United States”.
4. BBC, citing New Way: The official “fell into a pretty woman trap” set up by the CIA. The two were photographed in secret liaisons and he was blackmailed, and agreed to supply secret information to the US.
5. IHT, citing senior Obama administration official: The detention came during the same period as investigations into Bo Xilai began. Unclear whether the espionage was related.

Foreign relations

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan

New York Times: Putin’s participation in the SCO “stood in stark contrast to his decision not to attend a summit meeting hosted by President Obama last month in the United States.” “The talks between Mr. Putin and Mr. Hu, along with the two-day Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit meeting, are fraught with the symbolism of two major powers interested in further developing a multilateral organization that does not include the United States, and where Iran plays a role, if only as observer.”

Ahmadinejad speaking at Peking University: “A wolf can tear apart over 1,000 other animals in its lifetime. But in our world today we have a capitalist controlling power that in order to fill its pockets can launch a global war.”

1. Greater role in Afghanistan
   1. Hu Jintao: “We will continue to manage regional affairs by ourselves, guarding against shocks from turbulence outside the region, and will play a bigger role in Afghanistan’s peaceful reconstruction.”
2. Military cooperation
   1. Putin: “Recently joint navy exercises were held in the Yellow Sea, and they were the first of such exercises. We have agreed with President Hu Jintao that we will continue such cooperation”
   2. Following US announcement last week that the US plans to reposition its fleet so that 60% of battleships will be in Asia Pacific by 2020, up from the current 50%.
   3. Also, reduce military presence on Sino-Russian borders in a move to bolster bilateral trust.
3. Launching of Russia-China Investment Fund: China’s sovereign wealth fund, China Investment Corp. (CIC), partnering with Russian Direct investment Fund to set up joint fund to channel Chinese investment into projects in Russia. China now fifth-largest investor in Russia.
4. Problem of gas unresolved: Russia wanting to sell at $350-400 per 1,000 cubic meters, while China willing to pay only $200-250. In response to stalemate China has increased its supplies from Turkmenistan, “a sign of how Beijing’s economic strength allows it to play the market”. Putin, on Russia’s part, visited Germany and France first before going to China, with Europe being Russia’s biggest energy customer.

CHINA – URBANISM

Recently released report by Landesa, a US-based non-profit organization on securing property rights: Interview 1791 farmers in 17 provinces. Farmers get USD18,000 per acre as compensation, less than 10% of the median land sales price of USD190,000 per acre. Of displaced farmers only 18% moved into established urban settings, 14% covered by urban social security system, 9% have access to urban medical benefits.

Minor property housing (小产权房)(xiaochanquanfang, hereafter XCQF)

1. Different land ownership for urban and rural land in China
2. XCQF refers to illegal residential dwelling constructed on rural, collective-owned land that is sold or rented to non-local urbanites.
3. SUPPLY SIDE:
   1. Usually jointly developed by villagers’ committees or township governments and land developers to capture profit from increase in land value
   2. Higher profit shares to peasants, hence encourage them to collude with nearby city dwellers under leadership of officials.
4. DEMAND SIDE: Attractive to buyers due to affordable price:
   1. China Daily, 2007: “In Beijing’s heated real estate market, 300,000 yuan can buy no more than a 20-square-meter apartment within the second ring road. And, with a bit luck, you might be able to buy a 40-square-meter place inside the fifth ring with the same amount of money. However, you can afford a 100-square meter home in some residential complexes near the fifth ring but with a vague property right.” “Among the 400 residential developments currently on sale in the Beijing market, 18 percent are “minor-property right” projects of this kind.”
   2. Most XCQF 50-80% cheaper than commercial apartments even in same suburban locations.
   3. Problems with affordable housing projects launched by central government: the neediest people cannot afford government-subsidized housing.
5. Why cheaper? XCQF developers do not have to pay land transfer fees (出让金) to higher governments to transform rural collective land to state-owned land, as according to legal procedures. They also pay fewer taxes and fees since profit-making is not officially reported to higher-level governments.
6. “Positive-sum coalition game”, unlike “near zero-sum game of other exploitative land developments”:
   1. “It brings a rare opportunity for grassroots officials, entrepreneurs, and ordinary citizens to find a manner of co-existence.”
   2. Interests of lower-level governments and non-elites converge, hence jointly defy higher-level governments’ land policies.
   3. Non-elites becoming increasing able to distinguish between different layers of government and have become selective:
      “On the one hand, in a large number of cases, the masses surely take advantage of the central government’s rightful laws and paternalistic intentions to challenge and negotiate with local governments.
      “On the other hand, in a minor but increasing number of cases such as XCQFs, the masses surely side with some local governments to defy, if not challenge, the central government’s intention as well as take advantage of its limited governing capacity.”
   4. “Unrightful resistance” (vs. O’Brien and Li’s “rightful resistance)

Central government’s response

1. XCQF’s ambiguous legal status:
   1. Land Management Law: collectively-owned land cannot be sold, transferred, or leased for nonagricultural construction purposes
   2. Urban and Rural Planning Law: developers must obtain Country Construction Planning Certificates, but this is not granted in the case of XCQF
   3. 2007 State Council notice (“Notice 71”): urban citizens not entitled to purchase land or houses in countryside. Use of collectively-owned land for real estate development prohibited.
   4. 2008 Ministry of Land and Resources notice (“Notice 146”): urban citizens who purchase XCQF cannot obtain land use rights; no certificate issuance.
2. “Property Ownership Certificate” (房产证) not granted, but township governments and village committees issues so-called “Township Property Ownership Certificates” (乡产权证), “Village Property Ownership Certificates” (村产权证), or “Villager’s Jointly-Built Housing Documents” (村民联合建房协议) as a substitute: against Constitution and related laws.
3. The state’s dilemma: Three reasons to ban XCQFs
   1. Significant loss of farmland
   2. “Illegal and arbitrary land development” (土地乱用) against planning
   3. Challenges “only major socialist legacy” in capitalist economy, hence challenges central government’s “absolute control over the land development regime”
4. But XCQF provides cheap housing for vast populations, especially migrant workers, and fills in gap created by overheated real estate market. Large-scale demolition will only engender new housing problems and create social tension.
5. Two main reactions from central government:
   1. Campaign-style crackdown; highly-publicized XCQF demolition
   2. Urging local governments to build alternative housing such as Economic Housing (经济适用房), Limited-Price/Size Housing (两限房), Low-Rent Housing (廉租房)
6. Proposals: real estate tax

Shenzhen: 深圳市土地管理制度改革综合试点

1. XCQF: In Shenzhen, XCQF accounts for 56% of all housing units and accommodates about half of the city’s population. 截至2011年年底，深圳小产权房违法建筑达到94万栋，建筑面积达4.05亿平方米，是深圳市总建筑面积的49.27%。
2. Land rights confirmation (确权)

The benefits of being a city: Henan province, Poyang county, Xixinzhuang “city” (河南濮阳县西辛庄)

1. 5/8: Village party secretary Li Liancheng announced establishment of the nation’s first “village-level city” (村级市): plaque “濮阳县庆祖镇西辛庄市(筹)”. Li’s goal: build a “little Hong Kong” in ten years.
2. Highly controversial:
   1. Civil affairs bureau: “严重违背了相关政策规定，提法不规范，没有法律依据”, “私自称市”
   2. Villagers: “全村720口，没听说谁不拥护的，农民是实在不想当了。我们想把村变成城市。挂了牌，就觉得有奔头了，俺要撵上城市。” “当市民感觉多好。名一变，对自己标准就变了，就觉着要提高素质了。”
   3. Li Liancheng： 三大好处：一是圆了农民的“城市梦”，让农民腰板硬起来；二是“市”有集聚效应，周围15个村组合，能整合出2000亩发展空间；三是发展“西辛庄市”，可以减少周边城市的压力，附近农民可以在这就业、生活，“当市民”。 “我要挂到底，永远是这个牌子。自己的名，村民同意、村民满意，就可以叫！濮阳县还有个村叫刘市呢！挂牌子全村都高兴，山西、山东、四川农民都打电话来祝贺。我敢说9亿农民，8亿都想当市民！”
3. Henan Academy of Social Sciences deputy head Yu Xinan: Li has put forth a challenging proposition (挑战性命题): 农民发出了改变自己身份标签的意愿
4. HNASS deputy head Liu Daoxing: No harm done: 西辛庄建村级市，实际上概括成一句话就是用城市的办法来解决农村问题
5. CASS professor Yu Jianrong: 瞎胡闹

CHINA – EDUCATION

National university entrance examination (gaokao)

1. Number of high school students signing up for gaokao has declined since 2008; 9 million this year. Some universities may be forced to close following their “reckless expansion” since the late 1990s.
2. Reasons for decline:
   1. Number of mainlanders aged 18-22 will fall by 40 million over next decade.
   2. Disenchantment with China’s universities: poor job prospect
   3. More heading abroad: number has risen by more than 20% since 2007, expected to hit 430,000 this year.
3. Southern Metropolis News: Exam questions often divorced from reality. The best topic this year is set by Guangdong: “你想生活的时代”

Alternative? Liberal arts education in Shanghai: first liberal arts college set up by Harvard educated investor Chen Weiming with an annual tuition of 100,000 yuan. Xing Wei College has an American-inspired curriculum taught in English by faculty members recruited from the US.

Education and real estate: Century Weekly report

HONG KONG – POLITICS

Chief executive scandal

CE Office spending on Tsang’s duty visit for 2011-12 financial year was HK$4.5 million, up from 1.7 million the previous year. Most controversial: Tsang’s stay in Brasilia, where he spent HK$53,280 for his one-night stay in the presidential suite of the Royal Tulip Brasilia Alvorada hotel (civil servants’ daily overseas subsistence allowance in Brasilia is HK$2,300).

1. Independent committee set up by Tsang in March 2012 released report, describing the present system as “totally inappropriate” and “has a fundamental defect that it exempts the chief executive from the strict regime applied to politically appointed officials and civil servants.” Tsang said he had followed “an internal rule” in accepting advantages; but the committee pointed to the absence of documentation.
   1. Proposed new rules: Making it a criminal offence for CE to solicit or accept any advantage without permission of statutory independent committee, etc.
2. Audit Commission report on Tsang’s extravagant hotel expenses overseas:
   1. CE did not participate in decisions over where he stayed; all decisions made by personal secretary.
   2. Criticized extravagance of Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices overseas.
3. Separately, CE Office director Gabriel Leung said he is willing to take personal responsibility for the hotel expenses scandal.
4. On June 3 honorary president of Federation of Trade Unions Chan Yuen-han called on Tsnag to step down. SCMP: “Beijing loyalist turns on Tsang”. Possibly an attempt to secure voter support for the Legco elections.

Oriental Daily editorial:

“曾蔭權濫權謀私，證據如山，謝罪下台是最起碼的道德要求，無論他的任期是剩下一個月還是一天，甚至一小時。

“由於廉政公署、審計署以及有關調查委員會均已介入曾蔭權貪腐公案，整個社會形成了必須嚴懲官商勾結集團的強大民意壓力，中央政府亦將展開「秋天行動」，一場反貪大風暴蓄勢待發。”

Related to this: Macau scandal: involving former Macau minister Ao Man-long and two Hong Kong property tycoons, Chinese Estates Lau Luen-hung and Lo Kit-sing.

5. Y. Leung announced wage freeze for incoming cabinet ministers. Pan-democratic legislators criticized the freeze and called for a pay cut instead. Pay for lower and middle-ranking civil servants will rise by 5.8%.